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ABSTRACT
Free will skepticism denies that humans possess the type of freedom required for moral
responsibility (FMR). While not the most popular position in scientific, philosophical, or
mainstream communities, I contend that this lack of acceptance is due not to flaws inherent in
the position, but to misconceptions concerning its ethical and practical implications. In my
dissertation, I endorse free will skepticism, beginning with a refutation of contrary positions,
followed by a response to objections, and ending with a defense of social reforms necessitated by
the denial of free will. Ultimately, I support Derk Pereboom’s optimism that a global acceptance
of free will skepticism would result in societies that are more moral, beneficial, and just than
those which perpetuate the illusion of free will.
Because of flaws in the alternative positions, I argue that free will skepticism is the most
feasible view to hold regarding free will. Libertarianism, which denies causal determinism and
purports that humans possess FMR, is not compatible with our current scientific understanding
of the universe. On the other hand, while compatibilism accepts causal determinism, it retains
free will only by relaxing the requirements for it. I explain why accepting a position contrary to
science, or accepting weakened definitions of freedom, is both untenable and unnecessary.
Some object to free will skepticism not because they found something inherently wrong
with the logic of the position but because of practical concerns. Their arguments against free will
skepticism assert that if such a view is accepted, society will unravel, interpersonal relationships
will become compromised, personal identity will be undermined, and life would lose all
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meaning. However, largely inspired by Derk Pereboom’s book “Living without Free Will,” I will
show why such misgivings are unfounded. Pereboom offers good reasons to believe that not only
would society, relationships, identity, and meaning remain intact, but also that society would
enjoy practical advantages by accepting free will skepticism. Furthermore, a society based on the
belief in free will perpetrates grave injustices on its citizens, and beliefs in desert and blame fuel
destructive reactive attitudes inimical to flourishing interpersonal relationships.
The social advantages of accepting free will skepticism involve sweeping reforms
necessitated by its acceptance. I discuss two such reforms pertaining to the institutions of
punishment and parenthood. If those who commit immoral or illegal acts are not to blame for
their transgressions, then our current system of punishment is unfair and unjust. There are
alternative ways to cultivate a safe society without subjecting wrongdoers to desert-based
penalties. Using an alternative model of justice, one that tailors a punitive response to the
specific risks and needs of each perpetrator, would be far more effective than mere incarceration.
Furthermore, since the root cause of criminality can, in many cases, be traced to childhood abuse
or neglect, I argue that society should do more to ensure that incompetent parents are not raising
children. Therefore, I advocate a licensing program for parents for the benefit of both future
children, and for the safety of society.
Building on the arguments of notable free will skeptics, I conclude that free will
skepticism is the most scientifically defensible position, that the objections to it are unfounded,
and that the benefits of accepting it surpass those of alternative positions. While a discussion of
all ethical and practical implications would surpass the space allowed here, I hope that my
limited discussion inspires more research and challenges the many misconceptions surrounding
free will skepticism.
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INTRODUCTION
Humans are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility. Yet, people feel like
they possess free will because of misconceptions about the nature of their experiences. Such
misconceptions include, but are not limited to: a misunderstanding about the type of causation
agents exert, a misunderstanding about the type of control agents possess, short-sightedness
concerning historical and contextual causal influences, and a disbelief in the inevitability of
outcomes. The reasons people want to possess free will (the reasons people are averse to free
will skepticism) are based on a deeply ingrained sense of entitlement to reward and punishment
based on merit, a desire to see wrongdoers “pay,” and a misunderstanding of the ethical and
interpersonal implications of free will skepticism. I will challenge support for free will by
refuting contrary positions, by defending free will skepticism against objections, and by extolling
both the personal and social advantages of accepting free will skepticism over competing views.
I devote the first three chapters to showing why free will skepticism is more feasible than
contrary positions. In the first chapter, I refute libertarianism, which denies causal determinism
and accepts free will. In chapter two, I argue against compatibilism, which accepts the truth of
both causal determinism and free will. In chapter three, I address popular objections to free will
skepticism, and I show how free will skepticism can account for morality, moral education, and
phenomenological experiences, despite the lack of moral responsibility. Finally, in chapter four, I
argue that accepting free will skepticism would demand major reforms in the social institutions
of punishment and parenthood.
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Why the Debate Matters
The free will debate has serious repercussions for social, moral, and political theory. For
example, Immanuel Kant bases his moral theory on the presupposition that humans possess free
will; he asserts, “since morality serves as a law for us only insofar as we are rational beings, it
must be equally valid for all rational beings; and since it must be derived solely from the
property of freedom, we need to prove that freedom too is a property of the will of all rational
beings” (2002, 247). Most people accept Kant’s claim that morality requires free will, and they
fear that should we abandon belief in free will, we would also have to abandon morality.
Others argue that forsaking free will would undermine justifications for punishment or
that skepticism-inspired reforms to the justice system would result in a rise in crime and immoral
behavior. For example, Saul Smilanski claims,
If implemented [hard determinism] would generate more rather than less crime, more
criminals would be caught up in the system and incarcerated apart from society…and
public sentiment would hardly move towards an offender-sympathetic stance, once crime
blossoms...A backlash against hard determinist reforms would be inevitable. (2011, 361)
Since the concepts of blame and guilt require free will, or at least moral responsibility, and since
such concepts form the foundation for systems of reward and punishment, many fear that the
social and practical implications of free will skepticism are too costly, even if such skepticism is
scientifically and theoretically justified.
The above fears reflect a deeply entrenched association between free will and social and
political stability. Thus, challenges to free will are often met with hostility or apprehension. On
the other hand, proponents of free will skepticism argue that should belief in free will continue,
then so will grave injustices perpetrated on its behalf. Derk Pereboom, a contemporary advocate
of hard incompatibilism (a type of free will skepticism) argues, “If it is significantly probable
that one’s justification for harming another is unsound, then prima facie that behavior is
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seriously wrong, and one must refrain from engaging in it” (2013b, 62). Since our society
justifies punishment based on a belief system that is false, then our society is perpetrating a
serious injustice on many of its citizens. This is especially true since there are alternative ways to
handle criminal and immoral behavior that both benefit society and are compatible with free will
skepticism.
Since belief in free will is the prevailing ideology in Western societies, the burden of
proof in the free will debate seems to rest on the shoulders of the skeptics. In what follows, I will
champion the arguments of leading free will skeptics and reply to common and contemporary
objections. I echo Pereboom’s optimism that free will skepticism is not only the most
scientifically feasible position to hold, but that it will have the most just, practical, social, and
moral implications, if accepted on both a personal and societal level. Much is at stake in the
debate, and with enough support, I hope that the tides of public opinion and political action will
shift in favor of free will skepticism.
Chapter 1: A Refutation of Libertarianism
Before tackling libertarianism, I briefly discuss agent causation, distinguishing between
first or “ultimate” causes, intermediate causes, and immediate or “proximate” causes. This
distinction is important to the debate because free will skeptics, and most incompatibilists,
demand that for agents to possess free will, they must be the “ultimate,” or first cause, of at least
some actions. Compatibilists on the other hand, are satisfied with the agent being only the
intermediate or immediate cause. I defend the necessity of ultimate agent causation for
ascriptions of freedom and moral responsibility.
Libertarians, like free will skeptics, generally accept the necessity of agent causation;
however, unlike free will skeptics, they believe we possess the ability to originate thoughts and
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actions. There are two types of libertarians: event-causal (EC) and agent-causal (AC). EC
libertarians argue that indeterminacy in the causal flow provides for free will, while AC
libertarians argue that human actions originate within the agent, and therefore constitute free
actions.
According to event-causal libertarians such as Robert Kane, indeterminacy in the causal
stream leading to an agent’s action allows an agent to act freely. According to Kane, when an
agent is caught between two competing desires, then the resulting decision originates within the
agent and becomes a “self-forming action” (2011, 387). He argues that such decisions are
character forming and affect choices made in the future, thus making agents free in the sense
requisite for moral responsibility. Drawing upon Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso, I will argue
that indeterminacy does not provide libertarians with a convincing argument for free will, and
that truly self-formed or self-willed actions do not seem to exist given our current knowledge of
the mind and brain.
Agent-causal libertarianism, on the other hand, posits that agents are the sole originators
of their actions and decisions. Pereboom argues against this type of libertarianism from a
scientific point of view, claiming that our “scientific understanding of the world” precludes both
agent-causal power and the type of free decisions required for moral responsibility (2001, 69).
Pereboom argues that because the natural world is subject to the laws of physics and to causal
processes that trace to factors beyond our control, and because humans are physical animals that
cannot deviate from such processes, we do not possess free will. I will explain and expand on
Pereboom’s arguments against specific agent-causal libertarians.
Gregg Caruso charges agent-causal libertarianism with being inconsistent at best,
incoherent at worst. Caruso explains that AC libertarians often deploy one of two defense
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strategies: either they appeal to mind-body dualism, or they define the mind as an emergent
property, capable of independently instigating original causal chains (2012, 22-23). I will support
Caruso’s and other’s arguments against dualism in this section, and I will address the problem of
emergence in chapter three.
Since agent causation is intricately linked to notions of personhood and mind theory, I
finish my refutation of libertarianism with a discussion of personhood and extended mind theory.
I argue that libertarians are limited to an internalist view of the mind, which posits that cognition
is contained within the mind. Against internalist positions, I defend diffused moral responsibility,
based on the concept of a diffused self, using extended mind theory as my main justification. I
will appeal to theorists including, Andy Clark, Mason Cash, David Chalmers, Shaun Gallagher,
and Anthony Crisafi to support my position that extended mind theory supports free will
skepticism over libertarianism. I reference Clark, Chalmers, Derk Pereboom, Fred Keijzer and
Maurice Schouten to defend externalism against internalist objections from Jaegwon Kim, Fred
Adams and Ken Aizawa.
Chapter 2: Refutation of Compatibilism
Compatibilism tries to have it both ways: it claims that one can have free will and be
morally responsible given causal determinism. Most compatibilists attempt to reconcile free will
and determinism by redefining what it means to be free. I will address the varying renditions of
compatibilism, showing the inadequacy of their definitions of the type of freedom required for
attributions of moral responsibility (FMR). Classic compatibilism as argued by John Locke
defines freedom merely as the capacity to act upon one’s desires. I begin chapter two by
challenging Locke’s definition and re-asserting the necessity of agent origination in the
definition of FMR.
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For my refutation of contemporary compatibilism, I focus mainly on Harry Frankfurt’s
and John Martin Fischer’s respective renditions. According to Frankfurt, FMR requires only the
conformity between an agent’s first and second order desires (i.e., if an agent endorses her desire
to eat cake, then her choice to eat the cake is freely willed). I support Fischer’s rejection of
Frankfurt’s version arguing that second order desires could be manipulated, coerced or otherwise
influenced depriving the agent of free will; therefore, conformity between hierarchical desires is
not sufficient for FMR (Fischer, 2006, 79).
Fischer’s alternative compatibilist account grounds moral responsibility in an agent’s
ability to exert a certain type of control, namely “guidance control.” He argues that if an agent is
able to effectively respond to good reasons for not performing an action, then she possesses
guidance control and is therefore morally responsible for the ensuing action (2006, 39). He
attempts to procure agent origination by appealing to “mechanism ownership,” defined as the
endorsement of reasons for acting after subjecting such reasons to critical evaluation (2011, 199).
The main problem with reasons-based compatibilist positions, such as Fischer’s account, is their
acceptance of intermediate or immediate causation as sufficient for free will, whereas I argue
that only ultimate causation will suffice for FMR attributions.
Another strategy I use for challenging compatibilism is to appeal to Peter van Inwagen’s
consequence argument. The two conditions traditionally deemed necessary for FMR are: 1)
alternate possibilities and 2) agent origination. While Locke and Frankfurt offer convincing
examples to support their view that alternate possibilities are not necessary for FMR, Van
Inwagen’s consequent argument challenges both the alternate possibilities and the agent
origination requirements (Locke, 1975, 238 and Frankfurt, 1969, 144). The consequence
argument assumes physical determinism and asserts that if I have no control over the past and the
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laws of physics, then I have no control over whatever the past and physical laws entail. Thus,
according to the consequent argument, we lack both alternate possibilities and the type of control
over actions necessary for FMR. I then appeal to the consequent argument and distinguish
between varying senses of the word “can,” to refute Daniel Dennett’s and Heidegger’s respective
compatibilist defenses of free will.
Although free will seems intuitively to be incompatible with causal determinism,
compatibilism remains a popular position. Therefore, I finish the chapter with Baron Paul
D’Holbach’s explanation of why the belief in free will persists despite the overwhelming
evidence against it. According to D’Holbach, The tenacity with which people believe in free will
can be attributed to misunderstandings concerning the nature of mind, the subtle and sometimes
imperceptible nature of causal influences, and the inability to see how one’s actions fit into a
historical context. I attend to the above misunderstandings and misgivings in my responses to
objections in chapter three.
Chapter 3: Responses to Common Objections
While I cannot respond to every objection against free will skepticism in the space
provided, I include what I perceive to be the most persistent and serious misgivings about
accepting the position. For example, the first objection I address is the concern that should
society accept free will skepticism, anyone performing, or wishing to perform, immoral or illegal
acts would have a universal excuse. The fear is that should free will skepticism become a
dominant ideology, society would suffer from rampant crime, an increase in unscrupulous
behavior, and would have no justification for dealing with the ensuing chaos. I allay these fears
by explaining how alternative forms of punitive responses to immoral behavior could still be
retained, given free will skepticism.
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The second objection I address posits that free will skepticism precludes “ought”
statements. For example, Saul Smilanski argues, “We cannot tell people that they must behave in
a certain way, that it is morally crucial that they do so, but then, if they do not, turn and say that
this is (in every case) excusable, given whatever hereditary and environmental influences have
operated in their formation” (2002, 434). I defend Derk Pereboom’s response that, since we
cannot predict every individual’s moral determination, it makes sense to clarify and disseminate
the moral rules individuals are expected to follow through moral education. Statements such as
“you should not have done that” would not imply that the individual had an actual choice in the
matter; rather, they would signify that the action was wrong and should not be repeated. Since
we do not know beforehand what agents can or cannot do, “ought” statements retain their
importance and viability.
The third objection claims free will skepticism does not recognize that those with
diminished rational capacities or those who are under duress should be held to a lower degree of
culpability than those with who are in full possession of their faculties of reason at the time of
the action. According to the objection, as argued by Fisher, Ravizza, Ayer, Strawson, Wallace,
and Arpaly, we need to maintain a “scale of responsibility,” recognizing that some agents are
more worthy of punishment, or worthy of harsher punishments, than others. To do otherwise,
they claim, would be unfair and unjust. Those who believe in free will skepticism would agree
that responses to those with diminished capacities would be different than responses to those
without impediments to reason. However, one does not need to ground such differences in
beliefs in free will or moral responsibility. Free will skeptics shift the distinction from between
levels of liability to between types of treatment. We can treat a kleptomaniac differently than we
treat a common thief without relying on responsibility ascriptions.
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I turn next to the “reactive attitudes” objection, as argued by P.F. Strawson. In Freedom
and Resentment, he argues that, regardless of whether or not hard determinism (a type of free
will skepticism) is true, not only are reactive attitudes so engrained in our social constitution as
to make abandoning them unfeasible, but also were we able to somehow overcome them, our
personal relationships would be seriously undermined as a result (1963, 129). In response to
Strawson, Derk Pereboom claims that we can retain a stance toward others that preserves or
embodies the positive attitudes, such as love, gratitude, and forgiveness (2013, 439). Pereboom
also argues that tempering negative attitudes may actually benefit, rather than threaten, personal
relationships. I argue that the feasibility of overcoming reactive attitudes is already apparent in
the way we respond to non-human animals, such as pets. We recognize the inappropriateness of
violently reacting to recalcitrant puppies precisely because we recognize that they are not
morally responsible for whatever offenses they commit. Since we already temper our reactive
attitudes when we realize the actor is not morally responsible for an offense, the reactive attitude
objection loses ground.
The “phenomenology of free will” objection attributes the persistence of the belief in free
will to the feeling of freedom people experience when thinking and acting. However, recent
studies in neuroscience, such as Benjamin Libet’s experiments, show that our brains register
choices and intentions before we are conscious of them (In Waller; 2011, 82-83). If such is the
case, then the feeling of freedom is illusory, since it is preceded by actions in the brain that occur
without an agent’s acknowledgment or endorsement. Baron D’Holbach claims that such feelings
are the result of misconceptions, since we cannot track all of the historical causal influences of
our actions. Thus, the mere feeling of freedom does not entail actual freedom.
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Some object to free will skepticism because they think they will lose their identity.
According to many continental philosophers such as Sartre and Heidegger, we are self-creating,
experiential beings who depend not only on the calculations of reason, but also on meaninggiving activities that make our lives significant to us. I will give a brief overview of some of the
positions maintained by existential philosophers, most notably Sartre, then defend my claim that
meaning, identity, and phenomenological experiences are not threatened, undermined, or
diminished, given free will skepticism.
The final objection I address comes from those who appeal to emergence theories in
defense of free will. This objection describes the mind as an emergent property, meaning it is not
reducible to the brain, and may therefore possess attributes, such as free will, that cannot be
traced to the mere physicality of the brain. This dualistic argument, as defended by Nancey
Murphy and Warren Brown, receives criticism from reductionists such as Jaegwon Kim. I will
argue further, that the concepts they use to defend emergent free will, such as downward
causation, actually support free will skepticism.
Chapter 4: Punishment and Parenthood
In chapter four, I argue that since criminal behavior is rooted in an agent’s causal history,
and since many criminals became such as a result of abuse or neglect, the institutions of
punishment and parenthood need to be reformed. I defend the reforms against objections, and I
argue that changing the way we punish and parent not only accommodates free will skepticism,
but also aligns with justice, fairness and morality in a way that our current institutions do not.
Discussing punishment, I favor rehabilitation and Pereboom’s argument for “quarantine”
over retribution and punishment. While deterrence and utilitarian justifications for punishment
are compatible with both free will skepticism and our current system of justice, using those
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justifications to maintain our current punishment practices would be immoral. If society could
enjoy lower rates of crime using an alternative and more humane response to criminal behavior,
then society should employ those methods; as Pereboom states, “all other things being equal, if
two methods achieve the same goal for an agent, but one harms him while the other does not, the
one that does not harm the agent should be preferred” (2001, 164). If criminals are not
blameworthy for their criminal actions, then they are due the same respect and humane treatment
as those who are sick; thus, treatment or quarantine, rather than mere incarceration, are
warranted.
The alternative I defend is the “risk-need-receptivity” (RNR) model of punishment, as
advocated by D.A. Andrews and James Bonta. Rather than tailoring the punishment to fit the
crime, this model prescribes tailoring punitive responses to the needs of the inmate. Studies at
Kentucky’s Department of Correction have shown that employing the RNR model has reduced
recidivism rates, and supplemental programs, such as therapy and meditation, have also proven
helpful in rehabilitation efforts (Brooks et al., 2012, 432, Perelman, 177 and Byron, 20).
Since free will skepticism acknowledges that childhood circumstances are integral to an
agent’s causal determination, and since there is such a strong correlation between criminality and
childhood abuse and neglect, I argue that society should do more to ensure that incompetent
would-be parents, those who would abuse or neglect, are not raising children. I support Hugh
LaFollette’s argument that parenthood should require licensing for the same reasons many
professions do: to protect a vulnerable population from people who are in a position to inflict
considerable damage to them (2010, 329). While there are practical and weighty objections to
immediately instituting a licensing program for parents, the risk of harm to children justifies
giving such a program serious consideration.
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Conclusion
I conclude my dissertation with a brief discussion of why accepting free will skepticism
would be the “safest bet” among competing theories. As I stated in the beginning, much is at
stake in the debate: perpetuating the belief in free will comes as the cost of perpetrating grave
injustices, while accepting free will skepticism would demand reforms for the benefit of all. The
repercussions extend beyond that for criminals and children; everyone benefits from living in a
society that enjoys less crime and less child abuse and neglect. Our society has much to gain, and
little to lose by merely changing its perspective on free will. In the final analysis, regardless of
where one stands in the free will debate, there are good reasons, both theoretical and practical,
why one should accept free will skepticism as the dominant ideology.
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CHAPTER 1
A REFUTATION OF LIBERTARIANSIM
Two broad disagreements dominate the free will debate: the first between
incompatibilists and compatibilists; i.e., those who believe that free will is not compatible with
physical determinism and those who believe that it is. The second occurs within the
incompatibilism camp between those who believe we have free will (libertarians) and those who
claim we do not (free will skeptics).1 The debate between incompatibilists and compatibilists
focuses mainly on which definition of freedom warrants ascriptions of moral responsibility.
However, libertarians and free will skeptics have generally agreed on which conditions are
sufficient for free will, and instead focus on whether or not those conditions obtain. This
disagreement revolves around conflicting views concerning causation and agent origination.
Libertarians assert that agents can originate at least some actions, while free will skeptics claim
that agents are always embedded within a causal stream over which they do not have the type of
control required for moral responsibility.2
Since all physical objects and events are subject to the laws of physics, including
processes of cause and effect, libertarians must explain how agents can cause actions without
those actions also being caused by antecedent events or external influences. To do this,
libertarian theorists have employed three types of doctrines: a dualistic theory of mind; a

1

I will use the term “free will skeptic” to include anyone who does not believe humans possess the type of freedom
relevant to moral responsibility ascriptions including hard determinists and hard incompatibilists.
2
I will use the term “agent” broadly as a person who has the rational capacity to intend and perform an action based
on reasons and who can decide between conflicting motivations.
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defense of agent-causation, in virtue of the causal efficacy of acting on reasons; and an appeal to
causal indeterminacy prior to the action or choice. Those who adopt either of the first two
stances are called agent-causal libertarians, while those in the latter camp are called event-causal
libertarians. I will first explain the causal distinctions relevant to the discussion of free will; then,
I will turn to reasons for rejecting both types of libertarianism. Finally, I will employ extended
mind theory are an argument against libertarianism.
Causal Distinctions
As stated above, the debate between libertarians and free will skeptics revolves around
the question of whether or not an agent can initiate an action or decision in a way that entails
agent causation. The libertarian argument generally claims that if an agent caused an action in
the sense relevant to FMR, then she is morally responsible for it. The challenges are to
distinguish which type of causation counts as “the relevant sense” and to determine whether or
not an agent can be such a cause. Because “cause” has myriad meanings, and because various
theorists use different terms to describe the same kind of causation, I will first explain which
terms and definitions I will adopt for my arguments.
The literature on causation is vast and varied. Theorists discuss agent causation, mental
causation, necessary and sufficient causation, and so on. For the purposes of relating causation to
moral responsibility, I am interested primarily in temporal causal distinctions. More specifically,
I support the position that if an agent is not the first or original cause (or, using Robert Kane’s
term, the ultimate cause), then that agent cannot be held morally responsible for the action. Thus,
I contrast ultimate cause with intermediary (efficient) causes and immediate causes.3 I will then
discuss why ultimate causation is necessary for moral responsibility.

3

My use of “immediate” could be replaced with “proximate.”
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Something is the immediate cause of an action if it is the action that is closest in time to
the effect. For example, when an agent throws a glass against the wall and it breaks, the event of
the glass hitting the wall is the most immediate cause of the glass breaking (combined with the
fragility of the glass and the hardness of the wall). An intermediary or efficient cause is merely
some event (apart from the ultimate and immediate causes) that is contributory to the effect, such
as the act of the agent throwing the glass toward the wall. We can (at least in principle) track the
intermediary causes back until all the factors contributing to the glass breaking are accounted for;
the one cause that begins the process is the first, or ultimate cause.
Incompatibilists generally agree that to be morally responsible for an action an agent
must be the ultimate cause of that action; ultimate causation entails causal origination, and causal
origination requires a certain type of control. We ultimately seek to determine whether or not an
agent exerted the type of control requisite for attributions of FMR. If an action did not originate
within an agent, if the ultimate cause of an action can be traced to events external to or prior to
an agent (such as coercive manipulation), then, at that time, an agent lacks the type of control
required for moral responsibility. We take this lack of control to be evident in situations
involving addiction or mental illness, but free will skeptics argue that all situations involve
ultimate-control-inhibiting factors.
According to causal determinism, every physical event has a physical cause such that the
antecedent cause makes the effect inevitable and theoretically predictable. According to hard
determinism (a type of free will skepticism), humans are purely physical beings and determinism
is true, so humans can never by themselves be the ultimate cause of an action. Libertarians argue
that causal determinism is not true, which inspired Mark Balaguer to conclude that whether or
not we possess FMR is “a wide open empirical question” (2009, 20).

In order to refute
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libertarianism, free will skeptics who claim humans lack free will regardless of whether or not
determinism obtains, need only show that humans are not and cannot be ultimate causes. This is
the position I will defend for the rest of the chapter.
Agent Causation
Non-coerced human action usually falls within three broad categories: involuntary,
automatic/habitual, and intentional. Free will theorists are most interested in intentional action. A
common, superficial understanding of intentional agent causation asks only whether an agent
meant to perform an action. If not (i.e., if an action was involuntary or out of an agent’s control),
then an agent is relieved of causal responsibility. This common understanding of agent causation
works as an explanatory tool, but I will argue that it is not a freedom-granting type of causation
(at least with respect to the kind of freedom at issue here).
Richard Swinburne defines agent causation as: “Intentional causation, being causation by
a substance (an agent) in virtue of its causal powers with some intention…and…in the light of a
belief about how that intention can be achieved” (2013, 140). This definition reflects the
superficial understanding of agent causation described above. In cases involving simple actions,
Swinburne’s definition of causation suffices to explain why the action took place, but that
explanation is merely descriptive. My taking a drink of water from my water bottle resulted from
both my desire to quench my thirst and my belief that the water in my bottle would satisfy that
desire. My intention to drink can be explained by those two conditions obtaining. My desire,
belief, and subsequent intention together directly resulted in my drinking the water. Simple cases
such as this describe non-reflective actions and are generally morally insignificant.
Simple cases also involve habitual actions that are unreflectively voluntary. Someone
who absentmindedly flicks her cigarette filter on the ground is littering; while the action has
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moral import, it can hardly be considered a moral choice until someone calls attention to the
habitual behavior by explaining the moral implications of the action. Certain menial decisions
also carry no moral import. For example, deciding between buying a blue squeaky bunny toy or a
red squeaky squirrel toy at the pet store is a simple aesthetic decision made trivial by the fact that
my toothy puppies will destroy either toy within hours. To say I “freely” chose the squeaky
bunny, or that I am responsible for not choosing the squeaky squirrel merely describes an event
in which I was not coerced to choose one over the other. Non-coercion, however, does not by
itself entail FMR.
To determine the cause of an action, one must first determine the reason(s) why an agent
performed an action. I lifted my arm to get a drink of water because I was thirsty. Thirst is a
physiological condition over which I have no control. If I were not thirsty, then I would not have
lifted my arm. If water were not available (environmental determinant) I would not have lifted
my arm. I was only the immediate cause of my lifting my arm. I was a cause, but only trivially
so, not in an FMR-granting manner. If I were determined to get a drink of water and discovered
the only water available was contaminated, my refraining from drinking the water despite my
thirst is also not a free action (D’Holbach, 1868/1970, 90). In that case, the cause of my
refraining can be attributed to my prudential character. Humans are generally self-preserving,
and self-preservation is either an evolutionary or a social determinant. Thus, if I efficiently
caused myself to refrain from drinking the water, I would not, in that case, be the ultimate cause
of the decision or intention to refrain.
More complicated cases usually involve competing desires within an agent, or conflicts
between desire and morality. For example, say Sally is deciding between going wakeboarding
and working on her dissertation, and no one is forcing her or trying to convince her to choose
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one option over the other. If she decides to forsake her academic responsibility for the joys of
wakeboarding, she feels responsible for that decision. This is especially true in cases involving
deliberation, when an agent can explain the myriad reasons for the choice. Sally may cite such
reasons as having worked for hours the previous day, that the weather is inviting, and that her
eyes are burning from staring at the computer for too long. As a direct result of her deliberation,
her decision to go wakeboarding seems to have originated within her. She feels as though she is
the sole and ultimate cause of that decision. However, the perception of being such a cause is
not the same as actually being such a cause. I will discuss this further in the third chapter, where
I respond to objections concerning the phenomenological experience of freedom.
A free will skeptic could theoretically give a causal history that eventually leads to
Sally’s decision to go wakeboarding. This history could involve her learning to wakeboard and
developing an affinity for it, the development of the type of character that would choose to go
wakeboarding instead of working, and the weather on that particular day. These contributing
causal factors mitigate her responsibility for that decision. Since we can trace the explanatory
causal history of all human decisions and actions back to antecedent events, it seems that the
only cause that suffices as “ultimate” is the “big bang.” All other causes are either merely
immediate or efficient.
I maintain that Sally’s decision to go wakeboarding on that particular day did not
originate within Sally independently of antecedent causal influences; however, Murphy and
Brown argue that even if Sally is not the sole cause of the action, she is still the primary cause
and thus bears responsibility. I will address this argument in my discussion of emergence in
chapter three (2007, 290). Fischer and Ravizza argue that even if Sally is not the original cause,
she still exerted a type of control sufficient for moral responsibility. Since this objection is
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compatibilistic, I will address it in the next chapter. For now, all I need to show, for the purposes
of challenging libertarianism, is that for all circumstances, an agent is neither the sufficient nor
the ultimate cause of any action or decision and therefore does not possess FMR.
Swinburne discusses two types of causation: inanimate causation (one billiard ball
causing another to move) and intentional causation (the billiard player causing the balls to
move). But if free will skepticism is correct, then even intentional causation is merely descriptive
and carries no additional moral weight. Swinburne states that the two types are merely two
species of the same genus. He endorses an “SPL” (substances, powers, and liabilities) account of
agent causation that states,
It is substances – planets, or billiard balls or gunpowder – which exert causal influence,
and they do so in virtue of their powers; if they exert enough causal influence, they often
cause effects. Exactly the same holds for intentional causation; substances (in this case,
animals or humans) exercise causal influence in virtue of their powers, and if they exert
enough of it they often cause effects. The only difference is that in inanimate causation
substances have a liability to exercise their powers under various circumstances, whereas
in intentional causation substances intentionally exercise their powers. (2013, 138)
To illustrate, he offers the example, “When I do throw the ball, this latter succession is a part of
the stream of causation which I initiate by throwing the ball” (2013, 138-139). As a free will
skeptic, I concede that agents often intentionally perform actions thereby voluntarily causing
those actions to occur. Taken out of context4, agents may even initiate streams of causation. But
they are always and already embedded within a broader causal stream. As a matter of verbal
practicality (for explanatory or descriptive purposes), we could talk about agents intentionally
causing or initiating actions, but when discussing free will and moral responsibility, it is
important to clarify that while an agent initiated an isolated sequence of events, that sequence
cannot be morally evaluated independent of the entire prior causal history.

4

By “context” I mean a linear temporal causal stream tracing back to the “big bang.”
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The causal distinctions will become especially salient when evaluating arguments that
attribute free will on the basis of the capacity to act according to reason. Such arguments place
the point of origin of the causal stream relevant to an action at the point when an agent either
decides to perform or not perform an action based on reasons, or when an agent decides based on
a prioritization of conflicting reasons. Donald Davidson calls such rationalization “a species of
ordinary causal explanation” (1963, 685). I will attend to such arguments after the following
discussion of dualism.
Against Agent-Causal Libertarianism
Appealing to mind-body dualism is one strategy by which libertarians attempt to position
agents as causal originators. Dualists such as Swinburne and René Descartes generally claim that
the mind is not the same as the brain, and as such, may not be subject to the same physical laws
as those governing physical substances. Thomas Nagel also challenges physicalism and the
identity theory by showing how the mind has at least one property not shared by the brain.
Philosophy of mind theorists refer to this property as “qualia,” or the subjective character of
experience. Using dualism to explain agent causation, Swinburne states, “It is…we humans, not
events which happen in us, who cause our brain events; we cause a brain event by forming the
intention to cause some effect of that brain event” (2013, 124). By describing causation as such,
Swinburne attempts to extricate agents from the physical causal stream that affects, influences
and determines physical entities.
Gregg Caruso offers three objections to dualism in general, all of which challenge
Swinburne’s dualism in particular. Caruso’s first objection is the oft-cited problem of interaction
(2012, 35). Mental states cause physical actions (e.g., feeling sad physically manifests as crying)
and physical phenomena cause mental states (e.g., drinking a substantial amount of alcohol
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causes a subsequent reduction of one’s rational capacities). According to non-dualists, dualists
have yet to adequately explain how an immaterial substance can have an effect on a material
entity and vice versa.
Derk Pereboom challenges dualist defenses of libertarian arguments by appealing to
physical laws. According to him, our “scientific understanding of the world” precludes both
agent-causal power and the type of free decisions required for moral responsibility (2001, 69).
Pereboom argues that the natural world is subject to the laws of physics and to causal processes
that trace back to factors beyond our control. Agent-causal libertarians such as Kant assert that
humans have the capacity to render decisions and cause actions that are independent of such laws
because they possess what Kant calls transcendental freedom (in Pereboom; 2001, 79).
However, the results of these decisions are actions that manifest in the natural world, and are
thus subject to determined causation. Pereboom argues that the chance of non-physical, nondeterministic mental events coinciding with their causal, deterministic, physical manifestations
implies coincidences that are “too wild to believe” (2001, 81; 2013, 434). A better explanation is
that we are physical substances subject to physical laws.
Caruso’s second and third objections stem from his advocacy of physical causal closure,
which he claims is the “best explanation” for the description of our universe (2012, 36). Physical
causal closure theory states that physical events have only physical causes and physical effects.
Even if quantum indeterminacy makes the relation between cause and effect probabilistic rather
than deterministic, the relation would still be contained within a purely physical universe. Thus,
Caruso’s second objection to dualism is that the mind is merely another physical thing subject to
physical laws.
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Given physical causal closure, Caruso’s third objection echoes Leibniz’s (and others’)
claim that dualism “violates the law of the conservation of energy” (2012, 37). This objection is
based on the following scientific principle: Energy can neither be created nor destroyed; it is
merely displaced from one physical object to another. If the mind is a non-physical entity, then
by causing a physical object to move, it must create the energy required to do so. By initiating
physical events, a non-physical mind would have to create new energy in the physical world,
which is a violation of a physical law and does not conform to physical causal closure.
The latter two objections ignore the problem of the apparent irreducibility of mind to
brain given that the mind has an aspect the brain does not, namely, qualia. Jaegwon Kim, in his
defense of physicalism, calls qualia “mental residue,” and argues that it does not pose a
challenge to mental causation because “the mental residue encompasses only qualitative states of
consciousness, and does not touch the intentional/cognitive domain” (2005, 170). He claims that
subjective experiences are not physical, but merely epiphenomenal since they play no causal role
in intentional actions. Thus, my subjective experience of pain is merely a byproduct to the cfibers firing in my brain, and such an experience merely accompanies any ensuing actions, but
plays no causal role in those actions.
Non-Dualist Agent-Causal Libertarianism
Other libertarians such as Randolph Clarke and Timothy O’Connor avoid the problems of
dualism by either appealing to the causal efficacy of acting based on reasons (Clarke) or by
attributing to an agent the power to directly cause actions by freely forming an intention
motivated by reasons (O’Connor). O’Connor does not credit the reasons themselves with causal
power because the possession of reasons is an event and he wants to attribute causation to agents
as substances. He argues, “the obtaining of the reason appropriately affects (in the typical case,
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by increasing) an objective propensity of the agent to cause the intention…reasons causally
structure the agent-causal capacity” (2009, 234-235, italics in original). The agent-causal
capacity to which O’Connor refers is the capacity to freely form intentions motivated by reasons.
Thus, for O’Connor, because agents cause the intentions that cause the actions, such actions
originate within the agent, satisfying a necessary condition for FMR.
Pereboom’s “coincidence” objection to Kant’s libertarian argument can be applied to
O’Connor’s rendition as well. Any libertarian theory that endows an agent with a special power
to originate action must reconcile that power with known physical laws (whether deterministic or
probabilistic). O’Connor argues that reasons as events (which are governed by physical laws) are
not by themselves causally sufficient, and since agent-causal power is different from eventcausal power, it is not subject to the same deterministic or probabilistic laws. Pereboom argues
that if one set of laws governs events and a different set of laws governs substances, then we
should expect these laws to (at least in some instances) diverge. Otherwise,
If we nevertheless found conformity, we would have very good reason to believe that the
agent-causal power was not of a different sort from the causal powers of the events…or
else, this conformity would be a wild coincidence, not to be expected and without
explanation (2005, 246).
We must either accept that the same set of laws governs both powers or tolerate the highly
implausible possibility that the outcomes of agent-causal power just happens to coincide with
event-causal expectations.
Clarke offers what he calls a reconciliationist account of agent-causal free will. He
attempts to reconcile agent-causal and event-causal libertarianism, not free will and determinism:
For suppose that all events…are caused by earlier events, but that event causation is
‘chancy’ or probabilistic rather than deterministic…Whatever happens now, past events
cause it; but since they do not causally necessitate it, something else might have
happened instead, in which case past events would have caused that something else.
(1993, 217)
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This satisfies the condition of alternate possibilities. According to Clarke, agent-causation
obtains because an agent decides which particular action to perform. He claims that agents are
uncaused causes because outcomes of decisions are probabilistic giving an agent the freedom to
choose among actual possibilities, and the act of choosing gives an agent the control requisite for
free will.
At first glance, Clarke’s view seems to involve causal overdetermination of actions
because actions are caused by agents and by earlier events. However, according to this view,
while the antecedent events influence character and the reasons for choosing one option over
another, an agent as the ultimate arbiter is the one responsible for making the final decision. The
ability of agents to prioritize reasons is the key to FMR, according to Clarke:
There are other sorts of cases in which it is rationally indeterminate not only for which
reasons an agent will act, but also how the reasons an agent has to act will be ordered. In
making a decision, an agent will sometimes change the order in which she ranks
considerations as reasons for action, and sometimes it may be as rational for her to
change an ordering as it is for her to maintain it. (1993, 220 italics in original)
Simply stated, Clarke’s argument is that an agent has FMR if she rationally chooses between
alternatives according to reasons. He offers the example of an agent, Pam, deciding between
attending a lecture and going to the movies (1993, 219). He cites reasons for both alternatives:
she knows the lecturer and is interested in the lecture topic, but she is also interested in
accompanying a friend to the movie. Clarke states that because she prioritizes her reasons for
attending the lecture, that decision is both rational and an exercise of free will.
Many libertarians like Clarke argue that what makes a decision free is that it was made
according to reasons. The reasons do not cause an agent to act; rather, it is the capacity of an
agent to choose among competing reasons that warrants ascriptions of free will and moral
responsibility. However, citing this capacity of an agent as the causal point of origin for action is
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shortsighted; a causal explanation could be given for why she considered only certain reasons,
and why she prioritized the reasons for going to the lecture. A free will skeptic would argue that
the way she orders her reasons, and the reasons that become salient to her, are determined by
past events including experience, influences, conditioning, and education. Reasons are merely
intermediary, or efficient, causes, and the way in which an agent grants priority to her reasons
either has an explanatory and causal history or is the result of responsibility obstructing
indeterminacy. Either way, the capacity itself is not the ultimate cause of the action.
Benjamin Libet has argued against free will citing evidence that the brain signals an
intention before an agent is consciously aware of forming the intention (Caruso, 189-201). If he
is right, then the temporal ordering of action transpires as follows: neural event à intention à
action. Libertarians explain agent causation as follows: intention à neural event à action. If
Libet is right, he offers a convincing argument for why reasons do not cause actions, but are
instead caused by physical neural events. While there is a debate as to whether Libet provides
convincing reasons to doubt free will, I argue that even if Libet is wrong, even if an agent’s
intentions cause neural events that cause actions, because those intentions are merely efficient
causes and not ultimate causes of the action, agents do not possess FMR.
Against Event-Causal Libertarianism
As an event-causal libertarian, Robert Kane argues that his view overcomes the common
objections to agent-causal libertarianism. He claims that the first condition for free will—that
there are alternate possibilities—is not sufficient for free will since we can be ultimately
responsible for our actions even if we could not have done otherwise (2007, 14). The
requirement of alternate possibilities for FMR has come under scrutiny since the popularization
of counterexamples involving agents who will be covertly manipulated to perform an action,
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even if they choose to do otherwise. I will discuss the alternate-possibility requirement more
thoroughly in the next chapter.
Kane and many other incompatibilists in the free will debate focus mainly on the second
condition for FMR, agent origination, or as Kane calls it, “ultimate responsibility” (UR). Such
incompatibilists are commonly called “source incompatibilists.” Kane defines UR as:
To be ultimately responsible for an action, an agent must be responsible for anything that
is a sufficient reason (condition, cause, or motive) for the action’s occurring. If, for
example, a choice issues from, and can be sufficiently explained by, an agent’s character
and motives (together with background conditions), then to be ultimately responsible for
the choice, the agent must be at least in part responsible by virtue of choices or actions
voluntarily performed in the past for having the character and motives he or she now has.
(2011, 383)
Kane stipulates that the causal chain that led up to any action can be traced to “self-forming acts”
(SFAs) whereby alternatives existed (2011, 383). According to Kane, such decisions are
character-forming and affect future choices. However, when an agent is presented with a choice
between competing interests, the resulting choice, if not determined by anything outside an agent
herself, seems to be arbitrary or random. Even if she engages in rational deliberation, the way in
which she deliberates depends on the factors she considers pertinent. How she prioritizes such
considerations depends on, among other things, her temperament, upbringing, education, social
conditioning, and life experience. Thus, truly self-formed or self-willed actions do not seem to
exist given our current knowledge of the mind and brain.
To explain how persons have the type of agency required for free will, Kane argues that
during a torn decision or moral dilemma, there is indeterminacy in the causal chain that leads to
an action. According to Kane, in this moment of indecision, enough indeterminacy occurs in the
brain to make either option viable:
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At such times, there is tension and uncertainty in our minds about what to do, I suggest,
that is reflected in appropriate regions of our brains by movement away from
thermodynamic equilibrium – in short, a kind of stirring up of chaos in the brain that
makes it sensitive to micro-indeterminacies at the neuronal level (2011, 387).
Kane asserts that even if quantum indeterminacy makes the result of a torn decision random,
since the agent wills both events, she is responsible for the decision; the decision is under her
control in a free will-granting way.
However, there is another reason for saying that agents do not have control over their
actions, and it has to do with UR. Certainly, in a torn decision involving competing desires,
regardless of which action an agent decides to take, she will have consciously and voluntarily
willed the successful action and will have reasons for doing so. However, once again, Kane’s
causal explanation stops at an agent’s having acted for reasons and fails to explain the causal
history giving rise to an agent having the reasons upon which she acts. Arguments such as
Kane’s create an isolated causal microcosm that appears to exist independently of a causal
history.
Kane argues that in resolving torn decisions, an agent acts freely and responsibly. An
agent desires and wills both actions, so she endorses whichever action indeterministically results
from the decision, and he argues that such resolutions constitute “self-forming” actions. They
become part of the character of the person and will influence further actions. If at the point of the
decision, indeterminacy in the brain did indeed cause one action over the other, then an agent did
not voluntarily intend that choice to become part of her character. That one option—say, an
altruistic one—predominated over the other—say, a self-interested one—was a matter of chance.
If an agent becomes a more altruistic person in general as a result, that character trait can be
traced to a factor that was beyond her control—the indeterminacy that led to the self-forming
decision. While she did indeed will the action that succeeded, the fact that that action succeeded
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rather than another was beyond her control. Random events are not willed events, even if an
agent endorses the effects of those events.
Kane’s position faces the following problems: 1) The fact that an agent limited her
choices to only two is beyond her ultimate control, 2) The reasons she has for willing either
option is beyond her ultimate control, and 3) If the choice is the result of indeterminacy, then that
too is beyond her ultimate control. Thus, it seems that an agent lacks free will, even if she could
have done otherwise, if the choice between alternate possibilities was resolved due to
indeterminacy in the brain.
Kane responds to the latter challenge by suggesting a “transformation of perspective.” He
writes, “think…of the indeterminism involved in free choice as an ingredient in larger goaldirected or teleological processes or activities, in which the indeterminism functions as a
hindrance or obstacle to the attainment of the goal”(2011, 393 Italics in original). He describes
indeterminacy in torn decisions acting as a hindrance, just as a vaccine hinders the probability of
contracting a disease. He argues that indeterminacy causes the resulting action no more than a
vaccine causes a disease despite “its role to hinder that effect;” the agent’s desires caused the
action (2011, 394). But the agent did not cause those desires; rather, she developed them as a
result of antecedent events (such as, social conditioning, education, genetics, parenting and so
on). Thus, Kane’s view does not satisfy the causal sufficiency condition for FMR.
Laura Ekstrom offers a defense of event-causal libertarianism similar to Kane’s. Her
view appeals to an agent’s ability to act upon reasons based on preferences, which she defines as,
“those desires that have been formed by way of or have withstood a process of critical evaluation
with regard to the agent’s conception of the good” (2011, 371). Thus, according to Ekstrom,
freedom and autonomy are grounded in our rational capacities. While Kane argues that we are
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responsible for our own character through self-forming acts in situations involving torndecisions, Ekstrom argues that we choose our character, or self, by non-coercively endorsing our
preferences in all intentional actions, not merely those involving conflicting desires. According
to her “coherence theory of autonomy,” all that is required for FMR is that we make decisions
based on “authorized” preferences, which conform to our already established character.
What makes her position an event-causal libertarian theory is her view that, first,
indeterminism may viably allow for “causal openness,” and second, that the fact that the agent
“authorizes” whichever outcome obtains makes that decision ultimately her own. She defends
her view by stating,
What we want in conceiving of ourselves as free agents is to be able to decide on our
character-defining attitudes on our own. We want our preferences to be up to us in the
sense that they follow our deliberations (i.e., they are caused and justified by our
reasons), but also such that we could have formed different ones instead (2011, 373).
While her theory as rendered above would satisfy both of the incompatibilist conditions for FMR
(agent origination and alternate possibilities) her view is vulnerable to the same objections as
those rendered against other event-causal libertarian theories.
First, according to Ekstrom, the type of freedom we want requires agent origination
through self-construction; however, she does not show how preferences originate within an
agent. She states only that they must follow from deliberation, be endorsed by an agent, and
cohere with “one’s other preferences and conviction” (2011, 372). These requirements place
preferences firmly within the “efficient cause” category. I will further defend the non-agentorigination of reason-based capacities in the next section.
Second, Ekstrom argues that FMR requires that our preferences are not causally
determined (i.e., we could have formed different preferences than the set we did form). Asserting
that decisions are indeterministic opens event-causal libertarian arguments to Nagel’s “luck”
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objection. If the choice is not determined, then the outcome is a matter of luck or chance, and not
under the control of the agent. Ekstrom responds to this objection by stating that the luck
objection does not threaten an agent’s self-determination as long as the agent endorses whichever
outcome obtains; she states, “one may decide what to prefer for reasons that cause and justify,
without necessitating, the decision outcome” (2011, 376). Thus, according to Ekstrom,
indeterminism satisfies the alternate possibility condition without undermining the agent
origination condition. However, if the agent origination condition is undermined for other
reasons, as I have argued it is, and since indeterminism is not by itself an FMR-granting
condition, then Ekstrom’s account fares no better than Kane’s at explaining libertarian freedom.
Extended Mind and Personhood
My final challenge to libertarianism concerns personhood. Describing agents as an
ultimate cause or generator of action assumes that the locus of agency is contained within the
agent. It makes no sense to attribute moral responsibility to an agent if the self is diffused and the
boundary between that agent and her environment is blurred. Large corporations, for example,
take advantage of the concept of “diffused responsibility” when avoiding prosecution for illegal
activities (e.g., pollution). Corporate executives are members of a system; as such, any single
executive is not held morally or legally responsible for the actions of the whole, just as any one
member of a mob is not accountable for the actions of the whole mob. In Did My Neurons Make
Me do it? Nancey Murphy and Warren Brown consistently refer to the fact that agents are
members of a dynamic, interactive system. At any given time, an agent is operating (i.e.,
thinking, deliberating, acting, deciding) within that dynamic structure. There is never a point in
an agent’s life where she is truly extricated from her environment and the causal influences
therein. If her identity is diffused throughout that environment, similar to the way corporate
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identity is diffused among its members, then an agent can no more be held morally responsible
for her actions than can a corporation.
Extended mind theory gives good reason for believing that the self is indeed diffused.
According to Andy Clark, the mind “just ain’t in the head”; rather, it extends into the
environment through the use of external devices and aids (2010, 27). While free will skepticism
focuses on the origin of actions, extended mind theories focus on the source and location of
cognition. According to Mason Cash, the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) “entails that
some of the intelligent control of action—indeed some of the intentional states that are the
reasons for action—are best seen as distributed across a system of which an individual person is
only a part” (2010, 2). Causal determinism situates individuals within a causal continuum
wherein agency is stretched along the continuum rather than residing solely within the
individual. Similarly, extended mind theories diffuse agency within a contextual environment.
While causal determinism focuses on a linear, temporal continuum (i.e., present events are the
effect of prior events and the cause of future events), extended mind theories turn their focus
outward (i.e., cognition is distributed across the individual and her environment). If moral
responsibility requires agent causation, and if agent causation requires autonomous, independent
cognition, then extended mind theories seem to support free will skepticism, depending on the
extent of the cognitive extension.
Andy Clark and David Chalmers defend HEC through their parity principle, which states,
“if, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it to go on
in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that
part of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process” (2010, 44). The example they
give to illustrate this point involves an Alzheimer patient named Otto who uses a notebook to
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remember information. According to Clark and Chalmers, the notebook operates as part of
Otto’s mind. They offer a list of requirements in order for external objects to be considered as
part of the cognitive processes, which include: reliability, portability and accessibility (2010, 46).
If part of the world contributes directly to the causal processes that result in some action, then the
agent cannot, in that instance, be described as the sole cause of that action. However, in order to
lack FMR, it is not enough that the agent is not the sole cause; she must also not be the original
cause. Thus, it seems that Cash is correct in thinking that the parity principle does not, by itself,
support free will skepticism.
For example, Otto’s notebook or a math student’s calculator may function as part of their
respective cognitive systems, but we would not attribute responsibility for decisions or
calculations to those devices. If a math student comes to a wrong answer because she put the
wrong information into her calculator, we do not mitigate responsibility because her answer
depended upon the output of the calculator; rather we charge that the fault lies at the point of
input. However, the problem may not reside in cognitive extension per se, but rather with the
limited parameters described by Clark and Chalmers and taken up by Cash.
Cash criticizes the extended mind theory as described by Clark and Chalmers for
retaining the individual as the locus for cognition, and limiting cognitive extension in such a way
as to ignore the role institutions, history and environment play in mental processes. Cash
references Shaun Gallagher and Anthony Crisafi, who have a similar complaint against Clark
and Chalmers’ depiction of extended mind. While Clark ascribes strict guidelines via the parity
principle for which external devices could count as being part of the mind, in Mental Institutions,
Gallagher and Crisafi argue that such constraints are unnecessary. According to Gallagher and
Crisafi, as long as the external environment is appropriately cognitively coupled to the
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individual, then the external entity, whether it is a portable device or an entire institution, need
not satisfy the parity principle conditions (2008, 47). For them, cognitive extension is merely a
matter of degree, and limiting it to the parity principle conditions is arbitrary and unnecessary.
Gallagher and Crisafi maintain, “cognitive effort may be distributed across a number of
heads” (2008, 47). History and institutions also play an active role in an individual’s cognitive
functioning, further diffusing agency and responsibility. One of their examples posits that the
legal system performs cognitive functions: “it is a cognitive practice that in principle could not
happen just in the head; indeed, it extends cognition through environments that are large and
various” (2008, 48). Along with the legal institution, they offer museums, the education system,
and even conversations as examples of mental institutions. Gallagher and Crisafi (and Cash)
stipulate that humans both constitute and are constituted by external institutions in that we
communally create the social order and norms that in turn influence and contribute to our
individual cognitive practices. The more extended our cognition becomes, the more dispersed
our agency becomes.
Gallagher and Crisafi question “whether thinking itself, as a human enterprise, and as an
individual practice, has changed” (2008, 51) I question whether thinking is an individual
practice. The dialogical view of the self holds that when thinking, agents are constantly engaged
in internal conversations with prior influences (Guignon, 2004, 122). Therefore, there is not one
“I,” but rather a multitude of “I’s” that represent antecedent contributors to our thoughts and
consequent actions. For example, there’s the “I” that exists in response to my mother’s
prescription to “not sweat the small stuff.” That “I” is calm, gracious, patient and forgiving when
provoked. While waiting in line behind someone scouring a cavernous purse looking for exact
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change, my mother’s voice echoes in my thoughts when I think that I should not be irritated at
such a person, even when I am in a rush.
Certainly there are visual physical parameters that demarcate me as a physical individual,
different and separate from other physical individuals. However, extended mind theory gives
good reason to believe that mental activity is not constrained by those physical parameters.
External influences, or voices, if you will, reverberate from the past not only affecting, but
actually constituting an agent’s thoughts such that thinking cannot be viewed as an independent
practice. If responsibility-granting capacities are generated from mental activities that are
extended and diffused through time and space, then responsibility should also be extended and
diffused through time and space.
Richard Campbell and Mark Bickhard stress the importance of the environment in
identity creation arguing, “it is not just that ontologically open systems are dependent on
interactions with their environments, they are constituted by, realized in those interactive
processes” (2010, 32). They state that this characteristic, of being a part of a process, gives an
organism its causal powers. However, what they mean by causal powers is not necessarily what
Murphy and Brown mean when they argue for FMR-granting causal powers. The ability to act
according to our will or intentions is a causal power in the trivial sense that such actions cause
events in the world. However, those actions are not spontaneously generated as a new causal
stream from the mind of the agent. Rather, actions are merely one part of a causal system.
The main problem with asserting that “I” created a causal chain or that the action belongs
to “me” in a robust way that entails FMR, is that there is no real “I” or robust sense of “me”
independent of my causal history or environment. To say that I caused an action is to merely
recognize that I took part in a causal structure over which I had no control. When I say “I,” I am
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referring to the biological entity that is recognized as me as opposed to you. I am merely
differentiating one human from another; however, I am not referring to a causally autonomous
self that is capable of initiating a causal stream. Rather, we are like the middle runners in a
cosmic relay race. Our actions only make sense in the larger context. What we voluntarily decide
to do (e.g. take a baton and run with it) crucially depends on what came before (e.g., someone
showing up with a baton), our genetic predispositions (e.g., a physical capacity to run), and the
present environment (e.g., weather, a clear path on which to run). Our future, and that of others,
depends on our present actions, so, in a trivial sense, we do in fact generate a causal stream; we
are just not the originators of that stream.
Externalism vs. Internalism
Extended mind theories offer an alternative to reductionist theories that reduce mental
events to physical events. If internalists are correct in their belief that cognition is bound within
the brain and operates independently of external entities, then a compelling argument for agent
causation could be fashioned based on our inability to track all causal influences on neural
activity – i.e. despite what we know about correlations between brain function and external
stimuli, we cannot (yet) track all of the factors that contribute to beliefs, desires, decisions and
behavior.5 Thus, libertarians could support agent causation without having to point to the neural
origin of “free” actions. However, if cognitive extension obtains, then there is a compelling
reason to support causal determinism and free will skepticism against agent causation.
One of the main proponents of an internalist description of cognition is Jaegwon Kim.
Kim attempts to defend reductive physicalism by showing how nonreductive accounts of
cognition, such as supervenience, fail to offer satisfying explanations of causal action.

5

This is not to say that internalists think that the environment never influences an agent’s mental processes, just that
no external entities could function as part of the cognitive process.
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According to him, “if supervenience is accepted, then there will inevitably be a problem with the
causal efficacy of supervenient properties” (2007, 111). He argues that mental and neural
processes are on “the same level” and are a part of the same physical object. Contra Kim, Fred
Keijzer and Maurice Schouten (K&S) defend what they call “process externalism.” According to
process externalism, “mental processes are not only constituted by processes within our nervous
system, but also incorporate bodily and environmental processes” (2007, 110). Cognitive
extension is one instantiation of process externalism. According to K&S, neural properties are
physical entities that reside in the brain, but mental properties may extend beyond the brain and
body and operate at “a different level of organization” than physical entities (2007, 112). If the
mental and the neural belonged to the same object, then all phenomenological experiences could
be explained through descriptions of neural activity and all neural activity could be explained in
psychological terms. Such is not the case, as K&S state, “some of my neurons are sensitive to
serotonin, but I am not” (2007, 113).
Another objection to externalism comes from Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa
(A&A). They charge proponents of extension theories, mainly Clark and Chalmers (C&C), with
committing two errors. The first is what they call a “coupling-constitution fallacy” (2010 p. 67).
According to A&A, supporters of cognitive extension conflate coupling with constitution; just
because I use, or am dependent on an external object to aid in my cognitive processes, does not
entail that the object constitutes my cognitive processes. K&S illustrate A&A’s objection by
pointing out that just because the body is dependent on oxygen to function does not mean that
oxygen constitutes the body. Clark responds to this objection stating that A&A “either ignore or
fail to properly appreciate the importance of ‘the mark of the cognitive,’ that is—the importance
of an account of ‘what makes something a cognitive agent’” (2010, 81). Clark argues that
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external objects by themselves are obviously not cognitive. However, when coupled with agents,
objects may become a part of a “cognitive system.” For example, a notebook, by itself, is an
inanimate object. However, if Otto transcribes important information into the notebook with the
intention of retrieving that information later, then the notebook functions as part of Otto’s
memory. When Otto uses the notebook as a reference, the notebook effectively becomes a part of
Otto’s cognitive processes.
K&S argue that a refutation of internalist conceptions of cognition only requires one
example of extended cognition. They offer visual perception as an example of how a cognitive
process “is realized by the ongoing interactions between brain, body and external visual scene”
(2007, 116). They illustrate their point through a discussion of change blindness. Rather than
taking a static mental picture of our surroundings when we visually perceive an environment, we
are in a dynamic relationship with that environment. Change blindness is the condition wherein
distracted individuals will not notice dramatic changes in their environment. This is because
“visual perception has to be interpreted as an ongoing process where the visual scene is scanned
according to need, and at no particular moment is there a full internal representation of the
external scene present inside the brain” (2007, 116). K&S take this example to be solid evidence
for at least one cognitive process that does not occur solely in the brain thus refuting Kim’s
purely internal conception of cognition.
K&S liken their position to Derk Pereboom’s “robust nonreductive materialism.” In
Living without Free Will, Pereboom launches an argument against agent-causal libertarianism
through his defense of nonreductive materialism. He states that, “according to nonreductive
materialism generally construed, causal powers in the purview of sciences such as biology and
psychology arise solely as a result of the organization of their material constituents, while they
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do not reduce to microphysical causal powers”(2001, 69). In this view, the causal explanation for
microphysical events will not be identical to the causal explanation of mental events. Thus,
contra Kim, the mental and neural do not belong to the same object. Kim’s main objection to
nonreductive materialism is expressed in his “causal exclusion principle” which states that if the
mental does not reduce to the physical, then only one property, the mental or the physical, can be
a sufficient cause of an action. Thus, either the action is overdetermined, or one causal
explanation is excluded from, or irrelevant to, that action.
Pereboom’s response to Kim involves a distinction between identity and constitution.
Kim claims that mental causation is reducible to and therefore identical with neural causation.
Pereboom, on the other hand, makes the weaker claim that mental causation is constituted by
neural causation (2002, 504). According to Pereboom, this amendment avoids Kim’s causal
exclusion principle because “if the token of a higher-level causal power is currently wholly
constituted by a complex of microphysical causal powers, there are two sets of causal powers at
work which are constituted from precisely the same stuff…and in this sense we might say that
they coincide constitutionally”(2002, 505). Pereboom’s and K&S’s argument against Kim retains
physicalism yet leaves room for both free will skepticism and an external conception of
cognition. Free will skepticism is supported by the argument that if microphysical causal powers
constitute higher level mental causal powers, then the latter is subject to the same deterministic
physical laws as the former. Extended cognition is supported by the argument that if mental
causation is constituted by physical causation, but not identical to it, then mental processes can
extend into the environment while neural processes remain in the head.
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Moral Responsibility and Extended Cognition
One advantage to internalist conceptions of cognition is that moral responsibility
ascriptions are unproblematic. If cognitive processes that originate within an agent directly and
solely cause an agent’s actions, then the agent is morally responsible for those actions. On the
other hand, if an agent’s actions are caused by a cognitive system of which the agent is only a
part, then ascriptions of responsibility become difficult, if not impossible. Thus, agency
dispersion as described by extended mind theories causes a problem for moral responsibility
ascriptions. This problem is explicitly evident in social groups and collectives. For example,
responsibility for the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico may be attributed to any number of
collective agents including BP, Transocean Ltd., and Halliburton. In this situation, assigning
guilt to select individuals may be impossible.
However, Cash discusses ways in which groups and collectives may be morally
responsible for their actions. He offers various examples of social and corporate collectives
including corporations, rioters, nations, and institutions such as a university (2010, 654). The
ascription problem arises because when individuals group together and collectively perform an
immoral action, it seems that no single person can be held accountable for that action. Cash
responds to this argument, via Pettit, by claiming that collective agents satisfy the conditions for
moral agency:
Collective agents can be responsible, if the group is autonomous, faces a significant
choice between morally valenced options, has the understanding and access to evidence
required for judging the relative value of options, and has the control required to make
such judgments and put them into action. (2010, 656)
However, there seems to be no morally relevant difference between actions performed by groups
of individuals and actions performed by cognitively extended individuals. In both cases, duties
are dispersed among various agents and institutions. In cases of cognitively extended individuals,
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the influences are implicit, while in groups, cognitive divisions are obvious and salient. If
individuals are not blameworthy for cases involving cognitive extension, then they should not be
blameworthy in cases involving collective actions.

This is not to say there should be no

repercussions for immoral acts committed by collective entities. British Petroleum has rightfully
compensated at least some of the victims of the oil spill, but it did so as a corporation.
According to Cash, ascriptions of responsibility depend “on the relationship between the
individuals involved and the wider extended entities that HEC might encourage us to see (also)
as the responsible agent” (2010, 649). If an agent has sufficient control over the extended
contributions to the action, then Cash would argue that the agent is responsible for that action.
For example, if Clark and Chalmers’s Otto wrote important information in his notebook, such as
directions and appointment dates, then he would be responsible for all actions that depended on
such information. If Otto wrote down a wrong appointment date and missed an important
meeting, it seems that he, rather than the notebook, would be culpable for missing that meeting.
Free will skepticism offers no such conditions for responsibility. According to free will
skepticism, an agent never has such control because humans are always in a state of “radically
wide” agency. Because an agent can never extricate herself from her historical, social, genetic,
causal context, mental processes (e.g. decisions, beliefs, intentions, and desires) are merely the
amalgamations of all the causal influences that precede them.
To illustrate the historical underpinnings of certain cognitive attitudes, Cash offers the
example of study participants subconsciously primed to be rude or polite. (2010, 648) The
participants acted on their own intentions, desires, and beliefs without realizing that their mental
attitudes had been influenced by the conditions of the experiment. Free will skepticism argues
that we are always subconsciously primed. However, Cash does not want to commit to the idea
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that individuals, even those whose actions and intentions may be attributed to external factors,
are blameless. He offers a “hybrid integrationist alternative account of moral agency and
responsibility” that reflects his belief that “cognitive science should shift to focus on the
operations of hybrid ensembles of neural, bodily, and environmental resources and processes”
(2010, 659).
To support responsibility ascriptions, Cash appeals to various feminist accounts of
intentionality and agency, which give context and environment a larger causal role in individual
action. Similar to HEC, feminist accounts of agency describe an individual’s mental processes as
part of a social system rather than fully situated within the skull. He describes how feminist
scholars “highlight the way our selves, our capacities for action, our values, and our attitudes are
developed in social relationships and are scaffolded and supported (but also constrained and
undermined) by the teaching, guidance, advice, examples, and normative practices of our
communities” (2010, 659). Thus, we are merely socially constituted individuals who reflect our
cultural milieu. Cash argues that moral responsibility can still be retained, given our capacity for
self-reflection and our ability to accept or reject certain social influences. We can, according to
Cash, become “authentic,” autonomous individuals through such reflection. However, if we are
socially constituted and subject to causal processes that trace to factors beyond our control, then
how we reflect on our environment and which influences we accept or reject are just as
determined and beyond our control as any other cognitive process. If we are truly social
constructions, then social determination permeates every aspect of our being, including our
capacities for self-reflection. Cash would have to explain what extra property we possess that is
immune to social, historical, genetic and environmental determination that would grant us the
robust sense of freedom required for moral responsibility.
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Based on Gallagher and Crisafi’s arguments for extended extension, it seems that any
boundary one places on cognition would be arbitrary. Therefore, it is a short leap from an
argument for mental institutions to an argument for complete agency dispersion. If no boundary
exists, then agency completely dissipates and we can be described as purely social, genetic, and
historical constructions. Cash denies this possibility. Even though he gives a convincing
argument for decentralized cognition, identity, and responsibility, he maintains that autonomy
and moral responsibility can be retained. He uses a typical compatibilist argument in favor of
FMR, despite his belief that “there is no objective fact about whether an action is really mine”
(2010, 665).
Cash argues that if an individual can give an appropriate reason for her action, then she is
morally responsible for that action (2010, 665). However, in his earlier example, where
participants were subconsciously primed to be rude or pleasant in a subsequent situation, the
participants would probably be able to give appropriate reasons for their attitude. Those who
were rude might say, “I was in a hurry” or “they were taking too long.” The pleasant participants
could probably come up with similar explanations, “I didn’t want to intrude” or “I wasn’t in a
hurry.” These participants were mentally coerced into experiencing certain attitudes without their
knowledge; any reason they gave for such attitudes would not belie the fact that the attitudes
were not their own in a morally relevant sense.
The fact that someone could explain or justify their actions does not, by itself, justify
ascriptions of moral responsibility. Reason, like every other cognitive function, does not operate
independently of external influences. Rather, reason is the culmination of cognitive habits
developed over time. It is a composite of all past decisions, experiences, education, and
intelligence. Thus, it is limited and biased by our perspective. Unless there is an objective
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mathematical calculus or an objective moral standard by which to evaluate choices, how one
reasons is going to depend on a variety of factors, such as whether one is a Kantian, Utilitarian,
Egoist, Christian, logician, or politician. Reason is neither impartial nor self-determining; rather,
it, like all cognitive processes, is determined by genetics, environment (both social and
historical), context, and past experiences.
Responsibility for judgments and decisions based on context-dependent information, the
origin of which is external to the agent, cannot be attributed to the agent who acted on it. Nor can
it be attributed to the institution or system from which the information came. An argument for
cognitive extension that includes historical, social, and environmental institutions in the
cognitive system must be considered causally deterministic. Thus, any argument that attempts to
retain moral agency and responsibility is subject to the same objections that are rendered against
compatibilist accounts of free will, which I address in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
A REFUTATION OF COMPATIBILISM
Compatibilism claims that one can have free will and be morally responsible within a
causally determined universe. Since the two concepts seem irreconcilable, compatibilism seems
incoherent. The way compatibilists attempt to make their theories intelligible is by attempting to
show that their definition of freedom is compatible with both causal determinism and moral
responsibility. According to compatibilists, the requirements for FMR vary, depending on which
compatibilist you ask. Some of the most common compatibilist requirements for FMR include
variations of at least one of the following:
1. The ability to act upon one’s desires without constraint.
2. The ability to respond to reasons for acting or not acting.
3. The “mesh” of certain desires and volitions within the agent.
For most compatibilists, if the action was voluntary, the result of a deliberative process, and
endorsed by the agent, then the agent was free in the sense required for moral responsibility. In
this chapter, I will discuss and object to the three main types of compatibilism: classic, mesh, and
reasons-based, as defended by John Locke, Harry Frankfurt, and John Martin Fischer
respectively. My objection to libertarianism was that none of the theories offered adequate
evidence of agent origination. Since compatibilists do not even require agent origination for
moral responsibility, I will show why their alternatives do not suffice for moral responsibility
attributions.
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John Locke’s Classic Compatibilism
John Locke’s argument for free will is an example of what is now called Classic
Compatibilism. Arguments have since become more sophisticated, but they have their roots in
the main gist of Locke’s claim: to have FMR means to have the freedom to do what one wants. A
free act is one that an agent performs because she wants to do it. In explaining Locke’s version
of free will, I will show how merely doing what one wants to do is not enough to warrant
ascriptions of moral responsibility. First, I will demonstrate how Locke’s compatibilism does not
account for agent causation, then, later in the chapter, I will defend the necessity of agent
causation for FMR.
Locke pointedly states that we do not have a free will; yet this fact does not perturb his
belief that we are free agents. Attempting to defend metaphysical freedom (as opposed to
political freedom), he reframes the terms of the debate by defining freedom as the power to act
according to one’s volition (i.e., acting without physical or mental constraint). While there is a
debate over whether Locke is a libertarian or compatibilist, I assert that his argument for freedom
resembles that of compatibilists.
Similar to compatibilists, Locke attempts to grant agents freedom by limiting its
definition. For Locke, freedom means merely that which is without constraint. Early in his
chapter on power in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke repeatedly insists that
freedom consists solely of our ability to act in accordance with our volition (II, xxi, §27). He
offers the example of a man choosing to jump off a cliff. According to Locke, the man is free
because he may decide, and consequently act on that decision, either to jump or not to jump.
According to free will skepticism, the man’s decision is not free because whether or not he
jumps is not up to him in the sense Locke intends. Rather, the decision is based on factors such
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as his personality and context, neither of which is under the agent’s control. An agent’s
personality is an amalgam of characteristics acquired through genetics and shaped by experience.
Character traits do not spontaneously arise without cause or reason.6 Thus, the ultimate cause of
the man’s action can be attributed to external and antecedent factors over which he has no
control.
In explicating his view that agents are free despite their possession of a determined will,
Locke makes three claims; first, he states that the will is not free because it is a power or faculty
of the mind and as such cannot be free. Since it would be strange to say that a faculty is a power
of another faculty, Locke maintains that the traditional vocabulary used in the free will debate is
fundamentally misguided; freedom resides in the agent rather than in a capacity of the agent (II,
xxi, §14). This distinction is irrelevant to the present argument, since free will skeptics argue that
neither type of freedom exists.
Second, he states that whether or not we will an action is not within our control, or, more
precisely, he believes that we will an action necessarily (II, xxi, §23). Vere Chappell, via
Leibniz, claims that there is a flaw in Locke’s defense of this assertion, because one may be
interrupted during her consideration of an action, and thus the non-existence of an action does
not depend on an agent willing it to not exist as Locke implies (1994, 106). However, even if the
argument were sound, the conclusion, again, is irrelevant to the challenge of causal determinism.
If the will is determined by factors outside the agent, then Locke loses agent causation. If other
faculties of the agent determine the will, then a free will skeptic needs to show how those other
faculties are determined by factors outside the agent. Thus, regardless of whether Locke’s
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This view may be challenged by proponents of indeterminism; yet even if it can be shown that quantum
indeterminacies can affect actions on the macro level, as stated earlier, random events are not willed events; thus,
agents are still not free, given indeterminism.

46

argument in support of a determined will holds, all a free will skeptic need show is that he fails
to effectively ground causation within the agent.
Third, he argues that our preference of one course of action over the other is also
necessary (determined) (II, xxi, §23). Free will skeptics accept this claim and argue that one does
not have control over her preferences, since such inclinations are merely products of genetics,
education, social conditioning, and environment. Thus, even though we may intentionally and
voluntarily will an action (i.e. we are not constrained to do or not do x and we do x of our own
volition), that act is not free (in the FMR sense) because all of the action’s constitutive causal
factors, including the agent’s will, volition, preferences, and desires, are not of the agent’s own
choosing. While Locke’s argument is consistent with the free will skeptic’s assertion that our
will and preferences are not only determined, but also determined by external factors, he still
wants to grant humans autonomous agency.
Locke claims that the will is determined by the mind (II, xxi, §29). This claim seems to
support agent causation. However, what moves the mind is its reaction to external stimuli. He
states that the motive for sustaining an action is pleasure, and the cause for changing an action is
uneasiness; but while both sensations are experienced within the agent, they depend on factors
beyond the agent’s control (II, xxi, §29). Locke could claim that the mind moves the will
independently of external factors, but that would assume that the mind can independently and
spontaneously generate reactions to external stimuli. As argued in the last chapter, this would
violate physical causal closure. Moreover, free will skeptics argue that reactions are merely
conditioned responses to the phenomenal world that can be overcome only through
reconditioning or some other change in one’s external environment. For example, Locke is
correct in assuming that my attendance at a Star Trek convention is motivated by the pleasure I

47

derived from the series and a desire to socialize with other fans of the show. However, that
pleasure is rooted in such external influences as my exposure to Star Trek as a child and the
positive attitude I have toward science fiction that such exposure has engendered. I am no more
the creator of my mind than I am of my will.
Locke continues his argument against a free will by explaining how “uneasiness” or
desire determines the will; he states, “This Uneasiness we may call, as it is, Desire; which is an
uneasiness of the Mind for want of some absent good” (II, xxi, §31; italics in original). Thus,
according to Locke, our motivation to act is caused by a lacking of some sort. Locke uses the
example of our need for nourishment motivating our desire for sustenance. Without desire, we
are inert. Yet the fact that biological needs motivate us to satisfy them provides stronger
evidence for causal determinism and free will skepticism than for freedom. Even our partiality
for one type of food over another depends on what is available and on the preferences that we
have cultivated as a result of habit, environmental influences, and biological limitations.
Locke develops his line of reasoning by asserting that the “greater good, determines the
will,” but only if and when we desire it (II, xxi, §35). Describing agents who recognize the
greater good but still indulge in contrary pleasures, he provides the example of a drunkard who
may realize and acknowledge that his habit is causing him suffering, but due to “uneasiness,” he
finds himself desiring alcohol, “and the present uneasiness determines the will to the accustomed
action; which thereby gets stronger footing to prevail against the next occasion” (II, xxi, §35).
With its account of compulsion to do something due to an overpowering desire, and reinforcing
that action through repetition, the example seems, again, to be a stronger argument for free will
skepticism than for freedom. Locke has provided an adequate argument for how desire
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determines the will, but since desire is caused by factors external to the agent, Locke does not
achieve the type of freedom that is required for moral responsibility.
Locke further argues that desire is motivated by happiness, defined as pleasure and the
absence of pain (II, xxi, §41). According to Locke, this pleasure and pain “are produced in us, by
the operation of certain Objects, either on our Minds or our Bodies” (II, xxi, §42). These objects
that operate on the mind, while not necessarily external, are also not self-generated. Thus, here
again, we are not free. As I stated before, we do not choose our preferences. Marketers make a
career out of telling us what makes (or should make) us happy. They provide a need or desire
where before there was none. We do not choose what makes us happy or what causes us
pleasure; we merely pursue that which does.
Locke’s strongest evidence for freedom is the claim that an agent has the power to reflect
upon her desires, and that capacity affords her the freedom to act or to not act according to the
results of her deliberation (II, xxi, §47). Anticipating future renditions of compatibilism, Locke
asserts here that liberty no longer resides merely in an agent’s ability to act according to volition.
While in sections 29 – 46 Locke repeatedly insists that it is uneasiness (sometimes equated with
desire) alone that determines the will, in §47 he asserts that freedom comes from our ability to
reflect on our choices and, more importantly, to “suspend” our desires based on deliberation. He
later defines judgment as “what ultimately determines the Man, who could not be free if his will
were determin’d by any thing, but his own desire guided by his own judgment” (II, xxi, §71).
Thus, it now seems he has evaded the charge of placing the ultimate cause of an agent’s choices
and actions outside of the agent.
Locke believes that this interpretation of freedom allows for moral responsibility. His
argument throughout chapter xxi may be organized as follows:
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1. Liberty is the power of an agent to act or refrain from acting according to her volition.
(§5, 8, 12-18, 21, 27)
2. Volition is a necessary exercise of the will. (§23-25)
3. An agent’s will is determined by her mind. (§29)
4. The willing of the mind is determined by uneasiness defined as desire for “an absent
good.” (§29, 31-46, 57)
5. Desire is determined by happiness defined as pleasure and lack of pain. (§41-43)
6. An agent can suspend her desire until she determines whether it accords with a greater
good. (§47, 52)
7. The result of deliberation is judgment, which guides desire. (§48, 50)
8. Deliberation and judgment originate within the agent. (§48)7
9. Therefore, “a Man may justly incur punishment.”(II, xxi, §56)
Vere Chappell claims that Locke completely ignores the concept of moral responsibility
in Book II of Essay (2007, 144). However, I think a close reading of Locke’s argument
defending freedom in Chapter xxi reveals that he does broach the subject, albeit obliquely. The
phrase concerning punishment in the conclusion of the above construction of his argument seems
to imply that because we can deliberate and act upon subsequent judgments, we are indeed
morally responsible for our actions. It would be odd if Locke thought we deserved punishment if
he did not think we were morally responsible.8
Chappell claims that Locke’s argument suffers from internal incoherence; this claim
frustrates Locke’s amendment concerning desire suspension, in that premises two and six seem
to be contradictory (1994, 106). In premise two, volition is a necessary act and therefore not
controlled by the agent, whereas in premise six, an agent can suspend desire and thus prohibit her
volition through deliberation and judgment. Free actions, according to Locke, are those that are
in accordance to the will. The will is determined by uneasiness. The act of suspending one’s
desire is the result of an agent’s will. The will in that case seems to be determined by the agent

7

I inferred this premise from his claim that, “every Man is put under a necessity by his constitution, as an
intelligent Being, to be determined in willing by his own Thought and Judgment, what is best for him to do; else he
would be under the determination of some other than himself, which is want of Liberty.” (II, xxi, §48))
8
Chappell finds a similar reference to punishment in Book IV but I think Locke’s reference in Book II suffices as
evidence of his belief in moral responsibility.
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herself rather than by uneasiness. While, if true, a self-determined will would be a boon for
libertarians, it seems to undermine Locke’s earlier assertions concerning determined volitions.
Chappell thinks that this apparent contradiction may be resolvable. First, he states that the
volition to suspend one’s desires need not be free, and is thus compatible with Locke’s belief in
determined volitions (2000, 244-245). This works if you accept that a determined volition can be
thwarted by another determined volition. Thus, while the volition to suspend desire may be
determined according to Locke’s argument, the volition that results from deliberation would be
determined by that deliberation rather than by uneasiness, which Locke asserts is the sole cause
of willed actions.
Second, Chappell states, “Locke’s view of freedom limits free actions to those that an
agent wills, and whose forbearance she could will directly” (2000, 116). According to Chappell,
an agent does not will the restraint on volitions directly; rather, she wills the suspension of
desire, of which the thwarted volition is merely a consequence. Thus, since the volition is not the
immediate object of the willing, it does not meet Locke’s condition for a free action. If the
volition or the prohibition of the volition is not freely willed in the act of suspending desire, then
there is no conflict between determined volitions and desire suspension. Chappell remains
skeptical about whether this truly solves the problem, and he states that even Locke may have
abandoned his commitment to desire suspension later in life (2000, 116-117).
Regardless of whether one accepts Chappell’s solution to the possible inconsistencies in
Locke’s argument, a free will skeptic can still claim that, even if there were no discrepancy
between voluntary suspension of desire and determined volitions, Locke does not achieve agent
causation. A free will skeptic can undermine Locke’s latest formulation of freedom by contesting
his apparent assumption that our reason is unbiased. Locke holds that when we are not in the
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emotional throes of “Love, Anger, or any other violent Passion” our examination of possible
actions will lead unerringly to the greater good (II, xxi, §53). According to Locke, if our
judgment is flawed, it is our own fault for not listening to the dictates of reason; we are thus to be
held responsible for our moral failings. However, reason, like every other function of our brain,
does not operate independently of external influences. As I stated in the last chapter, reason is
merely the culmination of cognitive habits developed over time. Thus, it is both limited and
biased by our perspective. Reason is neither impartial nor self-determining; rather, it is
determined by genetics, context, and past experiences.
Locke seems to anticipate this problem when he advises us to “take pains to suit the relish
of our Minds to the true intrinsic good or ill, that is in things” as if through training, the mind can
achieve impartiality (II, xxi, §53). However, he almost immediately admits that rational humans
are apt to be in disagreement over what has intrinsic worth; happiness, pleasure, human dignity,
morality, eudaimonia, compassion, and aesthetics all vie for a privileged place in the human
hierarchy of value. Furthermore, Locke assumes we can foster the ability to change what our
mind desires; he states, “The relish of the mind may be alter’d; and ‘tis a mistake to think that
Men cannot change the displeasingness, or indifferency, that is in actions, into pleasure and
desire, if they will do but what is in their power” (II, xxi, §69). In one sense, he is correct; our
mind, habits, inclinations and perceptions of the external world are malleable. However, the
extent to which we can change or mitigate a desire is dependent on our character, which is
developed by factors out of our control. A practicing Buddhist may be more successful at
resisting desire than one who is raised in a capitalist society, which espouses material
consumption and greed as virtues; however, the Buddhist is no more ultimately responsible for
that capacity than the capitalist is responsible for the lack of such a capacity.
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Thus, Locke’s argument, for metaphysical freedom (representative of classic
compatibilism) never achieves agent origination. According to him, freedom involves being able
to act without constraint, in response to deliberation and according to one’s will. Will is
dependent on the mind, which is governed by desire, which is determined by happiness, which is
produced by reactions to external objects and circumstances. The problem with Locke’s freedom
lies with his definition. While the freedom Locke offers is indeed compatible with determinism,
it is a mitigated conception of freedom that ignores agent origination and thus deprives agents of
moral responsibility.
Harry Frankfurt’s Hierarchical Account
Harry Frankfurt also argues that classic compatibilism is an incomplete picture of
agential freedom. According to him, free will requires more than merely acting upon or
according to one’s desires; rather, it requires a “mesh” of first- and second-order desires. In other
words, according to Frankfurt, an agent has free will if her first-order desires (e.g., wanting a
piece of cake) conform to second-order volitions (wanting to want a piece of cake). He begins
his article, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” with a discussion of what
distinguishes a person from a non-person, and he concludes that the relevant characteristic is the
capacity to form second-order volitions defined as an agent’s wish to have a certain desire be her
will (1971, 257).
He distinguishes between freedom of action (freedom to do what one wants) and freedom
of the will (freedom to want what one wants), and states that if a person “enjoys both freedom of
action and freedom of the will…he has, in that case, all the freedom it is possible to desire or to
conceive…there is nothing in the way of freedom that he lacks” (1971, 263). According to
Frankfurt, this type of freedom, is compatible with determinism, and does not require alternate
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possibilities. As for agent origination, Frankfurt dismisses the requirement as irrelevant to the
type of freedom that is worth having. In response to Roderick Chisholm’s view that “in order to
be free an agent needs to be a prime mover unmoved,” Frankfurt argues that “Chisholm offers no
reason for believing that there is a discernible difference between the experience of a man who
miraculously initiates a series of causes when he moves his hand and a man who moves his hand
without any such breach of the normal causal sequence” (1971, 263).
I agree with Frankfurt that the difference between the two events may not be discernible,
but that by itself does not render the difference irrelevant. The relevant difference between an
action that spontaneously originates within an agent and one that does not is the ownership of the
causal stream that issues from that action. If an action does not originate within an agent, if she is
not an uncaused cause, then the action is not hers in any robust sense of ownership. Agents are
like puppets controlled by the strings of antecedent causal factors and environmental, and social
influences. If the strings of a puppet move the puppet’s arm and cause it to punch another
puppet, no one blames the puppet; they blame whoever is controlling the strings. In the case of
human action, the strings may be indiscernible, but that does not mean humans are not
manipulated, controlled, or coercively influenced by factors over which they have no control.
Thus, without agent origination, agents lack the type of control that would make their actions
theirs in the robust sense that would justify moral responsibility ascriptions.
John Martin Fischer objects to Frankfurt’s rendition of compatibilism arguing that it is
not “sufficiently historical” (2011, 21). According to Fischer, “The problem with such
hierarchical “mesh” theories, no matter how they are refined, is that the selected mesh can be
produced via responsibility-undermining mechanism” (2006, 79). By “responsibilityundermining mechanisms,” Fischer means that covert manipulation could cause conformity

54

between volitions and desires depriving the agent of the type of freedom relevant to moral
responsibility. While I agree with Fischer’s assessment of Frankfurt’s argument, I argue further
that Fischer’s historical requirement does not reach far enough into the historical root of an
agent’s action.
Free will skeptics contend that because all desires, including second-order desires, are
causally determined by factors beyond an agent’s control. If the second-order desire did not
spontaneously originate within an agent, and if she has no ultimate control over what that desire
is, then merely endorsing that desire and making that desire one’s effective will is not enough to
grant FMR to that agent. What Frankfurt’s account lacks is an adequate, FMR-granting account
of the origination of second-order volitions. If an agent has no control over which mental
capacities, habits, and preferences are inculcated throughout her life, then second-order (and
third-, forth-, fifth-… order) volitions are as much a causal result of factors beyond her control as
first-order desires. The fact that they conform (or do not conform) is irrelevant to attributions of
moral responsibility.
John Martin Fischer’s Reasons-Based Position
Fischer’s alternative to Frankfurt’s hierarchical theory is a reasons-based compatibilistic
defense of moral responsibility. He labels his position “semicompatibilism,” because he argues
that we could be morally responsible without free will and, like Frankfurt, he rejects alternate
possibilities as a requirement for moral responsibility. Instead, Fischer devises a position based
on guidance control, moderate reasons-responsiveness, and mechanism ownership. Fischer
emphatically contends that agent origination, as defined in the last chapter, is too strict a
requirement for moral responsibility, calling it “metaphysical megalomania” (2011, 20). Fischer
aligns himself with the typical compatibilist agenda to redefine the requirements for moral
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responsibility. He understands that we lack “ultimate” or “total” control, so he defines FMR in
such a way as to accommodate that fact. Since my response to Fischer could also be used as a
response to any reasons-based approach, I will limit my discussion to his theory.
Guidance Control
Fischer distinguishes between two types of control: regulative and guidance. Regulative
control requires access to alternate possibilities (i.e., at the time of the choice, the agent could
have chosen differently). However, since Fischer takes Frankfurt-style cases to be convincing
evidence that alternate possibilities are not necessary for moral responsibility, the only type of
control Fischer claims is required (and sufficient) for FMR is what he calls “guidance control.”
He uses the example of an agent driving a car to illustrate the difference between the two types
of control:
Let us suppose that I am driving my car. It is functioning well, and I wish to make a right
turn. As a result of my intention to turn right, I signal, turn the steering wheel, and
carefully guide the car to the right. Further, I here assume that I was able to form the
intention not to turn the car to the right but to turn the car to the left instead. Also, I
assume that had I formed such an intention, I would have turned the steering wheel to the
left and the car would have gone to the left. In this ordinary case, I guide the car to the
right, but I could have guided it to the left. I control the car, and also I have a certain
control over the car’s movements. Insofar as I actually guide the car in a certain way, I
shall say I have “guidance control.” Further, insofar as I have the power to guide the car
in a different way, I shall say I have “regulative control.” (2006, 39)
According to Fischer, in order to have guidance control, one must be moderately reasonsresponsive and the “mechanism,” or process, resulting in the action must be “the agent’s own.”
Mechanism Ownership
“Mechanism ownership” seems to be Fischer’s attenuated version of sourcehood. It
means that an agent has control over the mechanism, which results in a behavior. He explains
mechanism ownership stating, “[an agent] makes his mechanism his own by taking responsibility
for acting from that kind of mechanism. In a sense, then one acquires control by taking control.
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When I act on my own suitably reasons-responsive mechanism, I do it my way” (2011, 11 italics
in original). According to Fischer, in order for a mechanism to be an agent’s own, she must not
be under the influence of covert manipulation by, say, a nefarious neurosurgeon or hypnotist.
Another attribute of mechanism ownership is the ability to subject reasons for acting to
critical evaluation. He states,
As practical reasoners and normative agents, we identify and weigh (or ‘process’) reasons
in certain distinctive ways. Different physical parts might physically implement this way
of identifying and weighing reasons in the brain in various different ways and; even so, it
would still be the same unimpaired human mechanism of practical reasoning. This
mechanism of practical reasoning involves the reasonable and fair opportunity to subject
to critical scrutiny any emergent or newly presenting desire, or any tendency to identify
or weigh reasons in a certain way. (2011, 199)
This requirement for mechanism ownership resembles other compatibilist accounts such as
Laura Ekstrom’s and John MacIntyre’s condition for free will, in that it requires the ability to
critically evaluate potential actions and decisions based on one’s values, and the ability to either
endorse or reject such actions and decisions. Such proponents of compatibilism attempt to
reconcile physical determinism with FMR by arguing that as long as an agent has complete
control over certain faculties of the mind, such as reason, then the agent should be held morally
responsible for her actions. For example, Immanuel Kant states, “Reason must regard itself as
the author of its own principles” (2002, 148). Reason may indeed author its own principles, and
it may do so independently of desires and inclinations, but it may not do so independently of
external influences.
A compatibilist may attempt to reconcile causal determinism with autonomous reason by
stating that during any instance of deliberation, moral or otherwise, one’s reason at the time of
the action or decision is bracketed from the past and external world and remains as a freestanding composite of past actions and influences. However, if reason were completely separable
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from the external world there would be no grounding for cognitive habits. For example, if I will
that it be a universal law that it is always good to help an elderly, blind person cross a busy
street, eventually I will no longer have to deliberate each time I see an elderly, blind person
trying to cross a busy street; I will need only to recognize the situation as one requiring such
action. In novel situations, even if I reason independently of my character, desire, or inclination,
my deliberation on what to do will require access to my upbringing, education and other social
influences. Thus, while critical reflection indeed causally contributes to an action, the ownership
of the mechanism or process does not belong solely or ultimately to an agent.
Reasons-responsiveness
Along with mechanism ownership, Fischer argues that an agent must also be moderately
reasons-responsive in order to possess guidance control. Fischer distinguishes between weak,
strong, and moderate reasons-responsiveness. Strong reasons-responsiveness means that if an
agent had any sufficient reason to not perform an action, then the agent would refrain from
performing that action. Fischer argues that this is type of reasons-responsiveness is inadequate
because it would absolve weak-willed individuals from moral responsibility (2012, 125). For
example, imagine I want to go wakeboarding on a sunny Sunday afternoon, knowing that I have
to submit a currently unfinished paper proposal early the next day. Imagine in this scenario that I
am weak-willed, and the impending deadline would not be enough to distract me from my plan
to wakeboard. According to Fischer, because I do not respond to a sufficient reason for not
wakeboarding, strong reasons-responsiveness would absolve me of moral responsibility, should I
miss the deadline.
Weak reasons-responsiveness means that as long as an agent could and would respond to
at least one sufficient reason, such as an impending deadline, for not performing an action, such
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as wakeboarding, then the agent is morally responsible. According to Fischer, this is not strong
enough, because it grants moral responsibility even to those who would recognize only “weird”
or “bizarre” reasons for not performing an action (2012, 125). In this example, imagine I actually
go wakeboarding on Sunday afternoon; however, had I suffered from schizophrenia, and had
voices in my head told me that I must never wakeboard again under pain of death, I would have
recognized that as a good and sufficient reason to not wakeboard. In this case, Fischer would
argue that my response to this reason should not warrant responsibility ascriptions since I would
have been under the influence of a psychological disorder.
Moderate reasons-responsiveness refers to an agent who performed an action, but would
have refrained from performing that action if she had had at least one good (a reason recognized
as good by any rational person) and sufficient reason to not perform that action. Fischer claims
that requiring an agent to be moderately reasons-responsive grants moral responsibility to those
who are weak-willed, but not to those whose actions result from a compulsion or a faulty or
irrational reasoning process. In the final example, I go wakeboarding on Sunday afternoon;
however, had it begun to rain torrentially on the way to my car, I would have recognized that to
be a good and sufficient reason to refrain from going wakeboarding. In the last case, should I still
endeavor to go wakeboarding despite the good reason to not do so, if I literally could not stop
myself from going wakeboarding even as lightning threatened overhead, then I would fail to
meet the moderate reasons-responsiveness requirement. In that case, Fischer would agree that I
was acting under a compulsion and not morally responsible for that decision.
Fischer responds to his skeptics
Fischer defends his position against incompatibilists (both libertarians and free will
skeptics) who require stricter conditions for moral responsibility. For example, Galen Strawson
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argues that moral responsibility requires that we be something impossible: self-creators (in
Fischer 2011, 167). In response to Strawson, Fischer references Feinberg, “if one is presented
with an ‘inflated’ notion of self-creation or autonomy, one ought to jettison it in favor of
something more reasonable” (2011, 168). Fischer defends his “more-reasonable” theory by
illustrating that there are an almost infinite number of factors that have a causal influence over
our actions (such as the fact that if the sun were to wink-out, we would not exist, as agents or
otherwise) over which we have no control, and demanding such control over such factors is too
great a demand for moral responsibility.
I agree that requiring agents to have absolute and total control over every causal factor or
external influence involved in their choices and actions would indeed be too demanding, but that
is not what free will skeptics necessarily require for moral responsibility. The free will skeptic’s
argument is not that we need ultimate control over every factor contributing to our action; our
argument is that we do not have ultimate control over any factor contributing to our action. I do
not need to elucidate exactly which or how many causal factors must be within our control in
order to have moral responsibility, I need merely show that none of the causal events leading to
my choice or behavior were ultimately under my control (in the sense relevant to moral
responsibility).
For example, returning to my decision to go wakeboarding on a warm, sunny Sunday
afternoon. An infinite number of factors causally contribute to that decision, such as the fact that
it was not raining, the fact that the cable at the park did not break that morning, the fact that a
meteorite did not destroy the earth the previous evening. Fischer seems to claim that free will
skeptics 9 argue that we must have control not only over every causal factor that actually

9

Since Fischer’s theory demands only that causal determinism be compatible with moral responsibility, rather than
with free will, I will clarify that free will skepticism as I defend it includes moral responsibility skepticism.
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contributes to our choices and action, but also over every non-occurring counterfactual that also
contributes to our choices and actions. I do not, indeed I cannot, have control over such things,
but I at least need to have ultimate control over my decision to go wakeboarding on that Sunday
afternoon. That decision needs to have spontaneously originated within me for me to be morally
responsible for it. If I, or perhaps LaPlace’s demon, could analyze that decision and account for
all the factors causally contributing to that decision (Fischer’s hypothetical counterfactual
interventions aside), I would find that I have no evidence of any of those factors spontaneously
originating within me. My affinity for the sport, my fitness and health, and the value I give to
reasons both for and against wakeboarding on that particular day at that particular time, all have
their ultimate sources in external and historical factors.
Saul Smilanski also argues for the requirement of total control for moral responsibility.
Smilanski agrees with libertarians and free will skeptics that the truth of causal determinism
would preclude moral responsibility, because “causal determinism would entail that ‘people
cannot ultimately create themselves, and their choices, including their choices to change
themselves, and anything they do, can only follow from factors ultimately beyond their control’”
(Smilanski in Fischer, 2011, 174). Fischer’s response to Smilanski uses the same line he gives to
both libertarians and free will skeptics, and it comes in the form of a strategic concession. He
agrees that, “luck is thoroughly pervasive. And it manifests itself, not just in a range of
alternative scenarios or non-actual possible worlds, but in the actual world” (2011, 176).
However, Fischer argues that neither luck nor causal determination deprive a person of moral
responsibility, since neither luck nor causal determinism affect guidance control.
Furthermore, Fischer argues that one of the benefits of his theory is that through guidance
control and mechanism ownership, an agent can indeed be the creative author of her life in a
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robust, meaningful, and responsibility-granting way, regardless of the truth of causal
determinism. Fischer states, “acting freely—exhibiting the signature freedom-relevant control,
guidance control—makes us the authors of our narratives. As such, we are artists, and I contend
that the value of acting freely is thus the value of artistic self-expression” (2012, 127). Thus,
according to Fischer, his theory grants us something that we value: creative self-expression.
I agree that the features Fischer uses to commend his own theory—its emphasis on the
history of an action and creative authorship—are indeed important to attributions of moral
responsibility. In fact, according to free will skepticism, as I defend it, the history of the action is
the only factor relevant to responsibility attributions. However, as I will explain in the next
section, compatibilists, including Fischer, do not trace the history of an action far enough.
Guidance control is not enough. As for the second feature, free will skepticism does not deprive
an agent of creative self-expression; it merely states that an agent is not the origin of that
expression. Regardless of the truth of causal determinism (or indeterminism), agents exist within
a unique narrative within which they can express themselves as they would like. The fact that
they did not author their own narrative should not, by itself, deprive someone of the value they
attribute to that narrative. I discuss and defend this point more thoroughly in the next chapter.
Pereboom’s Four Cases
As a response to the compatibilist accounts described above, Derk Pereboom offers four
cases wherein “Mr. Plum kills Mr. White.” These cases range from an obvious but whimsical
case of external manipulation to a case involving the type of causal determination we experience
in the real world. Together, these cases illustrate and support his claim that not only are we not
the ultimate cause of our action, but also that any account of freedom that lacks agent causation
also deprives one of moral responsibility.
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The first case stipulates that, “Professor Plum was created by neuroscientists, who can
manipulate him directly through the use of radio-like technology” (2001, 112). In all other
aspects he resembles ordinary humans. Plum is able to perform all the deliberative functions
required by the Locke, Frankfurt, and Fischer, in that he can deliberate, respond to reasons, and
act with intention according to second-order volition. These functions, however, are manipulated
by the neuroscientists, so that when Plum undertakes the reasoning process, he does so in
accordance with rational egoism. The neuroscientists only intervene when Plum begins to
deliberate. If the dictates of egoism demanded that he not kill White, then Plum would have
refrained from doing so; but in this case, egoistic reasons favor murder.
The second case is much like the first, except that rather than being created by
neuroscientists, Plum is the product of an ordinary birth. However, soon after he is born,
neuroscientists program him, as before, to reason “often but not exclusively” as a rational egoist
(2001, 113-114). In his present situation, egoistic reasoning again leads him to murder White. In
the third case, the neuroscientists are replaced by “the rigorous training practices of his home and
community” (2001, 114). Plum is once again conditioned at a young, impressionable age to be a
rational egoist. As in the first two cases, and as a result of his childhood manipulation, egoistic
reasoning outweighs the alternatives, and he murders poor Mr. White.
In the final case, Pereboom asserts that causal determinism is true and that Professor
Plum was born and raised under normal circumstances. As a rational egoist, Plum reasons
accordingly and chooses to murder White. Pereboom’s contention is that if one absolves Plum of
responsibility in the first three cases, which involve obvious manipulation, then one should
absolve him of responsibility in the fourth case as well:
The best explanation for the intuition that Plum is not morally responsible in the
first three cases is that he lacks the control required for moral responsibility due to
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his actions resulting from a deterministic causal process that traces back to factors
beyond his control. Because Plum is also causally determined in this way in Case
4, we should conclude that here too Plum is not morally responsible for the same
reason. (2007, 97)
The main point illustrated by Pereboom’s examples is that if we did not ultimately cause our
actions, then we should not be held morally responsible for them. If Ms. Peacock held a gun to
Professor Plum’s head and ordered him to shoot Mr. White or die, most, if not all, juries would
judge Plum to have a good enough excuse to be exonerated, despite the fact that Plum
intentionally pulled the trigger. Pereboom argues that there is no morally relevant difference
between the excusing conditions apparent in a bank robbery scenario, where a teller would not be
found morally responsible for giving a robber the bank’s money, and the so-called “normal”
condition of causally determined individuals. We do not cause our mental states, so we do not
ultimately cause the actions that issue from those mental states. If we excuse those who are
obviously manipulated by external factors, we should also excuse those who are manipulated by
external factors that are not obvious, which is everyone.
The Consequent Argument and Definitions of “Can”
One of the main reasons I personally am not convinced by compatibilist arguments is that
compatibilists have yet to provide an adequate answer to Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence
Argument, which states,
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events
in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is
it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things
(including our present acts) are not up to us. (Van Inwagen in Russell, 2013, 117)
The consequence argument may be interpreted to mean both that we lack the ability to do
otherwise and that we lack ultimate control. If the phrase “up to us” is interpreted to mean
ultimate control then, if I do not have ultimate control over the causal events of which the action
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is a consequence then I do not have ultimate control over the action. The consequence argument
poses no threat to guidance control, or to the ability to act on endorsed preferences, but if the
consequence argument is true, and if ultimate control is required for moral responsibility, then
compatibilist arguments for FMR ultimately fail.
The other interpretation of the consequence argument claims that it refutes the ability to
do otherwise, for example, Peter van Inwagen states,
It seems to be generally agreed that the concept of free will should be understood in terms
of the power or ability of agents to act otherwise than they in fact do. To deny that men
have free will is to assert that what man does do and what he can do coincide. And almost
all philosophers agree that a necessary condition for holding an agent responsible for an act
is believing that that agent could have refrained from performing that act. (1975, 188)
This interpretation of the consequence argument implies not only that humans are not free
agents, but we lack freedom precisely because we could not do other than what we do. To have
freedom, we would need the capacity to either change, or operate independently of the dictates
of, the past and the laws of nature, i.e., we would need the ability to do other than what those
conditions entail. Moral evaluations and judgments presuppose that an agent could have done
otherwise, i.e., belief in alternate possibilities underlies ascriptions of blame and praise. We
believe that an agent genuinely had a choice in the matter, and because they chose one action
over another, we hold them accountable for the choice they actually made. The consequence
argument challenges these moral intuitions implying that if we lack the ability to do otherwise,
we would have to re-evaluate our practice of holding people responsible for their actions because
they could no longer be seen as free agents.
One strategy compatibilists use in response to this interpretation of the consequence
argument is the application of varying senses of the word “can” as it relates to freedom and the
ability to do otherwise. One sense of “can” (or ability, or power) is the mundane, or trivial, sense,
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which refers to either a physical or epistemic ability. A physical ability denotes what I am able to
do by virtue of being a member of my species: I can walk, talk, and deliberate, but, in the
immortal words of the character Scotty, in the original Star Trek series, “I cannot change the
laws of physics.” An epistemic ability refers to what I know how to do as an individual. I can
knit, read, and write pedantic philosophy papers, but I cannot speak Swahili. While the physical
and epistemic senses of “can” are a necessary component of freedom and of an ability to do
otherwise, they are far from sufficient for FMR; mere physical ability and knowledge of how to
perform an action, as well as knowledge of what options are available, do not entail that one will
be able to act on that knowledge.
The second sense of “can” concerns whether or not I can perform an action in accordance
with my will or desire to do so, and is described by Berofsky in terms of “opportunity” (2002,
184). Under this definition, “can” implies that I act freely when I act in accordance with my will
and I am not constrained in doing so. This is the sense of “can” that Locke employs in his
defense of free will. For example, I may desire to knit a scarf on a plane, but if safety restrictions
do not allow knitting needles on planes, I cannot knit a scarf on a plane despite my epistemic and
physical ability to do so. As argued earlier, one problem with this sense of “can” is that it allows
for too much freedom. If a robust sense of freedom consists of merely being able to perform an
action without being constrained, then a dog or a rat may be said to have free will so long as they
are unfettered in their ability to act on their desire to eat steak or cheese (Frankfurt, 1971, 260).
Despite a non-human animal’s ability to desire, and in some cases, deliberate, compatibilists
typically do not want to extend free will to species that do not possess the mental capacities
enjoyed by rational humans. Compatibilists have responded by retaining this “opportunity” sense
of “can,” but rather than defining it as the ability to act according to desire, theorists such as
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Frankfurt and Fischer define it in terms of features of the will that are not shared with other
species, such as second-order volitions, powers of reflection, character, and the ability to respond
to reasons.
The final sense of “can” is the metaphysical sense. To say that I can do otherwise in this
sense does not refer to an epistemic ability (I could have knitted a scarf rather than going to class
because I know how to knit), nor does it correspond to my doing it according to my desire (I
could have knitted a scarf rather than going to class if I had so desired). Rather, the metaphysical
sense of “can” as it relates to alternate possibilities implies that I have contra-causal freedom,
i.e., my actions are not merely the products of natural laws and causal processes that trace to
factors beyond my control. Free will skeptics assert that this is the kind of ability required for
FMR, and that it never actually obtains. For every choice, according to free will skeptics, only
one option is actually available to an individual; thus, while a person has the theoretical ability
do what she knows how to do, and a person theoretically has the power to act on her desires, a
person does not have the ability or power to act contrary to the dictates of past events and natural
laws.
When applying the different senses of “can” to the phrase, “could have done otherwise,”
the first sense suggests that I knew of other options, but it does not imply that I could have
actually acted on them. The second sense claims that I have the ability to act otherwise according
to reasons, desires, inclinations and character, but this sense proves to be problematic because it
amounts to the claiming that, had I the power to change my desires and intentions, or were I a
different person at the time of the action, I would have acted differently. The last sense, given
free will skepticism, does not reside within the realm of possibilities.
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Most compatibilist arguments capitalize on the opportunity sense of the word “can.” One
such argument is the conditional analysis of freedom and ability. Berofsky cites a hypothetical
conditional offered by G.E. Moore: “we exercised free will in doing A rather than B…in virtue
of the conditional fact that we would have done B had we chosen to do so” (2002, 181) This
version of the compatibilist argument embodies the intuition that we could have done otherwise,
and the choice not to is “up to us.” Objections to conditional arguments take many forms. One
type refers back to van Inwagen’s consequence argument, pointing out that in order for someone
to have chosen differently she would have to have control over the prior events resulting in her
choice; since she has no such control, she could not have chosen differently even if she had
wanted to (2002, 183). Another objection comes from J.L. Austin, who describes a golfer
missing a putt (in Dennett, 1984, 146-147). The golfer has the physical and epistemic ability to
putt the ball into the hole, but after trying, fails. It makes no sense, in this example, to say he
could have done otherwise if he had so desired because he did desire to the make the hole, and
failed. Chisholm argues that “could have done otherwise” is not equivalent to the hypothetical
conditional “could have done otherwise if she had so chosen,” since the latter could be true while
the former is false: “our man might be such that, if he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would
have done otherwise, and yet also such that he could not have done otherwise” (1991, 191).
There are many nuanced instantiations of the different renditions of “can” that challenge
the simplicity of the three analyses detailed above. For example, Daniel Dennett cites Martin
Luther’s famous declamation, “Here I stand; I can do no other” (1984, 133 and Arpaly, 42).
Luther does not mean that he had no other epistemic options, but rather, because his character is
of a certain sort, he is compelled to act in a certain way. Yet despite being compelled, he seems
to imply that he takes full responsibility for his actions. This type of justification for actions

68

defines freedom in terms of acting according to one’s character and fits into the second sense of
the word “can.” If Luther’s character had been different (for example, had he desired to stay
home on the day in question) then according to the “opportunity” sense of “can” and the
conditional analysis of freedom, he would have.
Daniel Dennett and Martin Heidegger
Dennett believes that focusing on the metaphysical sense of the word “can” is
unnecessary. Since we obviously cannot change the past, Dennett thinks we should shift our
emphasis from the fixed past to the “open future”. He defines an “open” future as one “in which
our deliberation is effective: a future in which if I decide to do A then I will do A, and if I decide
to do B then I will do B; a future in which—since only one future is possible—the only possible
thing that can happen is the thing I decide in the end to do” (1984, 139). Thus, according to
Dennett, when someone commits a regrettable act, like slapping a coworker, the question should
not be, “could she have done otherwise?” but rather, “can she do otherwise in the future?” The
sense of “can” employed in the second question seems to be the trivial sense: is it within her
power as a certain type of being to alter her character in such a way that she avoids the past
mistake? Or perhaps she slapped her coworker due to Tourette’s syndrome; in which case, she
physically could not have restrained her motion. If the action stemmed from her character, and
she succeeds in reforming it, perhaps aided by anger management classes, then her ability
graduates from the mundane sense of “can” to the opportunity sense, i.e., she can, according to
her reformed character, refrain from slapping her coworker (if she so desires). Thus, according to
Dennett, asking, “could I have done otherwise?” is only meaningful when it serves as a tool for
evaluating an individual’s future potential.
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Heidegger attempts to disqualify the metaphysical sense of “can” by appealing to our
phenomenological sense of alternate possibilities. He offers an alternate description of human
agency by claiming that the fact that we can re-interpret the past and change its meaning signifies
that present actions are not necessarily determined by the past as it happened. As such, “humans
are beings who can envision a range of possibilities as defined by the cultural context in which
they act, and so always make choices against a backdrop of alternative ways of acting. This
‘standing out into a range of possibilities’ is not something that can be grasped by physicalist
causal statements” (2002, 333). A free will skeptic can grant that epistemically we have a “range
of possibilities” (i.e., we can recognize or know about all the options available in the world), but
metaphysically, we have only one option actually available to us. We can perceive all of the
options as open to us because we do not yet know which option we will choose. This is why
deliberation and choice are not undermined given determinism or free will skepticism, even
though they are not free actions. Also, the meaning we give to the past is determined by our
present context and thus does not lie outside of causal influences.
Dennett and Heidegger seem to be missing something vital by demoting the import of the
metaphysical sense of “can.” While being able to assess our epistemic options is important to
deliberation, and asking questions about future possibilities is important for moral education and
improvement (and may factor into one’s determination), questions concerning an agent’s actual
choices are important for moral responsibility ascriptions. This is what is expressed by the
position that free will requires alternate possibilities, and this is what we lack, according to the
consequence argument.
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Why Alternate Possibilities are not Required for FMR
Many free will theorists reject the requirement of alternate possibilities for FMR because
of examples or cases that illustrate how an agent may be free (at least in a mitigated sense),
despite the inability to do otherwise. In one such counterexample, John Locke describes a
situation wherein a sleeping man is brought into a locked room. The man awakes to find himself
in such desirable company that, even if the door were unlocked, he would “willingly” remain in
the room (1975, 238). According to Locke, because the man wants to be in the room with his
company, the fact that the door is locked, the fact that he could not leave the room if he so
desired, does not mitigate his responsibility for remaining in the room. Thus, Locke’s rendition
of agential freedom (of the type required for moral responsibility) requires only that the agent
acted according to her desires.
Harry Frankfurt provides examples that mirror Locke’s, in that they also illustrate
situations in which the desire of the agent supersedes the ability to do otherwise in responsibility
ascriptions. In the example Frankfurt uses in Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,
Black wants Jones to perform an action that Jones is already contemplating doing (1969, 144). If
Jones decides to not perform the action, Black will know, and he will manipulate Jones into
performing the action using whatever means necessary. The means Black employs would
constitute, according to Frankfurt, causal sufficiency for Jones’ performing the action. In the
example, Jones decides to perform the action without any interference from Black. Frankfurt
concludes that Jones is morally responsible for the action despite his inability to do otherwise.
Since the publication of Frankfurt’s article, many (but not all) free will theorists have abandoned
alternate possibilities as a necessary condition for FMR.
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Fischer and Ravizza dispute van Inwagen’s consequence argument by offering
counterexamples involving overdetermined actions. These examples challenge the intuition that
if I have no responsibility for one event (the past), and that event causes another event (the
present), then I have no responsibility for the latter event. (1998, 154) One such example
involves a double agent, Betty, who wishes to bury an enemy camp in an avalanche of snow at
T3 by exploding a bomb at the top of a mountain at T1. However, due to erosion, a natural
avalanche would have started at T2 crushing the camp at T3 regardless of whether or not Betty
detonated the bomb (1998, 157). Thus, even though Betty had no control over the fact that the
enemy camp was going to be destroyed at T3 as a direct consequence of an avalanche, the
intuition is that Betty is still morally responsible for its destruction. Overdetermination examples,
like Frankfurt-style examples, undermine the necessity of alternate possibilities for freedom;
together, these two types of counterexamples provide a credible reason to discard the notion that
freedom requires the ability to do otherwise.
Other compatibilist definitions of freedom also do not depend on alternate possibilities.
R. Jay Wallace combines elements of Kant’s and Strawson’s accounts of free will, arguing that
one can be held morally responsible if she has “the power to grasp and apply moral reasons, and
the power to control one’s behavior by the light of such reasons” (1994, 7). Nomy Arpaly’s view
of freedom focuses on the actual reasons upon which an agent acts and ascribes blame along a
continuum of desert based on an agent’s quality of will (2006, 17-18). While it is not possible to
provide an exhaustive list in this chapter, the fact that so many examples exist illustrates a
growing abandonment of alternate possibilities as a requisite for FMR.
Free will skeptics object that merely abandoning the requirement of alternate possibilities
for FMR is not enough to grant FMR. While compatibilists describe a type of freedom, it is not
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the type required for moral responsibility ascriptions. Because the above compatibilist positions
employ the opportunity sense of “can” rather than the metaphysical sense, such arguments do not
satisfy free will skeptics. Since none of the above compatibilist renditions of “can” or freedom
account for the sort of agency that free will skeptics contend is required for moral responsibility,
the contention that alternate possibilities is not necessary for freedom provides no consolation to
those seeking a justification of, or argument for, FMR.
Baron Paul D’Holbach’s Argument against Free Will
One of my main arguments against compatibilism is that tracing an action to one’s
intentions or desires does not go back far enough. Compatibilists do not account for the
determination of mental capacities and attitudes such as intentions, desires, preferences and
beliefs. If my mental capacities and attitudes are caused by external and historical factors
beyond my control, then the actions resulting from such attitudes are also beyond my control. I
disagree that demanding such total or ultimate control for moral responsibility is a sign of
“metaphysical megalomania.” Rather, in the spirit of fairness and justice, it is the necessary,
sufficient and minimal kind of control requisite for FMR.
Baron Paul D’Holbach explains why agents are not, indeed cannot, be the ultimate
creators of their thoughts and actions in his System of Nature:
Man’s life is a line that nature commands him to describe upon the surface of the earth,
without his ever being able to swerve from it, even for an instant. He is born without his
own consent; his organization does in nowise depend upon himself; his ideas come to
him involuntarily; his habits are in the power of those who cause him to contract them; he
is unceasingly modified by causes, wither visible or concealed, over which he has no
control, which necessarily regulate his mode of existence, give the hue to his way of
thinking, and determine his manner of acting. (1970, 88)
D’Holbach’s argument perfectly illustrates the consequence argument. If actions are the result of
one’s will (or proattitudes such as volitions, desires, preferences and intentions), and if one’s will
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is determined by past events and physical laws over which we have no control, then one’s
actions are also determined in a way that deprives an agent of FMR. According to D’Holbach, if
someone is able to refrain from acting upon certain volitions, then “it is because a new cause,
new motive, new idea, modifies his brain giving him a new impulse and determines his will
another way” (1970, 90). The example D’Holbach uses is that of a thirsty person refraining from
drinking poisonous water. Compatibilists would argue that the ability of the agent to refrain from
ingesting the poisoned water is a responsibility-conferring ability. Since the agent is acting on
her desire to not drink poison, Locke would call the action a free one. Since the agent’s volition
is in alignment with her desire (i.e., she endorses her decision to not drink the poison), Frankfurt
would also agree that the agent is engaged in a free action. Fischer would claim that the agent
possesses guidance control, since she was able to respond to a good reason to not drink the
water, and because the action was chosen in accordance with the agent’s value preferences—
valuing life over the desire to quench one’s thirst.
However, D’Holbach argues that the agent, in her refraining, is neither free (in the
relevant sense) nor morally responsible, just as the person who would drink the poison out of a
compulsion or blatant disregard for her life is neither free nor responsible: “the actions of fools
are as necessary as those of the most prudent individuals” (1970, 90). The reason for this equity
is D’Holbach’s position that the ability to choose is not the same as exercising free will.
According to D’Holbach, in order to have FMR, a person “should be able to will or choose
without motive, or [be able to] prevent motives coercing his will” (1970, 92). Acting without
motive, intention or reason would extricate the action from its historical or environmental
entrenchment, but our current understanding of agential action indicates that it cannot be
extricated in this way, as Hume argued, “if an action is uncaused, it will not have sufficient
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connection with the agent for her to be morally responsible for it” (in Pereboom, 2013, 55) As
for preventing motives or choosing which motives affect one’s will, D’Holbach has explained
why such abilities do not originate within the agent. When an agent decides not to act upon a
certain motive, there is a historically- or environmentally-based reason she did so. Either way,
the action did not originate within the agent.
Conclusion
The ability to act voluntarily upon intentions, the possession of guidance control, and
conformity between levels of volitions and desires are not enough to grant moral responsibility if
such abilities, capacities and volitions are not ultimately of the agent’s making. Many of our
mental attributes form in our youth without our knowledge or awareness, much less our consent
and endorsement. Compatibilists dismiss an agent’s lack of control over which mental attitudes
she possesses, while free will skeptics argue that it is that type “ultimate” control which makes
her morally responsible for the actions stemming from those attitudes. Without the capacity to
control the formation of the mental capacities causally responsible for the choices and actions,
we are merely the puppets of circumstance, environment, biology, and history. We truly are, as
Shakespeare wrote, “merely players” acting out our parts, with no ultimate control over the
script.
The reasons people feel like they possess FMR are based on a misunderstanding about
the type of causation agents exert, shortsightedness concerning historical and contextual causal
influences, and a disbelief in the inevitability of outcomes. The reasons people want to possess
FMR and the reasons people are averse to free will skepticism, are based on a deeply ingrained
sense of entitlement to reward and punishment based on merit, a desire to see wrongdoers “pay,”
and a misunderstanding or pessimistic view of the ethical implications of free will skepticism. I
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will focus the next chapter on dispelling such misunderstandings, and, in the final chapter, I will
present my arguments for why free will skepticism is the best practical option for a flourishing
society.
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CHAPTER 3
RESPONSES TO COMMON OBJECTIONS TO FREE WILL SKEPTICISM
A hard determinist order would be nightmarish, even for hard determinism, if correctly
implemented. – Saul Smilanski
Despite the problems with libertarian and compatibilist defenses of free will, some
philosophers maintain that accepting free will skepticism would have such dire consequences for
society and interpersonal relationships that assuming the truth of free will is better than the
alternative; for example, Mason Cash’s main argument against mitigation of responsibility is that
“there are…very good moral, pragmatic and social reasons” to hold individuals responsible, even
in situations where external influences directly and obviously affect an individual’s actions and
intentions (2010, 651). Because of pragmatic concerns, Saul Smilanski calls free will a
“necessary illusion” (2002, 493-494). However, in responding to objections, I will show why
free will is an unnecessary illusion: illusory because the positions defending free will are
untenable, given our current scientific understanding of the universe, unnecessary because
adopting free will skepticism would have moral, personal and social advantages that outweigh
the benefits of perpetuating the illusion of free will.
The “Universal Excuse” Objection
Many of the objections to free will skepticism involve those who commit immoral or
criminal acts. One concern is that those prone to akrasia or criminal behavior may feel more
inclined to engage in immoral or criminal acts, given free will skepticism, because they would
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have a universal excuse: “I could not have done otherwise.” The same type of argument has
been rendered against atheism by paraphrasing Dostoevsky: “without god, everything is
permitted.” One can imagine that if we were deprived of moral responsibility, everything would
indeed have to be permitted. This sentiment is reflected in a quote by Dennis Overbye,
“According to those who believe that free will and determinism are incompatible…it would
mean that people are no more responsible for their actions than asteroids or planets. Anything
would go” (In Nadelhoffer and Tocchetto, 2013, 122). Pereboom concedes, “the hard
incompatibilist must admit that the agent’s lack of free will provides a legitimate excuse” (2001,
155). The fear is that with such an excuse readily available, criminal and immoral behavior
would increase destabilizing both personal relationships and society in general.
The main problem with the “universal excuse” objection is that it assumes there would be
no repercussions for immoral or criminal behavior, or that those using the excuse could not
respond to or be deterred by such repercussions. However, Pereboom argues that it may very
well be a part of a person’s determination to learn to avoid acting immorally or criminally (2001,
156). Also, there are many blame-free ways to hold people accountable for their actions. The key
is finding an appropriate response that is compatible with a person’s inability to do otherwise.
For example, if Sally discovers her partner Pat has been having an illicit affair, she could not
blame Pat or hold her morally responsible for the betrayal, but Sally can still respond to the
action by leaving the relationship. Sally’s justification would merely be explained in different
terms: instead of leaving Pat because Pat is blameworthy of the infidelity, Sally would leave
simply because she does not want to be in a relationship with someone who cheats. Cheating
would merely be a point of incompatibility between the two.
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Thus, when someone commits an immoral act, I need not appeal to blame in my response
to that person’s actions. When someone explains her behavior by appealing to causal
determinism, a free will skeptic could reasonably accept that answer while imposing the
appropriate, non-desert-based censure or response. I will deal more thoroughly with societal
responses to violent criminal behavior in the next chapter.
The “Ought Implies Can” Objection
Another common objection to free will skepticism is the claim that if we cannot control
our actions in a way that justifies moral responsibility, then it does not make sense to say that
people should behave in a certain way. Put another way, if one cannot do otherwise, then it does
not make sense to say that one should have done otherwise. If people’s choices are determined
by factors beyond their control, then it seems as though moral prescriptions lack the efficacy that
justifies them. However, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Derk Pereboom, and B.F. Skinner argue
that, in cases relevant to moral responsibility and free will, “ought” does not necessarily imply
“can.”
Sinnott-Armstrong argues that there are three ways to interpret the phrase “ought implies
can.” The first interpretation is that of semantic entailment, the second is that of semantic
presupposition, and the third is that of conversational implication (1984, 249). He distinguishes
between the implications of each interpretation stating,
If ‘ought’ entails ‘can’, and an agent cannot do an act, then it is false that the agent ought
to do the act. If ‘ought’ presupposes ‘can’, and the agent cannot do the act, then it is
neither true or [sic] false that the agent ought to do the act. If ‘ought’ conversationally
implies ‘can’, and the agent cannot do the act, then it might be true that the agent ought to
do the act. (1984, 249-250; Italics in original)
Thus, if the interpretation of “ought implies can” is conversational, then there no reason to
assume that “ought” statements are futile without free will.
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Sinnott-Armstrong defends the conversational interpretation by first arguing against the
entailment and presupposition interpretations. He employs a counterexample against ought/can
entailment and presupposition: Suppose Adams promises to meet Brown at 6:00, but decides to
go to a movie at 5:00. He cannot go to the movie and fulfill his promise even though he still
ought to attend the meeting (1984, 252-253). This example indeed shows that an “ought” neither
entails nor presupposes at least one sense of “can,” but it is a weak sense that would not appease
those who believe in free will. It is not actually the case that Adams metaphysically cannot fulfill
his promise; he could leave the movie early. Since the movie does not physically restrain Adams
from fulfilling his obligation, then, according to libertarians and compatibilists, Adams could
still be held morally responsible for missing the meeting. Even free will skeptics could allow that
Adams’ actions warrant an appropriate response (not blame).
While the specific counterexample above does not provide compelling evidence that
would sway free will believers, Sinnot-Armstrong still offers reasons for believing in a flexible
relationship between “ought” and “can” by describing an alternative interpretation of that
relationship: conversational implication. Briefly, conversational implication means that p
conversationally implies q if a rational person can reasonably assume that q was intended by the
person who uttered “p” (1984, 255). This interpretation leaves open the possibility for the
speaker to clarify that q was not implied by p. Thus “ought implies can” is a contingent
relationship; it depends on the intention of the speaker and the purpose of the particular “ought”
statement. When a free will skeptic declares that Sally ought to fulfill a promise or that Sally
ought not to hit her brother, the skeptic is not assuming that Sally’s determination is such that
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Sally metaphysically can abide by such dictates.10 Rather, the skeptic would merely be invoking
the “opportunity” or “physical ability” sense of the word “can,” detailed in chapter two.
By stating that Sally “ought to x,” the free will skeptic is informing Sally of her moral
duty. The purpose of the ought statement in this case is that of “advising” and it in no way
implies that Sally can metaphysically fulfill that moral duty (1984, 257). Free will skeptics argue
that agents metaphysically cannot do other than what they do. This sense of “can” (or “cannot”)
applies to agents regardless of physical ability or physical restraints. Sinnott-Armstrong
acknowledges that “‘cannot’ is sometimes a reason for denying ‘ought,’” such as when a person
misses a meeting because of a physical inability such as sickness (1984, 252). Free will skeptics
can agree that in certain circumstances involving physical restraint or lack of consciousness,
ought statements are rendered meaningless. However, when the restraint is merely metaphysical,
rather than physical, ought statements can still serve a vital, practical purpose.
Derk Pereboom expands upon Sinnot-Armstrong’s argument by stating that actions are
still right or wrong regardless of one’s ability to conform to the moral rule, and telling agents
what they should or should not do acts as guiding principles (2001, 143,147). Telling an agent
she ought to do a certain action informs that agent that such actions will have beneficial effects
and telling an agent she ought not have done something merely informs the agent that her action
had deleterious effects. Distinguishing between good or moral behavior and behavior which is
not serves as a foundation for a moral education that may help shape and change an agent’s
character and behavior (if it is within that agent’s causal determination to be affected by such an
education). Thus, the practice of telling someone they should perform moral actions and should
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The skeptic may hope that is within the realm of possibility that Sally can metaphysically abide by moral rules.
Otherwise, advisory “ought” statements would be a futile waste of time. But that does not mean that the skeptic
knows for sure that abiding by moral duty is within Sally’s metaphysical realm of possibilities.
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not perform immoral actions serves the function of moral education and could be retained
regardless of a person’s inability to do otherwise.
If free will skepticism is true, we can still retain “ought” statements even when we realize
that an individual could not have done otherwise, did not have the relevant control over her
actions, and was not the ultimate cause of her actions. Derk Pereboom argues that moral
education and reinforcement may serve the purpose of punishment in a way that addresses the
effect of moral transgressions upon individuals and society without resorting to ascriptions of
blame. According to Pereboom, since we cannot predict who can and who cannot abide by moral
rules, it makes sense to clarify and disseminate the moral rules individuals are expected to follow
and hope they have the metaphysical ability to abide by them. Pereboom states, “one clear role
that moral ‘ought’ judgments have is to guide actions. We tell people that they ought not to steal
to keep them from stealing” (2001, 147). Even if they could not, metaphysically, have done
otherwise, we can limit their epistemic options (options that they consider viable) through moral
“ought” statements. Besides, there are still repercussions for those who break the law or act
immorally, even if we recognize that they could not have done otherwise and their actions are
not “up to them.” I discuss this more thoroughly in the next chapter.
Skinner defends the efficacy of “ought” statements as merely explanatory tools. He
describes both moral and amoral uses of such statements expressed as hypothetical imperatives
(1971, pp106-107). For example, amoral uses of “ought” include advice statements such as, “If
you want to pass the exam, you should study” and “You should read Lord of the Rings.” There is
no moral force to such statements, they are merely prescribing a course of action should one
desire a certain end. In Skinnerian terms, such ends are reinforcing, so if a person desires such
reinforcement, then they should perform certain actions.
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Skinner describes moral ought statements in the same terms. For example, telling a child
she should tell the truth, according to Skinner, is akin to saying, ‘“If you are reinforced by the
approval of your fellow men, you will be reinforced when you tell the truth.’ The value is to be
found in the social contingencies maintained for the purposes of control” (1971, 107). Thus, if
you want to avoid or encourage certain reactions, then you ought to act within prescribed limits.
Humans make associations between actions and consequences and develop preferences for some
consequences over others. Like Pereboom, Skinner argues that ought statements serve as
prescriptive tools to educate people, children and adults alike, about which kinds of
consequences can be expected from their actions. Even if someone is causally determined to
choose only one action, such prescriptions can limit which options are salient to her and may (or
may not) become a determining factor in her deliberation process.
In the next chapter, I describe certain social changes that should or ought to take place,
given free will skepticism. If we are all determined by external factors beyond our control, then
such prescriptions may at first glance seem futile. After all, if we are causally determined to be a
certain way, if we could not be otherwise, then it could be that we could not have any other kind
of society than we do. However, just as prescriptions for change at the individual level could
become incorporated into the determination of an individual, prescriptions for change at the
societal level could become incorporated into the determination of a society. The civil rights
movement, the women’s liberation movements, and the marriage equality movement all arose as
the result of a unity of individuals committed to change. Indeed, if it is causally determined that
society will ignore or resist certain calls for reform, so be it. However, since we cannot predict
the future, since we cannot track the determining factors of all people in a given culture to see if

83

such prescriptions would be efficacious, calls for reform in the name of justice and fairness are
worth the effort.
The Scale of Responsibility Objection
This objection focuses on the common belief that responsibility exists on a scale, with
one side of the scale consisting of responsible agents and the other side consisting of agents
excused from moral responsibility ascriptions due to mitigating circumstances. Individuals who
have diminished autonomy due to coercion, duress, mental disabilities or psychological disorders
are usually excused or exempted from ascriptions of blame due to the concept of fairness. The
argument states that it would not be fair to hold individuals who are not capable of making
rational, moral decisions to the same standards of morality to which we hold individuals who are
in full possession of their faculties of reason at the time of action. Courts of law in the United
States frequently refer to mens rea when exculpating or reducing the sentences of the defendant
in cases involving mitigating circumstances (e.g. insanity, coercion, duress, mental deficiency).
This is because it is deemed that the person in question was not in control of her actions or she
lacked criminal intent in the manner requisite for moral responsibility.
Fischer and Ravizza defend the practice of making such allowances by stating,
Evidently, the causal history of an action matters to us in making moral responsibility
attributions. When persons are manipulated in certain ways, they are like marionettes and
are not appropriate candidates for praise or blame. These factors issuing in behavior are
intuitively, responsibility-undermining factors. (1998, 36)
However, according to free will skepticism, no one is in control of her actions in the manner
requisite for moral responsibility; we are all like marionettes manipulated by external influences
and causal processes that trace back to conditions beyond our control (Pereboom, 2001, 127).
What seems poorly founded in making allowances for those with diminished capacities is that
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such cases are seen as exceptions when, if free will skepticism is true, the rule upon which the
exceptions are based should be discarded.
In Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality of Illusion, Saul Smilanski takes
for granted that a distinction concerning desert should be made based on the mental capacities of
the individual; he claims that, “the kleptomaniac and the alcoholic differ from the common thief
and common drinker in the deficiency of their capacity for local reflective control over their
actions” (2011a, 429). Compatibilists often argue that the degree of control required for
ascriptions of moral responsibility obtains even within a deterministic framework; thus,
according to them, free will skepticism does not threaten or undermine the distinctions we make
between moral agents and those who cannot be considered agents at the time of an action due to
mitigating circumstances. Smilanski contends that, should we attempt to disqualify all
individuals from moral responsibility by pointing to determinism (or indeterminism), we would
be committing an egregious moral wrong. He defends this by claiming,
Working according to compatibilist distinctions might be just…because they correspond
to a sense of being up to us, which exists in many normal situations, but not in cases such
as kleptomania or addiction. It would be unjust to treat these different cases in the same
way. To fail to create a Community of Responsibility is also in one sense to fail to create
a feasible nonarbitrary moral order, hence to fail to show the proper respect for persons.
(2011a, 431)
Two responses to this objection are: first, free will skepticism denies that actions performed by
individuals are “up to them,” in the sense required for moral responsibility. Second, we would
not be treating the common thief and the kleptomaniac the same given free will skepticism: the
kleptomaniac would require a level of psychological care that the common thief would not. Even
though, according to free will skepticism, the common thief, like the kleptomaniac, was not in
control of her actions in the sense required for moral responsibility, her actions still would need
to be negatively reinforced either through payment of reparations, or, depending on the severity
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of the theft, through another means of corrective behavior modification. For example, if a car
thief was motivated to steal out of a desire for excitement, then she needs help finding an
alternative, legal outlet for her thrill-seeking disposition. If her motivation were financial, then
job counseling would be a more appropriate solution. While our attitudes concerning fault would
not vary between the common thief and the kleptomaniac, we would administer varying
treatments depending on the rational capacities and motivations possessed by an individual at the
moment she committed the crime.
Fischer and Ravizza offer another control-based argument favoring the distinction
between moral agents and those with diminished capacities. As discussed in the last chapter, the
kind of control they deem both necessary for moral responsibility and compatible with
determinism is guidance control, which refers to the control an individual has over certain
physical actions. Compulsive kleptomaniacs lack guidance control (they cannot control the
irresistible urge to steal, and thus cannot physically keep their hand from taking an object);
therefore, they also lack regulative control. On the other hand, common thieves lack only
regulative control because while they can control their physical movements, if free will
skepticism is true, they still lack the metaphysical ability to refrain from stealing. The influences
of the kleptomaniac and alcoholic’s disorders over their actions are obvious and salient. The
influence of causal factors on the common thief and casual drinker are less apparent, but the
latter have no more regulative control over their actions than the former individuals. Free will
skeptics claim that to qualify for moral ascriptions, guidance control is not enough. Rather, to be
morally responsible, an agent needs to be the ultimate cause of her actions. Since free will
skeptics deny this possibility, they also deny that an agent is ever morally responsible.
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A.J. Ayer insists that, despite causal determinism, there is a relevant difference
between the kleptomaniac and the common thief due to the different level of constraint
imposed on the individuals. As a compatibilist, Ayer defines freedom as a lack of constraint,
and he believes that this emphasis allows agents to be free despite the truth of causal
determinism (1954, 115). He admits that causal determinism can be viewed as a type of
constraint, but it is not the type that is relevant to ascriptions of moral responsibility. Unlike
Fischer and Ravizza, who would absolve the kleptomaniac of moral responsibility due to her
lack of relevant control, Ayer’s position treats the kleptomaniac differently because of her
diminished capacity for reflection on her actions. The common thief is morally responsible
according to Ayer because, had he desired to act differently, he would have. Ayer recognizes
that the conditional hypothesis may not convince “die-hard determinists,” so he labors to
show how causal explanations differ from constraint in a morally relevant manner, stating,
“from the fact that my behavior is capable of being explained, in the sense that it can be
subsumed under some natural law, it does not follow that I am acting under constraint”
(1954, 117). A strong sense of constraint implies that there are internal or external forces
acting upon the agent at the time of the choice; on the other hand, according to Ayer, causal
determinism merely serves as an explanation, not a justification, and does not disqualify the
agent from responsibility.
P.F. Strawson offers yet another defense of the scale of responsibility through his
discussion of who should be considered an appropriate recipient of reactive attitudes. He
explains that it is appropriate to take an objective stance toward those with diminished
capacities, because the reactive attitudes, such as anger and indignation, would not be a
fitting response to those who are incapable of making moral distinctions at the time of their
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actions. According to Strawson, our reactive attitudes are only fitting when directed at
rational agents who act with intention (1963, 125). He stresses that the conditions under
which we make allowances are “abnormal,” and he argues against the possibility that
determinism could excuse everyone, stating, “it cannot be a consequence of any thesis which
is not itself self-contradictory that abnormality is the universal condition” (1963, 128).
R. Jay Wallace further defends this strategy by categorizing two types of
circumstances that make agents eligible for mitigated responsibility ascriptions. He calls the
first type “excuses,” which refer to specific actions performed by otherwise capable agents
during a time of constraint, such as duress or coercion (1994, 118). He offers the example of
a bank teller who, at the point of a gun, gives money to a thief. Wallace contends that the
bank teller did not actually do anything wrong; she did not violate any moral obligation, due
to the excuse that her life was at stake. Couching responsibility in terms of the will of an
agent, Wallace claims that, “all of the excuses indicate the absence of a culpable quality of
will; hence the principle of no blameworthiness without fault offers a unified treatment of
the moral force of the full range of excusing conditions” (1994, 151). However, according to
Wallace, an agent who violates a moral obligation without such an excuse should be held
morally responsible. He claims that determinism does not count as an overarching,
generalized excuse that relieves individuals of moral responsibility, since agents can
regularly meet or violate moral obligations according to their will in a determined world.
Wallace refers to the second type of mitigating condition as “exemptions”; here, the
individual does not deserve to be regarded as an agent due to mental deficiencies (severe
psychological disorders, infancy) or overriding compulsions (addiction) (1994, 118). Agents
who do not have an excuse and who are not exempt possess “powers of reflective self-
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control” which Wallace defines as “the general ability to grasp and apply moral reasons and
to regulate their behavior by the light of such reasons. Possession of these powers is thus a
basic condition of the fairness of holding people accountable” (1994, 155). He then argues
that those who should be exempt from moral responsibility lack these powers. While
excuses show that the agent did not intend to perform an immoral or otherwise wrong act in
a particular situation, those who are exempt may have acted with intention, but because of
their diminished mental capacity, their condition renders them an unfair target for blame
ascriptions. Like Strawson, he argues that causal determinism would not exempt all humans
from blame, because individuals are capable of reflective self-control given free will
skepticism.
Nomy Arpaly’s view, based on the quality of will of an individual, also accounts for
mitigating circumstances in moral value ascriptions. She offers the example of the murderer
Robert Harris. Although he murdered his victims with intent and an ill will, she contends that,
“his ill will appears not to be of his own making. Harris is thus a case of bad constitutive moral
luck” (2006, 34). However, it seems arbitrary to assert that Harris’ will is attributable to “luck”
while the will of others is of their own making. I agree that the abuse and neglect he experienced
in childhood makes the external factors that influenced his will more apparent, but making a
distinction between his will and that of others seems to imply that there are aspects of a “normal”
person such that they have a ‘special quality’ that makes them immune to the causal processes
that resulted in their will.
A Skeptical Response to the Scale of Responsibility Objection
According to free will skepticism, if all actions are merely links in a chain of long causal
processes over which an individual has no control, then moral responsibility has no justification
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in any case of wrongdoing, not just in cases of “abnormality,” as described by the above
objections. Free will skeptics assert that all acts are either random or can be explained through
causal determinism. The murderer with guidance control who responds to reasons, and concludes
based on those reasons that murder is the right/best course of action to take is comparable, in
terms of moral responsibility, to the murderer with schizophrenia who responds to the voices in
her head. The difference should be in the treatment rather than in the ascription of fault. The
former may be quarantined and re-educated, while the latter may require a battery of
pharmaceuticals and intensive psychotherapy. Instead of everyone being described as
“abnormal,” as Strawson suggests, everyone from the corrupt CEO, to the deviant child, to the
psychopath are “normal”; they are merely suffering from varying (sometimes extreme) degrees
of unfortunate determining circumstances.
While descriptions of control, reflection, will, and intent provide an intuitive reason to
distinguish between moral agents and those with diminished capacities, Derk Pereboom insists
that excuses and exemptions can indeed be generalized, given free will skepticism (or, as he calls
it, hard incompatibilism); if he is right, then making allowances for some individuals and not
others would be patently unfair. He prefaces his argument with the commonly held principle of
fairness: “If no relevant moral difference can be found between two agents in distinct situations,
it is a feature of the practice of holding people morally responsible that if one agent is
legitimately exempted from moral responsibility, so is the other” (2001, 99). Pereboom argues
that capacities such as guidance control, ability to respond to reasons, ability for reflection, and
will are not sufficient bases by which to judge moral responsibility. Rather, according to free will
skepticism, in order to possess the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility, an
individual must be the ultimate (as opposed to proximate or immediate) cause of her actions. If
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no agent has such a capacity, then the practice of making allowances solely in extreme cases of
deficiency is ill-founded and unfair.
One reason many support the scale of responsibility argument is that they do not see
themselves or others as being forced by past events and their life circumstances to make certain
choices and perform certain actions. However, this may be due to the difficulty, if not
impossibility, of discerning all external antecedent factors that causally contribute to any one
decision (D’Holbach, 1970, 399). The self—one’s identity—is a construction over time caught in
a constant feedback loop with its environment. The human brain simply cannot process and
remember all of the external and historical factors that play a causal role in any one decision or
action. Making allowances for agents whose external causal factors are immediately apparent
while not making allowances for those whose causal influences are invisible, inaccessible, or
merely forgotten is unfair. The level of an individual’s mental capacities at the time of an action
dictates what kind of treatment is appropriate, but no ascription should be made in terms of
responsibility.
The “Reactive Attitudes” Objection
In Freedom and Resentment, P.F. Strawson popularized the argument that relinquishing
the belief in free will would have dire consequences for social relations. He discusses the
affective “participant” attitudes we have for others, as opposed to an “objective” attitude (1963,
126). He argues that to deny that others have moral responsibility would be to ask that we adopt
an objective attitude toward them that
…cannot include the range of reactive feelings and attitudes which belong to
involvement or participation with others in inter-personal human relationships; it
cannot include resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger, or the sort of love which two
adults can sometimes be said to feel reciprocally, for each other. (1963, 127)
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He concedes that we do indeed take this attitude toward some others (e.g., children, and the
mentally deficient or incapacitated) or toward all others some of the time (e.g., in the case where
an injury or benefit was performed out of ignorance), but our default position is the participant
attitude. He argues that, regardless of whether or not causal determinism is true, not only are
reactive attitudes so ingrained in our social constitution as to make abandoning them unfeasible,
but were we able to somehow adopt the objective attitude, our personal relationships would be
seriously undermined as a result (1963, 129).
Pereboom’s response is twofold. First, he claims that we can retain a stance toward others
that retains or embodies the positive attitudes such as love, gratitude and forgiveness. Then he
argues that tempering negative attitudes may actually benefit, rather than threaten, personal
relationships. Regarding love, he mentions that there is a host of instances where we love others
without thinking they “deserve” that love because of their moral responsibility or free will. For
example, parents love their children irrespective of their level of moral development. We also
love others for aspects of their personhood over which they have no control; these attributes
include a person’s character, behavior, intelligence, appearance, style, and resemblance to others.
(In Fischer et al., 2007, 121) Certain qualities that people have are loveable and attractive
regardless of whether or not a person freely chose to have them. Pereboom states, “Love of
another involves, fundamentally, wishing for the other’s good, taking on her aims and desires,
and a desire to be together with her, and none of this is endangered by hard incompatibilism”
(ibid, 122). Thus, meaning and fulfillment in personal loving relationships can be retained given
free will skepticism.
Concerning forgiveness and gratitude, Pereboom argues that these can be accounted for
through encouragement and appreciation. When someone sincerely apologizes for an offense,
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this shows that the person recognizes the wrong that was committed and shows her intention to
amend the behavior in the future. Forgiveness is merely the acceptance of the apology and “the
willingness to cease to regard past immoral behavior as a reason to dissolve or weaken a
relationship” (ibid, 120). Conversely, gratitude involves letting a benefactor know that you
acknowledge and appreciate a kind act, not because you hold them responsible for it, but because
such behavior is intrinsically worth encouraging. Thus, we can express joy and thanks without
assuming the person acted on their own free will.
Along with fostering positive reactions to behavior, forsaking or at least mitigating the
negative attitudes such as anger, resentment, and guilt may enhance personal relationships. Guilt
may seem integral to an agent’s cultivation of a proper response toward her own immoral or
criminal acts. However, as was discussed earlier, one can recognize the wrongness in an act
without feeling morally responsible for it. Pereboom argues that sadness and regret over past
actions are still preserved in free will skepticism, and they can help a person resolve to improve
such behavior in the future (ibid, 120).
Anger, resentment, and indignation are the most difficult reactive attitudes to account for
given free will skepticism. The wrongs committed against individuals, groups, and societies
seem to rightfully engender outrage. Without anger as a motivating force, it seems one would be
resigned to or complacent toward the ubiquitous instances of moral offenses committed against
others. Pereboom argues that other emotions, analogues, can serve the same function in relating
the wrongness of certain acts; “[t]hese emotions include feeling hurt or shocked about what the
other has done, and moral sadness or concern for the other. These attitudes are not aggressive in
the way that indignation can be, and all by themselves they do not typically have indignation’s
intimidating effect” (2001, 200). Anger in itself is a toxic emotion that goes beyond the mere
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communication that an individual has committed an offense. Anger can be the motivating force
behind the perpetuation of violence. Personal and societal relationships would benefit from
tempering such aggressive emotions, and free will skepticism provides strong reasons for doing
so.
Ought Implies Can (revisited)
Even given the best reasons for refraining from reactive attitudes, some might doubt that
we can ever overcome them entirely. Indeed, saying we “ought not” engage in destructive
emotions, given free will skepticism, would be futile if such emotions were an integral and
inextricable part of human construction. We seem prone to emotional responses, even in
situations where we intellectually recognize them to be inappropriate or irrational. The idea that
rational humans are morally responsible is deeply embedded in our social and mental worldview,
and to recondition such a mindset seems a daunting, if not impossible, task. However, accepting
free will skepticism into our ontological framework would require a shift in perspective toward
others, making the practice of temperance viable. For example, animal trainers operate under the
knowledge that non-human animals are not morally responsible. When a non-human animal acts
in ways that are contrary to our wishes or expectations (e.g., relieving themselves on a favored
oriental rug) we would be irrational to punish them in abusive ways. Rather, experienced animal
trainers prefer and employ operant conditioning as an effective method of training. If a dog ruins
a prized possession, for instance, by chewing on an expensive pair of shoes, we recognize that it
is in the dog’s nature to chew. We can feel sad for the loss of the material object, but to hold the
dog morally responsible for the action would be absurd.
Anyone who has refrained from throwing their dog out of a high window despite
returning home to a grave-yard of chewed-up or peed-on cherished possessions knows that it is
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possible to temper reactive attitudes solely because the “guilty” party is not morally responsible.
That we can exercise emotional restraint in the face of destructive behavior, despite our
emotional attachment to an object ruined by a non-human animal, is evidence that reactive
attitudes are not inherently necessary and ineluctable components of human composition. Thus,
at least in some circumstances, we already recognize the ability, and moral obligation, to
moderate reactive attitudes. The problem, then, is not whether it is possible for humans to
overcome, minimize, or eradicate reactive attitudes, but rather whether humans can accept and
internalize free will skepticism to the point where we view and treat wayward humans with the
same moral consideration we (should) view and treat wayward pets.
Baruch Spinoza argues that we can overcome reactive attitudes merely by accepting free
will skepticism. He devotes Part Five of the Ethics to explaining how the use of reason, or the
intellect, “leads to freedom” (Part 5, Preface). However, unlike compatibilists, he does not mean
to imply that the ability to act according to reason entails the ability to act independently from
the dictates of causal determinism. What he means by “freedom” in this section is merely the
contingent ability to control or temper the emotions through the use of reason. He employs this
weaker definition of “freedom” to argue that we do not have to be passive slaves to our emotions
(unless, of course, we are causally determined to be as such). In other words, we have a
hypothetical ability (weak definition of freedom) to learn to overcome irrational emotions, but
only if we have the metaphysical ability to do so. Furthermore, he states, “In so far as the mind
understands all things as necessary, so far it has a greater power over the emotions, or, it suffers
less from them” (Part 5, Proposition 6). Thus, according to Spinoza, not only do we not have free
will, recognition of this fact will help us overcome or restrain the reactive attitudes by helping us
recognize or accept that events could not have been otherwise.
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A Mindful Approach to the Reactive Attitudes
A strong objection to P.F. Strawson’s view that reactive attitudes are inevitable or
preferable comes from those who practice and advocate meditation and mindfulness. Traditional
Buddhist traditions generally do not accept free will skepticism, yet they argue that reactive
attitudes can (and should) be overcome. Mindfulness practices and meditation techniques are
designed for just this purpose and contemporary research in psychology has pushed such
practices into mainstream consciousness. In “Mindfulness: Theoretical Foundations and
Evidence for its Salutary Effects,” Kirk Brown, Richard Ryan, and J. David Creswell argue that
mindfulness techniques drawn from Buddhist traditions can be used to modify behavior and
improve relationships.
Brown, et al. define mindfulness as “a receptive attention to and awareness of present
events and experience” (2007, 212 italics in original). The evidence they cite from a wealth of
clinical trials suggests that practicing the art of focusing awareness and attention to the present
moment, and practicing non-judgment and non-attachment to thoughts disrupts habitual
cognitive attitudes ameliorating reactive and emotional responses. For example, they state that
“[mindfulness] has been associated with lower levels of emotional disturbance (e.g., depressive
symptoms, anxiety, and stress)” (2007, 219). If agents were more adept at regulating their
moods, they could respond to potentially upsetting situations in a more rational, dispassionate
manner. It is merely a matter of creating new cognitive habits.
Reactive attitudes occur frequently in interpersonal relationships; thus, merely being able
to regulate one’s mood would not be sufficient. However, Brown, et al. argue,
Specifically, the receptive attentiveness that characterizes mindfulness may promote a
greater ability or willingness to take interest in the partner’s thoughts, emotions, and
welfare; it may also enhance an ability to attend to the content of a partner’s
communication while also being aware of the partner’s (sometimes subtle) affective tone
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and nonverbal behavior (Golman, 2006). At the same time, such a person may be more
aware of their own cognitive, emotional, and verbal responses to the communication.
Boorstein (1996) has argued that mindfulness promotes an ability to witness thought and
emotion so as not to react impulsively and destructively to them. (2007, 225)
Thus, P.F. Strawson’s position that interpersonal relationships would suffer without reactive
attitudes is weakened by evidence suggesting that such relationships would actually benefit from
overcoming such attitudes. Pereboom showed that the positive attitudes of forgiveness and
gratitude could be retained through analogues, and mindfulness studies have shown that
destructive attitudes like anger could be ameliorated. Many mindfulness and meditation
programs have been started in prisons with varying degrees of success. I’ll discuss meditation in
prisons more thoroughly in the next chapter.
The Phenomenology of Freedom Objection
Even if people accept intellectual reasons for challenging free will skepticism, humans
have a personal experience of feeling free that free will skepticism needs to address. Many
libertarian and compatibilist theorists (including, but not limited to, Kane, Ekstrom, and Fischer)
emphasize the personal experience of being morally responsible in their assessment of whether
or not an agent is actually morally responsible. Thus, an argument for free will skepticism as a
metaphysical explanation would be rendered vacuous if it could not account for our
phenomenological experiences.
Baruch Spinoza argues that the feeling of being free in the sense required for moral
responsibility can be attributed to ignorance of the external and prior causal events influencing
an agent at the time of any given action:
Men are deceived in that they think themselves free, an opinion which consists
simply in the fact that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes
by which those actions are determined. This, therefore, is their idea of liberty: that
they know no cause of their actions. For when they assert that human actions
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depend on the will, these are just words, of which they have no idea. (Part 2,
Proposition 35, Scholium)
Spinoza uses the perceived proximity of the sun as an example of how our imagination can be
deceived by the perception of phenomena. We may know that the sun is far away, but because
we feel its closeness, we perceive it to be closer than it actually is (Part 4, Proposition 1,
Scholium). Likewise, because we perceive only the immediate cause of an action, and because
we experience ourselves as that immediate cause, we make the mistake of regarding ourselves as
the ultimate or sole cause of an action, when the actual ultimate cause long precedes our
existence.
Similar to Spinoza, D’Holbach argues that people feel free, not because they actually are
free, but because humans are complicated, there is great variety in their actions, there is a
multiplicity of causes that move them, and the multiple causes for any given action or decision
are “too remote from their effects” (1970, 400). As discussed previously, the self—one’s
identity—is a construction over time caught in a constant feedback loop with its environment.
The human brain simply cannot process and remember all of the external and historical factors
that play a causal role in any one decision or action. D’Holbach claims,
The errours of philosophers on the free agency of man, have arisen from their regarding
his will as the primum mobile, the original motive of his actions; for want of recurring
back, they have not perceived the multiplied, the complicated causes which,
independently of him, give motion to the will itself; or which dispose and modify his
brain, whilst he himself is purely passive in the motion he receives (1970, 94).
B.F. Skinner similarly states, “Man is a machine in the sense that he is a complex system
behaving in lawful ways, but the complexity is extraordinary” (1971, 193). Our inability to
recognize our passivity in our constructions and decisions, and to justify or explain decisions
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made subconsciously has been evidenced by Benjamin Libet’s (and subsequent) experiments and
research.11
One of Libet’s experiments involved participants recording the exact time they became
conscious of deciding to flick their wrists. By observing their brain activity during the decision
process, Libet and his colleagues discovered that “The electrical readings showed that a
‘readiness potential’ (RP) occurred in the brain approximately 550 milliseconds prior to the onset
of muscle movement, but the conscious awareness of an urge/intention to flex did not occur until
200 milliseconds prior to muscle movement” (In Waller; 2011, 82-83). Many philosophers since
Libet interpret the gap in time between non-conscious brain activity and conscious choice to
mean that the brain makes certain decisions before the agent is consciously aware of those
decisions. If true, then there is scientific evidence showing that, at least in some circumstances,
the phenomenology of freedom is an unsubstantiated fiction.
Waller and Caruso respond to myriad objections to the argument that Libet’s and Libetstyle experiments threaten free will.12 Tim O’Connor’s objects that the flicking of a wrist is not
the kind of decision relevant to free will ascriptions (2011, 85). According to him, trivial actions
such as flicking a wrist are different in kind than weightier actions such as moral deliberations.
Therefore, he contends that Libet’s experiments are not sufficient to threaten agent-causal
accounts of freely caused actions and events. Waller counters, “If the ‘inner experience’ is false
in small things, that casts significant doubt on its veracity in large things” (2011, 85). The
mechanism for making decisions is the same regardless of the scale or seriousness of the choice.
Libet’s experiments show that at least some seemingly spontaneous, voluntary decisions actually

11

For a list of references of Libet-style experiments see Caruso (2012, 189, 192).
For a more thorough discussion of objections and responses see Caruso (2012, 189-196) and Waller (2011, 8386).
12

99

originate in the preconscious mind rather than in the conscious mind; the nature or content of the
decision is irrelevant.
Alfred Mele charges Libet’s experiment with conflating urge and intention: the brain
activity signifies a mere “urge,” while the actual intention does not occur until it is consciously
registered by the agent (In Waller, 2011, 85 and in Caruso, 2012, 194-195). Caruso responds,
What Libet’s findings show, and what Mele does not deny, is that the ultimate source of
voluntary action is not the conscious self but unconscious brain activity. Hence, even on
Mele’s interpretation, the causal process that ultimately results in spontaneous voluntary
action is unconsciously initiated. (2012, 196)
The upshot of Libet’s and Libet-inspired experiments is that the phenomenology of freedom rests
on an illusion. While such experiments do not threaten the feeling of being free, they lend
credence to the free will skeptic’s argument that a mere feeling does not substantiate belief.
Like d’Holbach, B.F. Skinner argues that the feeling of freedom merely reflects social
reinforcers and that “casual observation alone will seldom reveal the contingencies” (1971, 141).
By “contingencies,” he means the external factors that causally influence our actions and
undermines our autonomy. In a controlled environment or experiment, he argues, specific
contingencies can be accounted for and manipulated in order to manipulate behavior. This idea
plays out in countless psychological experiments, most notably those conducted by John A.
Bargh, wherein subjects were “primed” to exhibit certain social behaviors such as rudeness or
politeness. (1996, 233-236) Since then, similar studies have corroborated their conclusion that
not only are our behaviors, attitudes and perceptions receptive to priming, but that subjects were
unaware of being externally manipulated, and thus felt that the primed behaviors and attitudes
they exhibited or experienced spontaneously originated within them (Bargh et.al., 2012). What
these and Libet’s experiments show is that the feeling of freedom does not by itself guarantee
actual freedom.

100

The Threat to Deliberation Objection
Even if one accepts the above challenges to the phenomenology of freedom, she may still
resist such objections thinking that a commitment to free will skepticism will undermine the
deliberative process. However, accepting free will skepticism would not diminish the feeling one
has during deliberation that multiple options actually exist in the world, nor would it affect the
feeling of consciously choosing between those options. I may intellectually recognize that when I
am deciding between wakeboarding or grading papers that only one option is metaphysically
available to me, and that whichever option I select was guaranteed (or completely random if
indeterminism is true and operative on the level of brain-functions during that decision).
However, such knowledge does not undermine my need to make a decision. The illusory feeling
of freedom to choose between two seemingly viable options does not change the fact that only
one option was actually viable, and that the resulting choice was not up to me in any way
relevant to free will and moral responsibility.
In response to objections that belief in causal determinism is inconsistent with belief in
the rationality of deliberation, Pereboom argues for “deliberation compatibilism” defined as “S’s
deliberating and being rational is compatible with S’s believing that her actions are causally
determined” (2014, 106). He argues that the unpredictability of the results of the deliberative
process makes that process both viable and rational. When I need to decide between
wakeboarding and grading papers, I will not know which action I will choose until I rationally
consider the consequences of each action and endorse one action over the other. Belief that only
one action is metaphysically possible for me does not preclude the fact that both options are
epistemically available to me (i.e., I am aware that both options exist as possibilities). I will only
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become aware of which option is the metaphysically open option when I find myself actually
performing that action.
The Loss of Identity Objection
According to D’Holbach, “If people had the time and inclination to examine their own
peculiar actions and search out their true motives to discover their concatenation, they would
remain convinced that the sentiment they have of their own natural free agency, is a chimera that
must speedily be destroyed by experience” (1970, 400). D’Holbach thought that through
reflection upon experience, agents would recognize the determination and contingency of their
existence. I agree, but humans, especially those in Western countries, are stubborn when it comes
to freedom. Freedom and independence are part of many people’s cultural identity, and humans
seem to have a deeply personal and emotional investment in their experiences of the self or
identity that seems threatened by free will skepticism.
Continental philosophers perpetuate this perception when they claim that we are selfcreating, experiential beings who depend not only on the calculations of reason, but also on
meaning-giving activities that make our lives significant to us. Jean-Paul Sartre, an agent-causal
libertarian, believes not only that we are free, but that we are “condemned to be free” in the sense
that we must take full ownership of and responsibility for our lives and the choices we make
(1956, 567). Taking responsibility for our lives makes the choices we make meaningful to us.
However, I contend that such meaning and value can be retained, given free will skepticism.
In Being and Nothingness Sartre argues for a radical notion of freedom, where humans
are viewed as the ultimate creators of themselves and their lives. In discussing his “no excuses”
approach to adversity, he argues that we create the situations to which we are subjected; “[i]t is
therefore senseless to think of complaining since nothing foreign has decided what we feel, what
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we live, or what we are” (1956, 708). In this way we own our selves and lives and must accept
with full responsibility whatever situation we find ourselves in, even war. According to Sartre,
as human beings endowed with a rational nature and consciousness, we have the ability to step
back and reflect on the context into which we are thrown (our thrownness). This ability to
mentally remove ourselves from the phenomenal world creates a gap, a nothingness, from which
is disclosed an open realm of possibilities; he states, “human reality is free to the exact extent
that it has to be its own nothingness” (1956, 583).
It is through explicating nothingness that Sartre fashions his argument against free will
skepticism. He argues that it is our ability to withdraw from our phenomenal surroundings and
to contemplate our selves, our lives, our past, others, and our place in the world that extricates us
from the conditions of a linear causal order. He asserts that the mere facts in the world cannot
motivate us to act; rather, it is only when we remove ourselves, stand apart from and reflect on
those facts can we recognize a lack that provokes action (1956, 562-563). When we retreat from
the “in-itself” we are able to imbue our circumstances with meaning; we can re-interpret the past
and project into the future by setting ends.
According to Sartre, ends rather than prior events or facts in the world are the motivating
force or cause of our actions (1956, 564). The desire for a certain state of being that we are
presently lacking incites dissatisfaction and anticipation. In our anticipation we act toward that
which we care about. He claims that free will skepticism confines us to a state of being-in-itself
in which we can only recognize and accept what is, rather than comprehend what is not: “The
ultimate meaning of determinism is to establish within us an unbroken continuity of existence in
itself” (1956, 567). This seems to be true, given his account, but the nothingness which is
integral to his concept of freedom may be understood as just another aspect of our determined
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being. If we look at Sartre’s description of our experience of a lack as merely a description of
how things appear to us, rather than conceding that that is how things really are, we can include
that perception within the free will skeptic’s outlook.
Humans have the ability to approach a situation from a variety of different angles; we
can accept what we think is an objective approach and review our lives accordingly, but we can
never step fully outside our subjective perspective and see things as how they really are. That the
future is unpredictable, and therefore unknowable requires us to reflect fully on our choices so
that they bring about the ends we desire. This kind of removed analysis is not closed to free will
skeptics. That we cannot predict where circumstances and choices will throw us next, despite our
most meticulous planning, is testament to the possibility of anticipation of ends and of the
apprehension that the path to those ends might be obstructed; this is as inherent to free will
skepticism as it is to libertarianism.
If free will skepticism is true, then rather than endowing the world with meaning, we
discover it. As much as we invent the world around us, we are inventions of it. What shows up
for us as meaningful is not a spontaneous manifestation of cogitation but rather is dependent on
our perspective as it has been shaped by external factors, as B.F. Skinner states,
Man has ‘controlled his own destiny,’ if that expression means anything at all. The man
that man has made is the product of the culture man has devised. He has emerged from
two quite different processes of evolution: the biological evolution responsible for the
human species, and the cultural evolution carried out by that species. (1971, 198)
We are engaged in a constant interplay with the world, where the events and people around us
affect us in myriad ways. Depending on our mood and personality, what shows up for us, and the
meaning we impart on it, are highly contingent phenomena, since our perspective is relative to
our past and our causally determined psychological constitution.
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Our ability to make choices, stand back, reflect, re-interpret, and impart meaning to our
lives is as much a part of the path of discovery as it is the path of creation. Even if, when faced
with a choice, we only have one option actually available to us, the fact that a multitude of
options exists in the world and is at our disposal like a menu awaiting our selection, renders as
essential the practice of deliberation and reflection. We have the ability as rational beings to
stand back at any given time, reflect on who we are and whom we want to be in the future and
act accordingly. If we want to change our situation, if we are unsatisfied and want to become
someone else, it is within our means to do so, given the requisite disposition and causal
determination to actualize such a project. Free will skepticism does not entail a fixed character;
it does not mean we have to become stagnant or complacent, as Skinner states, “In shifting
control from autonomous man to the observable environment we do not leave an empty
organism” (1971, 186). We have our entire past and future set out behind and before us so that
we can reflect and project at will (just not free will). According to free will skepticism, how we
do so is determined by our character, and that character, our responsive personality, is either
transformed, modified, or reinforced with every choice and with every external stimulus that we
confront on our path.
We can own our life with as much enthusiasm given free will skepticism as in Sartre’s
radical libertarianism. My actions, even if they are causally determined, are still done by me. I
must own up to my constitution and accept that it is mine, even if it could not have been
otherwise. I am unique in my circumstances, because the exact causal processes and influences
that have shaped my character are unique to me. Skinner illustrates this idea when he states,
“the individual is at best a locus in which many lines of development come together in a
unique set. His individuality is unquestioned. Every cell in his body is a unique genetic
product, as unique as that classic mark of individuality, the fingerprint. And even within
the most regimented culture every personal history is unique. No intentional culture can
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destroy that uniqueness…But the individual nevertheless remains merely a stage in a
process which began long before he came into existence and will long outlast him”
(1971, 200).
While some agents’ paths and ideas converge with others, the courses leading to that junction
are varied and inimitable. The fact that I am the product of my environment does not make my
perception of it any less my own. The world has conspired to make me who I am, yet I alone
experience the outcome. I alone have access to my mindset and I alone make use of my
deliberative mechanisms to effect change in my life and that of others. If my life has gone badly,
if I have made disadvantageous choices, I could not have done otherwise, so there would be no
shame or guilt; there would only be the wisdom that comes with learning from my mistakes. Our
missteps are part of our education, and they become part of the exclusive milieu from which we
draw when making future decisions. I own my mistakes and my accomplishments, not because
they are my fault, but because they are now a part of me, a part of my identity.
If life is a matter of discovery rather than creation, none of the excitement is lost, only
the pride or guilt, only the self-satisfaction or shame of being defined in terms of one’s
accomplishments and failures. Because the idea of freedom is so entrenched in our mindset, we
place our esteem into our endeavors, and we emotionally rise and fall with our successes and
disappointments. If free will skepticism were the accepted ontology, if we defined our being not
by what we created but rather by how we are created by the given world, then what would be lost
is not meaning, but rather and merely our psychological attachment to the consequences of our
actions. We would be “free” of the absolute responsibility to which Sartre condemns us, but we
would still be answerable for our actions and endeavors.
While we can never operate independently of our thrownness, what we can do is operate
within the given world and navigate through it with a sense of wonder rather than of resignation.

106

If free will skepticism is true, it is merely a metaphysical explanation of the way things are.
Phenomenological descriptions explain how things seem. By accepting free will skepticism we
need not renounce or abandon such a description entirely. If we lack free will, then we have
always lacked free will, in which case the thought that deliberation, reflection, interpretation, and
meaning-giving would suddenly disappear or be rendered irrelevant if one were to accept free
will skepticism is inappropriate. Because there are seemingly infinite variables that make up a
life or even a moment in time, reflection, interpretation and deliberation are just as necessary and
meaningful given free will skepticism as they are given libertarianism. Combined with our
inability to foretell the future, free will skepticism posits only that we are destined to be who we
are at every given moment given the state of the world as it is and has been. Given free will
skepticism, societal cohesion would not unravel, personal relationships would not be threatened,
and meaning-giving activities would not be undermined.
An Emerging Objection
Recently, both libertarian and compatibilist theorists have appealed to emergence theories
to defend free will. They argue that, if mental activity is emergent (a quality I will define below),
and downward causation obtains, then actions resulting from such mental processes would not be
subject to the same determinative causal processes that affect lower-level properties. While
emergence theories seem to provide libertarians and compatibilists with an argument for the
existence of free will, I will argue against free will by appealing to the same notions that they use
to defend it. Thus, I will argue that even if mental processes are emergent, free will still does not
exist. Given the myriad kinds and definitions of emergence present in the literature, I will first
explicate which definition I think is relevant to the free will debate. I will then present arguments
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for emergent mental causation. Finally, I will argue that such arguments fail to provide a
plausible account of free will.
Definition and Types of Emergence
To explain emergence, Robert Van Gulick states, “while the emergent features of a whole
are not completely independent of those of its parts since they ‘emerge from’ those parts, the
notion of emergence nonetheless implies that in some significant and novel way they go beyond
the features of those parts” (2007, 60; italics in original). While emergent properties are
comprised of physical constituents, they are defined as more than the mere sum of those physical
parts. As such, emergentist theorists posit that emergent properties have characteristics that their
physical parts do not possess. Terrence Deacon offers the analogy of the relation between a
sentence and its constituent words: “although the meaning of a sentence is dependent on the
meanings of its words, obviously the arrangement of the words is also critically important (as is
context). For this reason the meaning of a sentence can’t typically be deduced from just knowing
the meanings of the words being used” (2007, p.89). In philosophy of mind, emergentist theorists
posit that the relation of and interaction between constituent parts are what give emergent
properties their novel characteristics.
Van Gulick asserts that one reason emergent theories can be problematic is that there are
different types of emergence, and theorists may conflate the meanings, causing confusion and
controversy. He presents and explains two types of emergent relations: metaphysical and
epistemic. I will focus on only metaphysical emergence since that is the type relevant to the
current discussion. Van Gulick defines metaphysical emergence as a relation “holding among
real-world items such as properties” (2007, 60). Within this type, Van Gulick distinguishes
between emergent properties and emergent causal powers or forces (2007, 61). Within each of
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these two classes he posits three categories, ranging from the specific-value, wherein emergent
properties or powers are similar to their base properties, to modest-kind, wherein the properties
are less similar, and finally to radical-kind, wherein the emergent properties or powers are
“different in kind,” and more importantly, “of a kind whose nature and existence is not
necessitated by the features of its parts, their mode of combination and the law-like regularities
governing the features of its parts” (2007, 62). The latter is the kind that is relevant to the free
will debate, since consciousness, identity, and mental states fall under this category.
Emergence, Supervenience, and Downward Causation
One challenge to emergentist theories is the charge of dualism. If mental activities are
emergent properties that possess novel causal characteristics that in turn are radically different
from their constituents, then emergentists need to explain the manner in which the mind is
“connected” to the physical body and how mental events cause bodily behavior. Nancey Murphy
and Warren Brown (M&B) draw upon the notion of supervenience to explain the causal
interaction. However, Jaegwon Kim, a reductionist, argues that supervenience supports his
theory rather than emergence.
Kim’s argument against emergence begins with a definition of supervenience that places
causal efficacy at the base level, such that any change in the parts causes a change in the whole.
He argues against emergence by positing that supervenience entails reduction. According to
Kim, if mental properties supervene on physical properties, then any change in the physical
properties entails a change in the mental properties (2007, 21). For this reason, he argues for
bottom-up causation, wherein higher-level properties are completely determined by their base
properties; thus, there is no room for emergence as defined by Van Gulick, and mental states are
reducible to brain states.
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M&B reply to this argument by stating, “we propose…that supervenient mental states be
understood to be co-determined by subvenient neural events along with social, environmental,
and historical context” (2007, 21; italics in original). According to M&B, emergent mental
properties are not constituted only by physical constituents in the agent; by drawing upon
embedded mind theories, they assert that mind also extends into the environment. If such is the
case, then there is causal interaction, not only between the lower-level parts and the mind, but
also between the mind and the larger environment. Therefore, according to M&B, supervenience
entails neither reduction nor bottom-up causation.
To further illustrate the causal relation between mind, environment and human action,
Van Gulick explains the notion of downward causation (DWC):
If wholes or systems could have causal powers that were radically emergent from the
powers of their parts in the sense that those system-level powers were not determined by
the laws governing the powers of their parts, then that would seem to imply the existence
of powers that could override or violate the laws governing the powers of the parts; that
is, genuine cases of what is called ‘downward causation’ in which the macro-powers of
the whole ‘reach down’ and alter the course of events at the micro-level from what they
would be if determined entirely by the properties and laws at the lower level. (2007, 63)
While supervenience describes the relationship between one’s environment, mental events, and
basal properties, DWC seems to liberate mental events from the causal constraints of physical
reductionism. If emergent powers are free from the deterministic laws governing their physical
constituents, then they should be able to begin causal chains independently of physical laws.
M&B appeal to emergence and DWC when arguing for their theory of free will against
biological determinism.
Typical arguments against free will posit that since humans are comprised of purely
physical parts, and since those parts are subject to (determined by) the laws of physics and causal
influences, the entire human is also subject to those same determinative constraints. DWC seems
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to turn those arguments on their head. Due to DWC, Campbell and Bickhard (C&B) argue that
emergence entails causal origination, stating,
It is critically important that if there are ‘emergent’ properties and powers, they should
have their own distinctive causal powers, irreducible to the causal powers of their base
properties…this implies that emergent properties not only bring about changes in other
emergent phenomena on the same level, but such changes are also accompanied by
changes in the relevant base-level properties. (2010, 1)
If my choices influence the structure of my brain and the formation of neural pathways, then any
argument positing reductionism or biological determinism is radically undermined. While
emergent theories offer a compelling argument against biological or physical determinism,
biological determinism is only one kind of causal determinism, and emergence by itself does not
provide a convincing argument against causal determinism in general. Later, I will show how
emergent theories and DWC actually provide a stronger argument for causal determinism than
for free will.
From Particles to Processes
Targeting physical reductionists, emergentists argue against a Newtonian, mechanistic
ontology, the assumption of which “is at the heart of causal reductionism, the view that the
behavior of the parts of an entity (or the laws governing the behavior of the parts) determines the
behavior of the whole unilaterally” (2007, 10). C&B argue that physicalists mistakenly base their
theories on this antiquated presupposition, rather than on a process-based metaphysics, according
to which “there are no basic particulars, only fields of process” (2010, 15). They argue that this
shift to a process-based metaphysics requires a radical change in how we view and define what it
is to be a human organism. According to C&B, “biological systems—including humans—are not
aggregations of cells (smaller things), which in turn (after a few more reductions) are
aggregations of elementary particles…such creatures are open, organized action systems in
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essential interactions with their environments, such that we cannot say what they are without
taking those interactive processes into account” (2010, 28; italics in original). Thus, in this view,
humans are defined in terms of relations and context rather than in terms of individual, isolated
substances.
M&B offer a similar argument in which they conceive mental events as contextualized
brain events, wherein the mental is “co-constituted by the context in which the mental/neural
event occurs” (2007, 20). This shift from particles to processes to explain human existence and
action provides another convincing argument against biological and merely physical
determinism. However, radical-kind emergence is not necessarily limited to biological
organisms. Societies, nations, cultures, and similar human groupings all fit the definition of
radical-kind emergent causal powers. As such, through downward causation, they have the
ability to shape and influence their members and significantly influence—and in part
constitute—their members’ emergent causal powers. Thus, humans are caught in, and are a part
of, an open, dynamic, causal system. How much of a causal part (if any) they play in this system
is the focus of the rest of this section.
Free Will?
Traditionally, arguments for causal determinism have relied on physical theories, and
espouse bottom-up causation. Murphy argues that if DWC obtains, then there is now room for
“investigation of how humans’ neural and social complexity gives them (a degree of) control
over their own bodies and behavior” (2010, 254). M&B agree with causal determinists that
humans are causally affected and influenced by external factors beyond their control. However,
they claim that in order to have FMR, an actor does not need to be the sole, or even the original
cause of her behavior; she need only be “primarily” responsible. They assert a causal continuum
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wherein responsibility is ascribed in proportion to an agent’s causal role in the action. They
maintain that “some decisions and actions are to be attributed more to the agent than to the
triggering cause together with structuring causes put in place by biology and the environment”
(2007, 290). While their argument for what constitutes “primary” responsibility is vague, they
mention the fact that mitigating circumstances are often considered when sentencing a guilty
criminal.
Indeed, as mentioned above, courts of law in the United States consider mitigating
circumstances (e.g. insanity, coercion, duress, mental deficiency) when sentencing criminals
found guilty in trials. However, while M&B can account for mitigated responsibility, they still
need an account of what it means to be primarily responsible. Where is the line drawn between
primary responsibility, lesser responsibility, and total absolution? The free will debate usually
arises between those who believe actors are wholly responsible and those who argue against any
responsibility. Trying to find a position between the extremes is problematic, and M&B’s
version is incomplete at best.
Another assumption M&B take issue with is that of a linear causal sequence of events.
The traditional free will debate rests on the assumption that humans exist within a linear causal
chain that stretches back through history and forward into the future. They argue that this is a
misconception (2007, 288). Instead, according to them, we operate in a dynamic causal system
wherein we interact with the environment through a feedback loop. In this scenario, FMR
emerges through the processes of taking in information, evaluating it, and responding in light of
our evaluation.
This rendition of FMR relies heavily upon a MacIntyrean notion of responsibility.
According to Alasdair MacIntyre, free will is “the ability evaluate that which moves one to act in
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light of a concept of the good” (in M&B, 2007, 243). Leaving aside the problem of how one
develops a notion of the “good,” MacIntyre’s position is problematic in other ways. First,
appealing to meta-evaluations as the basis of freedom has regress issues; i.e., evaluating reasons
for actions and responding accordingly can either lead to an infinite regress or, at least, to a
regress that ultimately ends with factors that operate beyond the agent’s control. M&B provide
an example from G. Simon Harak, of a man, Harak, who, because of his martial arts training,
reacts to what he perceives as an aggressive stranger (2007, 256). Meanwhile, Harak’s friend
John, who does not have such training, fails to register any aggression in the stranger. Upon
contemplation, Harak recognizes how past influences caused him to react as he did, and he
decides to become a pacifist. Harak changes his behavior based on his realization that it was
caused by environmental factors. Every change he makes is caused by factors that did not
originate with him. M&B explain that Harak’s “evaluation happened as a result of the contrast
between his and John’s responses,” so the act of contemplating his actions was externally caused
(2007, 257). If he embarked on a mission to evaluate his reasons for evaluating his reasons, he
would enter an infinite regression from which he might never surface.
A second issue with MacIntyre’s account is that it seems that what he requires for moral
responsibility is precisely that which explains why we are not morally responsible. Being able to
perceive what moves us to action means that there is something that moves us to action. What
moves us to action can be any number of motivations including desires, preferences, obligations,
and aversions. Yet, contemplating the origin of those motivations will eventually lead to factors
beyond our control. Our actions fit into a causal narrative, and that narrative begins before we are
born and continues after we die. Motivations for action are merely one story in a narrative that
was not written by us. Each of us leaves a legacy of causal processes in which we play a part, but
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MacIntyre does not provide an argument that shows how that legacy could originate within us.
The mere act of recognizing the causal process does not, by itself, help us transcend it; rather, it
merely becomes another part of the process.
Thus, the non-linear, dynamic, evaluative, interactive process upon which MacIntyre,
Murphy, and Brown base their notion of FMR does not support their conclusion. How I evaluate
my reactions is a result of past and external influences. For example, imagine that Jack and Jill,
driving separate cars, each get cut off in traffic. They both react with anger. Jack, having just
come back from a Buddhist retreat where he learned mindfulness techniques, realizes he is angry
and comes to the conclusion that the aggressive emotion is unwarranted in this circumstance. He
takes a few deep breaths and chants a quick mantra, thus changing his mood, allowing himself to
focus on other, more important issues. Jill, on the other hand, is often angered by instances of
injustice, and has never learned to control her sudden outbursts. When people comment on her
anger, she replies with the cliché “if you’re not pissed off, then you’re not paying attention.” She
recognizes that she is angry at being cut off, and comes to the conclusion that her indignation is
completely justified. She yells an obscenity at the driver and spends the next hour blaming the
stranger for all that is wrong with the world. Jack is no more “free” and autonomous than Jill.
Both evaluated the situation and acted in light of what they perceived to be the “good.” The fact
that Jack could change his behavior as a result of his contemplation is a direct result of his
previous experience (along with genetics). The fact that Jill perpetuated her customary pattern of
behavior is also a direct result of previous experience (along with genetics).
According to M&B, the choice to continue or discontinue a behavior is a free choice,
because at that moment, all the mental work seems to be done only by the agent. M&B assume
that since reason, deliberation, and evaluation are emergent powers, any action resulting from
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them is self-caused. However, such is not the case. All mental activity, including how one
reasons, is the product of an ongoing process, one that is itself acted upon by external factors
such as experience and genetic programming. From the moment we spring from the womb, we
are born into a context that informs our perception of the world. Our neural pathways form in
response to external stimuli; we learn and form mental habits. The particular habits we form
depend upon which actions and choices get reinforced, which in turn depend on experience and
interactions with our environment.
M&B admit that our environment plays a large part in our character development:
We agree that humans are never entirely responsible for their own characters. We come
into the world with some degree of initial biological (genetic) predetermination…we try
out various actions and modify our behavioral tendencies based on feedback…This
action-feedback process involves increasing susceptibility to social influences. However,
the childhood task is not only social adaptation, but also the development of autonomy.
(2007, 286)
As in other compatibilist accounts of freedom, their argument hinges on their definition of
autonomy. M&B define it as involving “capacities for intentionally directed action” (2007, 286).
According to this definition, my dog could be described as autonomous every time she
intentionally chases a squirrel. If an individual’s character is partly determined by genetics,
environment, education, experience, and context, there does not seem to be any part of an agent’s
character that is self-caused. Even if character is an emergent property, it is the linear result of
past experience, it is upwardly influenced by genetics, and it is downwardly caused by social
context. An argument for FMR would need to show that the individual spontaneously generates
some part of that character and demonstrate that that part is enough to warrant responsibility
ascriptions.
Thus, if a rational agent voluntarily plans and executes a murder according to her will,
even if she recognizes the causal process that led to her decision to murder her intended victim,
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that causal process leading to her action still acts as an excusing condition in the same manner as
a situation where an agent is coerced, e.g., has a gun to her head at the time. This is because both
agents lack the control requisite for moral responsibility. If an agent has no control over her
mental states, i.e., if those mental states are not caused by her, but rather are merely the latest
manifestations of a causal process that reaches back to a time before her birth, then it would be
unfair to hold her responsible for actions caused by those states.
Even if emergentism and downward causation obtain, they do not provide free will
theorists with a foundation for free will. I do not solely, ultimately, or even primarily cause my
actions or the effects of those actions. Myriad causal factors make me who I am and cause me to
think the way I do. When I deliberate, decide, and act, I do so not as a single, original, or
independent entity, but as a conglomeration of all my past and present experiences, combined
with my genetic predispositions, social context and immediate environment. I deliberate, decide,
and act as part of a dynamic, interactive system. I am always and already an integrated member
of an institution(s), and as such, I cannot be solely, ultimately or primarily morally responsible
for my actions.
Conclusion
The self is a fiction. Individuals are interdependent, extended beings caught in the middle
of an historical and environmental causal stream. We cannot be other than we are, we can neither
think nor act other than we do, and we are not the original creators of our thoughts and actions.
To some, these circumstances may seem tragic; however, I contend that with social and political
reforms, we can (if we are determined [causally and otherwise] to do so) use the knowledge of
free will skepticism to our best advantage. We are simultaneously the products and creators of
our society. Granted, we have no ultimate control over who we are or what we create, but as
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stated before, that does not mean that our respective characters and our society are doomed to
meaninglessness and stagnation. Humans are resilient and responsive. With new information
comes new epistemic possibilities, and I firmly believe that if free will skepticism permeated the
ideologies of this culture, we could create a more just and fair society. In the next chapter, I
discuss a couple of those possibilities.
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CHAPTER 4
PUNISHMENT AND PARENTHOOD
In addition to praising and sanctioning individuals, we might have a moral obligation
to also encourage good behavior by explicitly manipulating environments in ways that
induce individuals to behave well. We also perhaps ought to identify and modify the
kinds of environments that tend to produce bad behavior. The educational initiatives,
socialization efforts, ethical theorizing, and moral norms in our societies should be
seen as part of the system that produces morally valenced behavior. (Mason Cash,
2010, 653)
The previous chapters of my dissertation focus on the theoretical and metaphysical aspects
of the free will debate. I turn now to the practical and ethical implications of accepting free
skepticism as they relate to punishment and parenthood. Skinner states, “We shall not solve the
problems of alcoholism and juvenile delinquency by increasing a sense of responsibility. It is the
environment which is “responsible” for the objectionable behavior, and it is the environment, not
some attribute of the individual, which must be changed” (1971, p. 70). Since society plays a
large causal role in creating its citizens, then we need to shift our focus from holding individuals
responsible for their actions, to creating social environments and institutions that reinforce legal
and moral behavior. If agents are merely the causal products of their history and environment
and if moral responsibility for an agent’s actions (criminal and otherwise) is diffused, then our
current system of punishing criminals is unjust. If the way children are raised causally
determines to a great extent the kind of people they will become, and if moral responsibility for
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their upbringing is diffused, then the society in which they are raised should13 ensure that each
child is not mistreated. Thus, given free will skepticism, we as a society should dramatically
reform the social institutions of punishment and parenthood. Such reforms would be beneficial
whether or not free will skepticism is true, and they would create a society that conforms to the
principles of fairness, justice, and morality in a way that our current society does not.
Punishment
An often-discussed consequence of free will skepticism concerns the implications for the
way society punishes wrongdoers. Our culture bases its ethical and judicial system on the idea
that people are free individuals, legally and morally culpable for their actions. However, if our
actions are either causally determined by forces beyond our control, or caused by random
quantum events, then we need to radically alter our perception and treatment of those who
commit immoral and criminal acts by shifting the focus of moral judgments from people to
actions. We need to divert our attention from the agent to the causal factors leading to an agent’s
immoral or illegal actions. If an agent commits an immoral or illegal act, then it is unfortunate,
and the society should do everything possible to ensure that the agent does not commit further
wrongs, but the response should not be predicated on guilt or blame. Skinner states, “No one
knows the best way of raising children, paying workers, maintaining law and order, teaching, or
making people creative, but it is possible to propose better ways than we now have and to
support them by predicting and eventually demonstrating more reinforcing results” (1971, 131;
italics in original). In what follows, I will defend what I consider to be alternative solutions to
current punitive practices and will argue that our policy of vilifying those who commit theft,

13

The term “should” in the context of this paragraph is meant to imply a hypothetical rather than a categorical
imperative. If we want to live in a society with reduced crime, then we should reform the institutions of punishment
and parenthood.
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murder, rape and even genocide should be eliminated, and that the retributivist justification for
punishment should be replaced.
Justifications for our Current System of Punishment
Our culture’s current justifications for punishment include retribution, deterrence and
rehabilitation. Retribution relies on notions of desert that are not relevant, given free will
skepticism. According to retributive justifications, we punish criminals because they deserve it
because of their past criminal behavior. Free will skepticism may concede that certain actions
warrant certain responses, even censure in some circumstances, but it is not because the criminal
deserves it or is blameworthy. Thus, punishment based on retribution would not be available in a
society that accepts free will skepticism.
While deterrence-based justifications for punishment are compatible with free will
skepticism, using such justifications is morally problematic. First, Pereboom cautions that such
justifications would “justify punishments that are intuitively too severe” (2013b, 69). If chopping
off one’s hand were the price to pay for stealing, then indeed, perhaps less people would steal,
and the entire society would benefit as a result. However, the practice of enacting punishments
more severe than the crime conflicts with the rule against “cruel and unusual” punishment in the
United States’ constitution.
Another objection against deterrence justifications for punishment is that crime statistics
show that criminal behavior in the United States continues to occur at alarming rates despite
well-known consequences. In 2012, “about 6,937,600 offenders were under the supervision of
adult correctional systems at year end,” and 920 people out of every 100,000 were in prison or
jail (Bureau of Justice Statistics). There were 6,842,590 victims of violent crimes in 2012
(Bureau of Justice Statistics). While the threat of punishment may deter some people from
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committing some crimes, these statistics provide compelling evidence that deterrence is not an
effective means of prevention, and, by itself, fails as an adequate justification for punishment.
Of course, we do not know how many would-be criminals are deterred from criminal
actions due to the fear of punishment, but even if deterrence were effective, Pereboom argues
that using it as a justification goes against Kant’s second formulation of the categorical
imperative: people should never be used as a mere means to an end (Pereboom, 2001, 168).
However, society does just that when it subjects criminals to severe punishments for the sake of
deterring others from committing the same crime, or that criminal from committing another
crime. Underlining this point, Pereboom states, “A general problem for utilitarianism is that it
allows people to be harmed severely, without their consent, in order to benefit others, and this is
often intuitively wrong” (2001, 168). Few would condone subjecting patients with a contagious
disease to a prison or death sentence merely because they pose a threat to others. Regardless of
how deadly, painful, or virulent the disease, the afflicted patients would be treated humanely
precisely because society recognizes that they have no control over and are not morally
responsible for the effects of the disease. This is the analogy Pereboom offers in his alternative to
our current system of punishment.
Rehabilitation as an Alternative to Retribution and Deterrence
In Living Without Free Will, Pereboom rejects retributivism in favor of rehabilitation
wherein a criminal is “quarantined” and her behavior modified according to the severity of the
crime and her psychological needs. Drawing from Ferdinand Schoeman, Pereboom suggests we
treat criminals as we would carriers of infectious diseases, by removing them from society until
they are no longer deemed a threat (2001, 174). The more serious crimes would warrant more
extensive rehabilitation through behavior reconditioning. Agents would be subjected to operant
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conditioning through encouragement and admonition rather than praise and blame. Since human
nature is not static (i.e., we are susceptible to social conditioning), containment and rehabilitation
in many cases would be both efficacious and compatible with free will skepticism.
The “Funishment” objection
At first glance, changing our view of those who commit heinous crimes seems like the
least satisfying consequence of accepting free will skepticism. To some, subjecting murderers
and rapists to a “quarantine” sounds like a soft response to hard crimes. Saul Smilanski suggests
such a sentiment in his practical objection to hard determinism. 14 He argues that hard
determinism commits a society to what he calls “funishment” instead of punishment:
Funishment would resemble punishment in that criminals would be incarcerated apart
from lawful society; and institutions of funishment would also need to be as secure as
current prisons, to prevent criminals from escaping. But here the similarity ends. For
institutions of funishment would also need to be delightful as possible. They would need
to resemble five-star hotels, where the residents are given every opportunity to enjoy life.
(2011, 355)
Indeed, if agents were not morally responsible for criminal behavior, then it would be unjust to
sentence them to lengthy stays in violent prisons. Smilanski argues that the only other alternative
is to place criminals in facilities resembling vacation resorts; however, incarceration is not the
only option. If the response to criminal behavior takes into account the motivation of the person
and the causal history leading to the crime, then incarceration would by no means be the most
common, much less the only, solution. If it were determined that the criminal committed the
crime due to a psychological disorder, then psychiatric treatment would be the just and most
effective response. If it were determined that a criminal committed a crime due to certain social
conditions (poverty, joblessness, lack of education, gang membership), then the response would
reflect that: education, job training, and perhaps relocation. This, of course, requires money. But
14

When discussing Smilanski, I will use “hard determinism” as he uses it in his article with the understanding that
his arguments also hold against free will skepticism.
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if such a policy were instituted, much of the money spent on maintaining and staffing prisons
could be redirected to social programs helping criminals readjust to a life free of crime. For
example, if the death penalty were to be abolished, given free will skepticism, public
expenditures toward the appeal process could be reallocated to cover the cost of rehabilitation.
Smilanski objects to Pereboom’s “incapacitation,” or “quarantine” account, claiming that
some violent criminals may be beyond rehabilitation or operant conditioning. He argues that
Pereboom’s quarantine analogy is “of only limited help,” because medical quarantines are not
usually meant as long-term solutions (2011, 357). If we must isolate dangerous individuals who,
through no fault of their own, pose a threat to society, then, according to Smilanski, we would
have to make the accommodations as pleasant as possible. However, after reading Smilanski, one
might think that free will skeptics would have the likes of Charles Manson, Hitler, and Jeffrey
Dahmer playing golf before taking in a massage and feasting on steaks (or Tofurkey for Hitler).
If such were the case, argues Smilanski, funishment would provide an incentive toward, rather
than a deterrent to, crime. Furthermore, having violent criminals enjoy accommodations more
luxurious than that of their victims or victim’s families would be an insult to justice and
morality.
Indeed, even if the prison system were not luxurious, reforming the justice system to
make prisons more humane and hospitable would seem to provide the poor and unfortunate with
an incentive to commit a crime just to enjoy decent accommodations. However, there is
something seriously wrong with a society that creates citizens whose circumstances are so dire
that they resort to committing a crime just to get a meal. Also, if an agent commits a heinous
crime such as murder (as opposed to minor vandalism or theft), just to get a meal, then there is
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something seriously wrong with that person, and she needs psychiatric help regardless of her
reason for committing the crime.
The main problem with Smilanski’s funishment objection is that he offers a false
dichotomy: either uphold the current justice system or send violent criminals to a heavily
guarded luxury spa. His alternatives overlook the fact that there can be facilities of intermediate
quality. Pereboom’s point is that we should treat criminals as though they were afflicted with a
dangerous disease or ailment, requiring isolation and treatment, rather than as though they were
untouchable outcasts, deserving exile, or malevolent demons, fit for execution. Patients suffering
from chronic diseases are not sent to a spa-like hospital; they are sent to facilities best suited to
address their medical needs. Likewise, even criminals who require life-long isolation need not be
afforded luxurious accommodations at taxpayer expense. All that is required, given free-will
skepticism, is that wrongdoers be treated as humanely as possible, since they did not have the
control requisite for moral responsibility.
Corrado’s Alternative
Michael Corrado offers another objection to Pereboom’s use of a sickness analogy: “it
will treat all as sick, and deny to those who are competent the special respect we believe they are
due as autonomous agents” (2013, 80). Corrado calls this the “awful outcome” because it does
not recognize a difference between “those who act autonomously and those who do not” (2013,
81). In chapter three, I discussed how free will skepticism could address such distinctions in
under the “scale of responsibility” objection. Here, I want to focus on Corrado’s alternative.
Corrado calls his alternative “a decent system of criminal justice.” While being
compatible with free will skepticism, it retains the distinction between “madness and malice,”
and between “those who were competent to conform their behavior to the law and those who
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were not” (2013, 89). He invokes a slippery slope argument to support his objection to
Pereboom’s quarantine solution:
The undesirability of such a system has nothing to do with the question of responsibility
and has everything to do with the quality of life. Under that system, those who are in
control of their behavior and are caught in the web of criminal justice are treated just like
those who are not in control. Those who are not yet caught in that web must be
preoccupied by the fact that at any time they might be found to be dangerous, and that
there is nothing that they can do to avoid that finding. Those who might have committed
a minor offense cannot know that they will be subjected to the limited sanctions of a
prison term; they might be detained indefinitely. Civil disobedience would become too
costly to consider. (2013, 91-92)
Corrado’s alternative assumes deterrence and correction as the main justifications for
punishment. The main problems with his view are: 1) our current punishment system does not
deter crime and 2) Corrado is offering no recommendations for change of our current system; he
is merely offering a different theoretical justification for the status quo. Whether you call it
retribution, a means to an end, or, using Corrado’s term, “correction,” the fact remains that
criminals are being treated harshly for actions over which they had no (ultimate) control.
Corrado uses utilitarianism to defend his position by explaining how both society and
criminals will benefit from a correction-based form of punishment. Society will benefit through
protection, and criminals will benefit because “harsh treatment is a way, certainly not the only
way, but a way nevertheless, to teach the significance of rules” (2013, 94). He supports the first
claim with an appeal to deterrence. According to Corrado, if the punishment is sufficiently harsh
(but not so harsh that it defies fairness and reason), rational people will have the proper incentive
to conform to the rules. Those who cannot conform to such rules, despite such incentives
(failing to meet Fischer’s reasons-responsiveness criteria for FMR), fall on the scale of
responsibility, and the justice system may mitigate their punishment.
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However, Corrado’s theory of punishment reads like compatibilism, window-dressed to
appease free will skeptics. He states:
On the other hand, controlling crime through the threat of correction allows the greatest
possible freedom consistent with some reasonable level of security. For this reason, it is
important that the guidelines set down by the threat of correction be able to be processed
by the citizen, and that correction itself be capable of having an effect on the citizen. The
good life (as I understand it here) requires understanding, the ability to reason
counterfactually from what we understand, and the ability to control behavior in
conformity with our reasoned conclusions. We may refer to these capacities, taken
together, as the capability of converting one’s better judgment into action. This capability
enables the citizen to grasp the threat of correction, to foresee the consequences of
compliance and noncompliance, and to conform her behavior to the law. (2013, 96,
italics added)
However, according to free will skepticism, whether or not agents have the capability to conform
their actions to the law, and the degree to which they have this capability, are matters that are
beyond their ultimate control. Those who can be deterred from crime by the threat of
“correction” are merely fortunate to have had the causal history that enabled them to do so.
Those who do not have the capability are merely unfortunate. Those who possess the capability
and commit a crime anyway are likewise unfortunate, and those who do not possess the
capability, yet coincidentally happen to never break the law, are merely fortunate. In no instance
are the agents blameworthy, because in no instance can the agents act other than they do, and in
no instance are the agents capable of wanting to act other than they want.
Vilhauer’s Rawlsian-based justification for punishment
Benjamin Vilhauer argues that free will skeptics can retain punishment while avoiding
the morally suspect implications of utilitarian justifications. He supports a Rawlsian-based
justification that retains Kantian considerations such as treating people and criminals, “as they
would rationally consent to be treated” (2011, 145). To defend his claim, he distinguishes
between action- and personhood-based desert claims.
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According to Vilhauer, an action-based desert claim assumes that the agent deserves
punishment based on her past actions. Such claims assume moral responsibility and are therefore
not available to the free will skeptic. On the other hand, personhood-based desert claims are
“based on the mere fact of being a person” regardless of moral responsibility (2011, 149). For
example, Kant’s decree that all people deserve to be treated with respect and dignity by virtue of
their rational capacities is a personhood-desert claim. Vilhauer’s examples mostly involve legal
rights such as the right to a fair trial and equal treatment. According to Vilhauer, “there is
nothing one could conceivably do to make it the case that one did not deserve these things”
(2011, 151). The shift from action-based desert to personhood-based desert demands a shift from
retributivist-justified punishment to an alternative justification.
Vilhauer’s alternative preserves key aspects of Rawls’ economic model, based on the
“veil of ignorance,” or original position. If we were to design a justice and penal system without
knowing whether or not we would become victims or perpetrators of crime, we would want a
system that would be fair to all parties. As Vilhauer states, “a principle is fair to competing
parties if I would choose it under the assumption that I was just as likely to be harmed by it as I
was to benefit. So the principles of punishment are fair if I would choose them under the
assumption that I am just as likely to be the person punished as I am to be a potential victim”
(2011, 156). The intuition that Vilhauer attempts to capture, and one with which I agree, is that
if it were possible to assess our justice system from behind a veil of ignorance, most would
enthusiastically advocate for radical reform. Free will skepticism provides both the incentive and
justification for such reforms. Alternatives to our current model of punishment already exist and
are being implemented on a limited scale; I discuss and defend these models in the following
sections.
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The Risk-Need-Receptivity Model15
Given free will skepticism, once an agent is convicted and enters the prison system, the
main goals should be to: 1) determine the causal factors that contributed to the agent’s criminal
actions; 2) assess whether that agent can eventually become reintegrated into society; and 3)
provide a strategy for successful integration that minimizes the probability of recidivism. The
current rates of recidivism show that the United States is failing to satisfy those goals: According
to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 2005, “(67.8%) of released prisoners were arrested for a
new crime within 3 years, and three quarters (76.6%) were arrested within 5 years” (Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 2010). To address this problem, D.A. Andrews and James Bonta devised a
method for treating criminals called “risk-need-responsivity” (RNR). This model aligns nicely
with the practical and moral implications of free will skepticism.
The RNR model is based on three sets of principles: overarching principles, core RNR
principles, and organizational principles (2010, pp. 46-47). The overarching principles
emphasize:
Respect for the person, including respect for personal autonomy, being humane, ethical,
just, legal, decent and being otherwise normative. Some norms may vary with the
agencies or the particular settings within which services are delivered. For example,
agencies working with young offenders may be expected to show exceptional attention to
education issues and to child protection. Mental health agencies may attend to issues of
personal well-being. Some agencies working with female offenders may place a premium
on attending to trauma and/or to parenting concerns. (2010, 46)
Such ideals are compatible with desert-based forms of punishment as well. Even the perpetrators
of the most heinous crimes currently have certain rights afforded them by the U.S. Constitution,
such as the right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishments. However, in practice, our
penal system does not measure up to those ideals. According to the Bureau of Justice,
“Correctional administrators reported 8,763 allegations of sexual victimization in prisons, jails,
15

For a complete description of the RNR model, see Andrews and Bonta (2010, 45-78).
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and other adult correctional facilities in 2011” (BJS, 2014). The report claims that only 10% of
the allegations were substantiated, but that percentage does not account for unreported instances
of rape. The most startling fact, though, is that staff members were the perpetrators in 48% of the
reported instances (BJS, 2014). These statistics persist, despite the apparently impotent Prison
Rape Elimination Act, which passed in 2003.
If rape were as common in hospitals as it is in prisons, there would be national outrage.
The public would cite the vulnerability of the patients; they would berate the cruelty of the staff;
and they would champion calls for drastic reforms in the medical care industry. Prisoners, on the
other hand, do not elicit such sympathetic pleas for their health and well-being. I contend that the
lack of national attention and concern for the safety of inmates is due to our perspective of
criminals as blameworthy. When we look at the heinous nature of a crime, it is easy to deny the
humanity of the criminal. However, if we see the criminal as a sufferer of a heinous disease, and
the crime as a symptom, then perhaps there would be more motivation to uphold the ideals
described in the overarching principles of the RNR model of prisoner treatment.
The core RNR principles eschew sanctions and mere punishment as a means for reducing
crime and recidivism, since “the typical legal and judicial principles of deterrence, restoration,
just desert, and due process have little to do with the major risk/need factors. It is through
human, clinical, and social services that the major causes of crime may be addressed” (2010, 46,
47). The RNR model recognizes the importance of tailoring treatment to the specific needs of a
criminal. As recidivism rates show, the punishment-fits-the-crime principle we currently employ
does not work. It is like treating all patients with a particular ailment with the same dose of
medicine without looking at their medical history. Rather, the treatment should fit the criminal
based on their “criminogenic needs.” The criminogenic needs principle recognizes that certain
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social, economic, and psychological factors make criminal behavior more likely. Andrews and
Bonta describe “criminogenic needs” as “dynamic risk factors that, when changed, are associated
with changes in the probability of recidivism” (2010, 49). Determining the risks and needs of
each criminal would be a far more effective means of constructing an effective rehabilitation
program, one designed for their eventual successful integration (when possible) into society.
The general specific responsivity principle of the RNR “refers to delivering treatment
programs in a style and mode that is consistent with the ability and learning style of the
offender” (2010, 49). This principle rests on the understanding that:
Offenders are human beings, and the most powerful influence strategies available are
cognitive-behavioral and cognitive social learning strategies…Hence, one should use
social learning and cognitive behavioral styles of service to bring about change. These
powerful influence strategies include modeling, reinforcement, role playing, skill
building, modification of thoughts and emotions through cognitive restructuring, and
practicing new, low-risk alternative behaviors over and over again in a variety of highrisk situations until one gets very good at it (2010, 49-50).
This principle echoes the Aristotelian-based exercise of developing virtuous habits. Through
practice and repetition, one can be re-conditioned to think and behave in ways novel to the
individual. Not every criminal would be responsive to the same degree; thus, the model
advocates the need to tailor strategies to the specific abilities of the person. The specific
responsivity principle recommends adapting “the style and mode of service according to the
setting of service and to relevant characteristics of individual offenders, such as their strengths,
motivations, preferences, personality, age, gender, ethnicity, cultural identifications, and other
factors” (2010, 46). Personalizing treatment and rehabilitation respects the humanity of the
criminals while benefiting society by reducing recidivism rates. Such a model, if successfully
implemented, would not only be compatible with free will skepticism, but it would be more
effective, and thus more beneficial, to society than our current system.
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Studies of the RNR model in action have shown that its employment in prisons “resulted
in lower recidivism rates than alternative criminal sanctions or treatment” (Brooks et al., 2012,
432). One example of its use is in Kentucky’s Department of Corrections (DOC). Wanting to
address the increase in prison populations and recidivism rates, the DOC instituted the Level of
Service/Case Management Inventory (LS/CMI), which “is a validated risk and needs assessment
tool that identifies criminal risk factors through a comprehensive interview and investigation
process. Once criminal risk factors are identified, LS/CMI enables the DOC to provide services
to mitigate the risks” (Thompson, 2013, 47). The responsivity aspect of the RNR model assesses
the prisoner’s ability to respond to certain treatments and evaluates which treatments are most
likely to reduce risks for recidivism. For example,
Placing an individual with limited English proficiency in a fathering program that is not
in his native language would be an example of responsivity not being considered.
Responsivity factors allow corrections professionals to match the intervention to the
learning style, motivation and demographics of the offender in order to be most effective.
(Thompson, 2013, 47)
Thompson argued that despite all of the resources previously available to the DOC, “none of
these tools allowed the DOC to identify the offender’s overall needs and risks for recidivism in
order to provide an appropriate level of programming, LS/CMI was used to fill this gap” (2013,
47).
Applying the specific responsivity principle, correctional treatments are tailored to each
inmate’s specific recidivism risk level:
A low-risk offender may need assistance in determining how to conduct an appropriate
job search or how to read a bus schedule. An offender who is high risk needs to be placed
in an evidence-based program. A high-risk offender needs to have structured
programming—meaning a curriculum-based program monitored by a trained
facilitator…Completing evidence-based programs are shown to reduce recidivism, which
in turn reduces that individual’s propensity to commit additional crimes, and therefore
increases public safety. (Thompson, 2013, 48)
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As described in the model, risk levels are based on an inmate’s criminogenic needs—
characteristics or circumstances that make criminal behavior likely. Thompson argues that
attending to the specific needs and challenges of the inmate is necessary for effective
rehabilitation, since “an offender can complete a vocational degree and gain stable employment,
but if his anti-social cognition and anti-social companions have not been addressed, he will not
maintain employment and will likely return to criminal behavior” (Thompson, 48). Thus, the
RNR model as employed by the Kentucky DOC provides evidence for the efficacy of using
criminal treatment and rehabilitation methods rather than mere desert-based punishments.
Meditation in Prisons
Other types of alternative treatments, such as mindfulness meditation techniques, are also
being employed in a limited number of prisons. In the last chapter, I discussed the effectiveness
of mindfulness techniques and meditation as a way to overcome, mitigate, or prevent unjustified
reactive attitudes within interpersonal relationships. Here, I will discuss studies that show how
such techniques have been applied with beneficial effects in prison populations. Meditation has
been shown to effectively reduce violent tendencies in prisoners, and to reduce recidivism rates
among those who practiced it.
Abigayl M. Perelman, et al. studied the effects of Vipassana, a type of mindfulness-based
meditation, on a group of prisoners in Alabama.16 The authors were concerned with the effects of
prison overcrowding: “these environments directly contribute to criminogenic factors…that both
create and maintain antisocial, hostile, and aggressive behaviors. It is hardly surprising that many
offenders return to the community not only lacking in the skills needed for reintegration, but are
often more criminalized” (2012, 177). They support this claim with recent recidivism statistics:
“the Pew Center on the States (2011) and the Association of State Administrators showed that
16

The meditation program in Alabama was the subject of a documentary entitled “Dhamma Brothers.”

133

the 3-year return-to-prison rate for inmates released in 1999 was 45.4% and 43.4% for those
released in 2004” (2012, 177).

Their goal was to see if integrating meditation into the

rehabilitation regime would reduce such rates.
The authors recognize that “The focus for treatment should be on securing positive/good
lives for the offender during and after incarceration while reducing negative risks. This newer
and less conventional theory notes the concept of ‘good lives’ should be individually tailored to
each offender” (2012, 177-178). Mindfulness meditation as treatment teaches prisoners who are
amenable to the practice how to distance themselves from reactive responses, thereby gaining
more (immediate) control over their emotions and impulses. The prison provided an ideal, albeit
unfortunate, place to test whether agents can overcome or mitigate negative, and often
destructive, reactive attitudes. Perelman, et al. state that “Incarcerated offenders often present
with many risk factors associated with criminal behavior, including personal distress,
aggression/hostility, criminal thinking, negative peer associations, rule/law infractions, and
substance abuse (Hawkins, 2003 in Perelman et al., 2012, 181). Vipassana meditation, with its
emphasis on alleviating psychological distress and ameliorating destructive emotions through
detachment and inward observation seemed like an ideal therapy to offer prisoners.
Perelman et al.’s longitudinal study took place in the Alabama Department of Corrections
(ADOC) after the prison instituted quarterly, 10-day Vipassana meditation (VM) retreats in
2007. At the date of publication, “430 inmates [had] participated in at least one VM retreat”
(2012, 182). Researchers used a battery of “self-report measures,” including surveys to measure
mental awareness, anger, mood states, and emotional intelligence (2012, pp. 186-187). Their
findings showed that,
In comparison to their baseline ratings, VM students showed enhanced levels of
mindfulness (during the first posttest period) and emotional intelligence (1 year after the
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retreat), whereas the comparison group showed no such improvement. VM students’
exposure to reflective attention skills during the retreat may be associated with their
improved ability to recognize emotion, which was not observed in the comparison group.
In addition, the support of peer engagement in similar practices experienced during the
retreat may have assisted in VM students’ agentic adoption of an alternative, mindful
framework of conceptualizing and managing emotion. (2012, 192)
This was a study of one 10-day retreat, and not all participants were able to report post retreat for
various reasons. However, the preliminary findings of Perelman’s study show the promise of
using alternative and supplemental treatments to reduce crime and rehabilitate prisoners.
Therapy in Prisons
Therapy provides a more conventional approach to treating the causal factors leading to
crime. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, “At midyear 2005 more than half of all
prison and jail inmates had a mental health problem, including 705,600 inmates in State prisons,
78,800 in Federal prisons, and 479,900 in local jails. These estimates represented 56% of State
prisoners, 45% of Federal prisoners, and 64% of jail inmates” (BJS, 2006). Using the risk-needsreceptivity model, the most effective treatment for such inmates is therapy rather than mere
incarceration. According to Robert Byron,
Forensic hospitals…which hold and treat offenders found not guilty by reason of
insanity, have a very high success rate in preventing disordered individuals from
returning to crime. In an analysis of date from California, New York, and Oregon,
Victoria Harris, a forensic psychiatrist at the University of Washington, reported in 2000
that people at these institutions reoffended at a ‘much lower’ rate than untreated mentally
ill offenders. Psychiatrist Jeremy Coid and his colleagues at St Bartholomew’s Hospital
in London found in 2007 that forensic patients in the U.K. were 60 percent less likely to
reoffend than released inmates and 80 percent less likely to turn to violence. (2014, 20)
Byron states, “Most of these mentally ill inmates are not treated for their conditions in prison”
and “more than 350,000 disordered offenders return untreated to society” (2014, 21). Our current
backward-looking, desert-based, retributivist model of punishment offers no challenge to this
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status quo, wherein psychologically disordered criminals do not receive the therapy they need, to
the detriment of society.
In our current system, only those who receive a verdict of “not-guilty by reason of
insanity” receive intensive psychiatric therapy. Yet despite the vast number of prisoners with
psychological disorders, “a small fraction of 1 percent of all criminal defendants are acquitted by
reason of insanity” (Byron, 21). To make an insanity plea, “the legal defense must demonstrate
that the offender had no control over his or her actions or did not comprehend the present reality
of the deed done” (Byron, 21). Given free will skepticism, no criminal had the control requisite
for moral responsibility over her actions, but the level of comprehension and the degree to which
a mental disorder caused the criminal action varies. Thus, an alternative way to handle criminals
is to first assess whether or not each one has a mental disorder, establish the degree to which the
disorder impairs reasoning, and treat according to the findings. This alternative model would
allow a far greater number of criminals to receive help in mental health facilities better equipped
to handle the specific needs of individual criminals. Again, tailoring the treatment to the criminal
is better for everyone involved.
The strongest objection to using therapy rather than incarceration is the financial cost.
Byron concedes that, “the cost to society of treating mentally ill criminals is hard for some
people to swallow. If offenders, disordered or not, are morally responsible for their offenses, why
not just keep them in prisons? It is so much cheaper” (2014, 22-23). While not explicitly a free
will skeptic, Byron argues that we must change our perspective of mentally ill prisoners to
account for the fact that “circumstances and experiences, rather than innate character flaws, give
rise to symptoms” (2014, 23). Again, using Pereboom’s sickness analogy, if we viewed criminals
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with mental disorders as sick rather than as guilty, the cost would be morally justified. Also,
factoring in the financial benefit of reducing recidivism, the cost is justified as well.
Mindfulness meditation and therapy are merely two examples of treatment alternatives
compatible with free will skepticism, and the researchers recognize that not all prisoners will
benefit or respond favorably to either one of the options. As discussed in RNR model, the
treatment must fit the needs, capabilities, and character of the criminal, and “interventions must
be delivered in ways that match offenders’ receptivity and skill level” (2012, 194). The above
studies show that there are viable ways to treat prisoners by addressing certain causal factors
leading to crimes (e.g., emotional instability or psychological disorders), and that these methods
are compatible with justice, morality, and free will skepticism.
If effective rehabilitative methods exist, then society has a moral obligation to
incorporate them into the justice system. Morality dictates that we treat people fairly according
to what they are due. If people do not have the type of control over their actions requisite for
moral responsibility, then to treat them as though they do is unjust and unfair. Thus, accepting
free will skepticism implies that we have a moral obligation to address the causal factors leading
to crime and immoral behavior. The rehabilitative methods and risk assessment techniques
discussed above focus on such factors; our current system of justice and punishment does not. If
we could encourage a substantial number of criminals to become law-abiding, socially integrated
members of society merely by changing our perspective and treatment of them, then it would
have a profoundly beneficial effect on humanity on both a societal and an individual level.
Licensing Parents
As discussed in the previous section, crime is not a symptom of broken individuals, but
rather of broken institutions. While biological and psychological factors may also contribute to
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criminal behavior, one social institution stands out as the most direct causal determinant of the
future health and well-being of children: parenthood. I have argued that criminals are not morally
responsible for their crimes due to the causal determinacy of their history and environment, and
parenting, more specifically, incompetent parenting, plays a fundamental and crucial role in
creating both the history and environment leading to criminal behavior. Thus, if we want to
prevent crime, we need to pay serious attention to who is raising our society’s children.
The effects of incompetent parenting are well documented. Jack Westman underscores
the primacy of parenting as a causal determinant, stating:
Competent parenting can override the adverse effects of brain damage, birth trauma,
malnutrition, and poverty. Conversely, the incompetent parenting of vulnerable and even
well-endowed children can produce adults who are ill-equipped for success in our society
and who are prone to antisocial behavior and to dependency on others to restrain or to
care for them. (1994, 50)
The link between crime and social instability is easily identifiable. In their respective books,
Westman and Michael McFall provide evidence for a strong link between child maltreatment and
crime. McFall states,
It is within the small subset of children who are maltreated that the greatest threat to
political stability exists. For example, over 80 percent of incarcerated criminals were
abused by their parents when they were children, 66 percent of institutionalized
delinquents had child neglect and abuse histories, and one–half of maltreated children
died at an early age, became alcoholic or mentally ill, or have been convicted of a serious
crime. (2009, 51)
Only through the enforcement of standards of parental competence and the cultivation of a
culture of intolerance for incompetent parenting, can society recognize and take responsibility
for the causal role parenting plays in the future character and behavior of children and in the
stability of society. Therefore, in the context of free will skepticism, I support Jack Westman,
Hugh LaFollette, and Michael McFall’s defense of parental licensing.
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According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in 2012, “there were a
nationally estimated 686,000 victims of abuse and neglect, resulting in a rate of 9.2 victims per
1,000 children in the population” (Child Maltreatment 2012, 19). These statistics reflect only
those cases that were reported, investigated, and confirmed. While parental incompetency exists
on a subjective scale, those who abuse and neglect their children are obvious examples of cases
where government intervention is warranted. However, proponents of parental licensing argue
that intervention after the fact is not enough; we should, if possible, institute a program of
prevention to make sure incompetent adults, those who would abuse and neglect children, do not
become parents in the first place.
Of course, some abused or neglected children grow up to be virtuous and productive
adults. Success stories of so-called “invulnerable” children appear to challenge both free will
skepticism and Westman’s argument about the primacy of parenting as a causal determinant of
crime. The fact that certain individuals are able to overcome dire and abusive childhood
circumstances seems to suggest that some people are able to act outside the stream of causal
determination thereby justifying blaming the individual. Westman responds by explaining that:
The invulnerable children who weather child abuse, poverty, and family crises have had
constitutional adaptability and competent parent figures. The idealized images of these
invulnerable children who surmount adversity and fulfill the American Dream and the
fact that children are remarkably adaptable should not distract us from facing the
generally devastating effects of incompetent parenting. (1994, 54-55)
A free will skeptic could echo Westman’s reply that children who are able to prevail over
childhood adversity are able to do so because of either countervailing external influences or
internal constitution, neither of which is under their control. The sad fact is, too many abused and
neglected children do not overcome damaging causal influences, and even those who do should
not have had to face that devastating challenge in the first place.
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Arguments for Parental Licensing
According to Peter Singer’s “greater moral evil”17 principle: “if it is in our power to
prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally
significant, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer, 614). If we, as a society, could prevent many of
the crimes that take place in the United States, we should. If many of the crimes that take place
in the United States are efficiently caused by incompetent parenting, and if we could do
something that would eliminate, or at least minimize, the number of incompetent parents, then
we should. Potential parents who were deemed incompetent and denied licenses would argue that
they had to sacrifice something morally significant—being a parent—therefore, they would say,
the program is not morally justified. However, the harm to children and to society as a result of
child abuse and neglect far outweighs the harm to potential parents who are denied licenses due
to incompetence. Likewise, the harm to such children outweighs the benefits of allowing
incompetent potential parents to raise children. Furthermore, the benefits to children and to
society as a result of denying parenting licenses to incompetent potential parents outweigh both
the benefits of allowing incompetent potential parents to raise children and the harms to potential
parents who are denied licenses due to incompetence. Incompetent parents would be sacrificing
the opportunity to abuse and neglect children. That is indeed morally significant, but not in the
favor of incompetent parents.
Westman’s defense of parental licensing is based on four reasons:
The first reason is the human rights principle that all individuals, including children,
should be free from abuse and oppression…The second reason is the civil-rights principle
that all individuals should have access to opportunities to develop their potentials in
life….The third reason is the common good principle in which society has a right to
regulate activities that are potentially harmful to others and to society….The fourth
reason is the humanistic principle that the future success of children as citizens and as
17

I am borrowing the name of Singer’s principle from John Arthur, who used it in his article, “Famine Relief and
the Ideal Moral Code” (2007, 624).
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parents depends upon forming affectionate attachment bonds with their own parents.
(1994, 245-246).
These reasons are complemented by the belief that society has a duty to protect its citizens from
harm, and the understanding that society has a right to interfere with the liberty of citizens who
perpetrate harm on others. According to Westman, society has the right to intervene on behalf of
children through the doctrine of parens patriae, which “justifies state intervention on parental
authority. Under this doctrine the state can assume the ultimate power of terminating parental
rights” (1994, 153). Parens patriae gives the state the right to intervene in the family and, if
necessary, remove children from abusive or negligent situations. Unfortunately, in many cases,
by the time the state intervenes, the child has already suffered irrevocable damage. Westman
reasons that if the state has the authority and power to ensure the safety and welfare of children,
then it would be better to exercise that authority before the child has been damaged, and that
“most importantly, expecting parental competence is far less costly than public interventions
after children have been damaged by incompetent parenting” (1994, 222).
Westman argues that along with prohibiting incompetent parents from raising children,
such a program “would provide an opportunity to inform parents of available parenting
resources. In addition, becoming licensed parents would provide a basis for eligibility for
governmental financial aid and supportive services to insure that public funding supports
competent and not incompetent parenting” (1994, 219). Thus, a licensing program for parents
would do more than merely deprive incompetent parents from raising children: it would provide
future parents with financial, educational, and social resources to help with the challenges
inherent in parenthood.
Like Westman, Michael McFall also focuses on incompetent parenting as a significant
cause of crime reporting:
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It is within the small subset of children who are maltreated that the greatest threat to
political stability exists. For example, over 80 percent of incarcerated criminals were
abused by their parents when they were children, 66 percent of institutionalized
delinquents had child neglect and abuse histories, and one–half of maltreated children
died at an early age, became alcoholic or mentally ill, or have been convicted of a serious
crime (2009, 51)
McFall defends parental licensing within the context of the ideal of producing a “stable, wellordered society,” defined as a society of just people. Supporting a Rawlsian theory of justice,
McFall argues that to achieve an ideal society, we must have a society full of “individuals with a
sense of justice” (ISJs) (2009, 3). According to McFall, to have ISJs, children need to be taught
appreciation and respect for the inherent worth of others. He echoes the Kantian view that all
human beings, even murderers, are worthy of respect by virtue of their inherent worth (2009,
23). He argues that unconditional parental love is essential to children developing an enduring
self-respect. Self-respect in turn is essential to becoming an ISJ, and ISJ’s are essential to
creating a stable, well-ordered society. Therefore, according to McFall, unconditional parental
love is essential to creating his ideal society (2009, 28, 32).
While necessary, love by itself is not sufficient for creating ISJs; an incompetent parent
may love her children, but still not be able to refrain from abusing or neglecting her children for
other reasons (e.g., substance abuse, psychological disorder). Therefore, McFall claims that the
“key” for raising children to be ISJs is proper nurturance, for “maltreatment often precludes
children from developing the self-respect and trust requisite for social cooperation, and it
increases the chances that children will eventually threaten political stability” (2009, 41). A
parental licensing program would, ideally, ensure that all (or most) children born in that society
would enjoy the kind of loving and nurturing familial environment essential to becoming socially
competent adults.
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Hugh LaFollette gives three theoretical reasons for licensing parents based on the reasons
justifying professional licensing programs: 1) parenting is an activity that can be significantly
harmful; 2) parenting can only be practiced safely by competent people; and 3) the benefits of
parental licensing outweigh the objections to it (2010, 328). He defends the first condition by
appealing to the “special relationship” between parent and child and to the vulnerability of the
child to the parent (2010, 329). He points to the fact that we require doctors to be licensed
precisely because of the special relationship they have to their patients and because of the
vulnerability patients have to their doctors. Unqualified and incompetent doctors could inflict
immeasurable harm on trusting patients; therefore, a licensing system for physicians is justified
and is generally supported by the public. Parents may also harm their children precisely because
of their special relationship to the child and the child’s vulnerability. Therefore, it seems that a
licensing program is also justified for the institution of parenthood.
LaFollette’s second condition emphasizes the need for competence in both the
professions and in parenthood. Discussing professionals, he states, “These professionals can
perform their tasks efficiently and safely only if they have the relevant knowledge, abilities,
judgment, and dispositions” (2010, 329). Since each profession has a specific skill set and
requires a specific disposition and character, licensing ensures that those in practice are qualified
and competent to perform the duties specific to that profession. Likewise, a parent must know
the basic requirements (e.g., diet needs) for raising healthy children. They must also be able to
meet the physical demands of raising children (or be able to provide for such demands if the
parent is handicapped or otherwise unable to do so). Parents should have the rational capacity to
exercise sound judgment when making decisions on a child’s behalf, and they must have a
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disposition amenable to handling the challenges inherent in raising children (e.g., the mental
fortitude to refrain from viciously beating unruly or obstinate children).
Most professionals must go through extensive training to gain competency in their field,
and they are tested on their capacity to perform their duties. LaFollette argues that such training
and testing is not only limited to professionals; for example, potential drivers in the U.S. must
prove their competency by passing a basic exam before being granted a driver’s license. A
parental licensing procedure would include a similar exam to gauge the level of the competence
of potential parents. Similar to driver’s education, parental education classes could be offered to
prepare potential parents for the challenges they could expect as parents. McFall advocates for
additional licensing requirements, including background checks, psychological tests, observed
interactions with children (if the applicant already has children), and a minimum age requirement
of 18 (2009, 121). LaFollette concedes that any licensing program “will not guarantee that [a
professional] never harms her clients. It would, however, make it less likely” (2010, 330).
LaFollette cautions that just as some licensed professionals sometimes fail to uphold the
standards of their profession, some licensed parents might still harm their children; however,
with a licensing program, the number of cases of abuse would still be far fewer than the number
that now obtains without such a program.
Objections to Parental Licensing18
LaFollette’s final justification for a parental licensing program is that the benefits of such
a program must outweigh the objections to it. The first practical concern involves testing for
incompetence (Archard, 2009, 187). The worry is that establishing objective criteria for
competent parenting seems impossible. McFall responds to this objection stating, “Licensing

18

I cover only what I perceive to be the strongest objections to parental licensing. For more thorough coverage, see
Westman, (1994, 251-273) and McFall, (2009, Chapters 7 and 8).
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parents seeks only to forbid the very worst potential parents from parenting; it does not require
that parents be prospectively good or excellent. Most prospective parents will be permitted to
parent, as most prospective drivers are permitted to drive” (2009, 111). Again, the focus would
be on incompetence only, on depriving of a license only to those who would abuse or neglect
their children. He cites two tests already in existence that serve as reliable predictors of whether
or not a person will mistreat her or his children: the Child Abuse Potential (CAP) Inventory and
the Family Stress Checklist. McFall states that in studies, the Family Stress Checklist was 85%
accurate in predicting who would abuse and neglect their children and 89% accurate in
predicting who would not abuse or neglect their children (2009, 119).
However, David Archard questions the reliability and predictive accuracy of such tests
since:
Research into child abuse has failed to yield a single, uniform cause, and has certainly not
managed to produce a clear and distinct psychological picture of the abusing parent.
There are factors, other than individual psychopathology, which are thought to play some
role in the incidence of child abuse. Importantly these include circumstances, such as
social and economic conditions, which cannot be guaranteed to remain as they were at
the time of the licensing review. Someone who is not now a likely abuser may become
one later in worsened conditions. (2004, 188)
McFall concedes that the tests are not perfect. Since they are self-reporting questionnaires, they
are vulnerable to the risk of dishonesty, false negatives, and false positives. LaFollette responds
to this concern stating, “All licensing programs cost money, have false positives and false
negatives, and limit people’s options. However, this does not stop us from licensing physicians,
lawyers, or engineers; we think the benefits of these programs outweigh their costs” (2010, 333).
While false negatives would indeed be damaging, child service institutions now in existence
could be used as a back-up measure to aid children in abusive situations. Furthermore, if a
predictive test had an accuracy rating of over 80%, then the number of children being raised by
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incompetent parents would decrease significantly despite the risk of error. The benefits are still
weighty enough to warrant the risk of a false negative or false positive, especially since no such
standard currently exists to prevent any incompetent parents from raising children.
On the political front, Archard is worried: “Concentration on individual psychology may
lead to neglect of the social preconditions of abuse. A society may be so keen to identify and
debar individual bad parents as to fail to remedy the economic and social causes of child abuse.
An emphasis on licensing would be the expense of improvements in housing, education, health
and childcare” (2010, 188). Indeed, as argued above, the punishment of criminals addresses only
the symptoms of a complex system of problems. Likewise, it seems that parental licensing alone
would not address the myriad social and economic causes of abusive behavior, since
childrearing, like crime, exists within the context of a system of interrelated institutions. If we
address only one institution, little will be resolved in the long run. However, this does not mean
that parental licensing is inherently a bad idea; it merely means that along with a licensing
program, other measures should be taken to safeguard children (e.g., free or affordable childcare,
tax subsidies, child monitors, advocates for at-risk children, paid parental leave).
Many people eschew the idea of parental licensing, due to its invasive nature and
infringement upon personal liberty. According to some, people have an inherent “right” to bear
and raise their biological offspring. McFall lists a number of court cases that ruled in favor of
protecting the privacy and the right of parents to bear and raise children (2009, 160-161).
However, McFall notes that:
[the cases] do not attack my parental licensing plan. For example, I concede that parental
rights are more precious than property rights, the family (not the state or federal
government) should care for and nurture children, and personal choice in family matters
is extremely important and deserves respect. Likewise, individuals have a right to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion; I simply believe that the intrusion of licensing
parents is warranted. Individuals should have a reasonable opportunity to develop close
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relationships with their children, but I believe that some opportunities are
unreasonable…Finally, Parham v. J.R. only attacks an uncharitable caricature of
licensing parents because licensing parents does not require governmental power to
supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children.
Only an extremely few people will be permanently precluded from parenting, and those
who are permitted to parent will have as much liberty to parent as parents currently have.
(2009, 161; italics in original)
Critics of any governmental interference in family affairs seem to view parenting as an inherent
and categorical right. However, our society already operates under the recognition that the right
to parent can be forfeited in certain dire circumstances–namely, in cases where abuse and neglect
have been confirmed. Once it is conceded that parenting is a prima facie, or conditional, right,
the theoretical objection to licensing based on rights loses traction.
Even if critics agree that the right to parent is contingent, some argue that the state would
be justified in intervening only after abuse had occurred; penalizing someone because of what
she might do in the future seems unfair, and in most cases it would be. McFall recognizes that
“the foremost legal objection is that licensing parents employs prior restraint…it prohibits some
actions from taking place due to highly probabilistic harm” (2009, 173). However, McFall
counters that, “licensing parents does not charge people as criminals or punish them. To the
contrary, it is for the benefit of a certain set of citizens, children, who are completely vulnerable,
and no less invasive system yields an outcome that help children akin to how licensing parents
helps them” (2009, 173). He argues further that we employ prior restraint when we require
professionals and adoptive parents to get licensed to protect vulnerable populations. To
emphasize this point, McFall modifies a bridge example used by John Stuart Mill, involving a
man wishing to cross a bridge that “has a 90 percent chance of collapsing and killing those who
walk on it” (2009, 174). If the man were by himself, any restraint would be paternalistic;
however, if the man wished to bring his two young children across the bridge with him, restraint
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seems reasonably justified. Even though the risk is probabilistic rather than certain, McFall
argues that “Certainty no longer matters; the potential for danger gains importance” (2009, 174).
If a test could predict who would or would not most likely abuse or neglect their children with
close to 90% accuracy, then prior restraint based on the results also seems reasonably justified.
LaFollette answers a challenge to using professional licensing as an analogy. The
argument goes that the general public has a vested interest in the competence of professionals
such as doctors, lawyers, and engineers, whereas parenting is a “private matter” (LaFollette,
2010, 333). LaFollette’s answer is that whatever dissimilarities exist between the two are
irrelevant to parental licensing (2010, 333). For example, LaFollette argues that the number of
patients a physician cares for is irrelevant to whether or not she needs a license. Even if a doctor
had only one patient, she would still need a license in order to legally practice medicine due to
the quality of potential harm she could commit and the vulnerability of the patient (2010, 333).
Westman further supports LaFollette’s analogy, arguing that those who take the contrary
view “do not realize how important [children] are to the health, welfare, and security of their
communities and to the society in which we all live…in order to become contributing citizens,
children need dependable relationships with adults who model competent living” (1994, 42).19
Children who grow up to be criminals as a result of abuse and neglect pose a serious and
dangerous threat to individuals, families, and society. Also, not only do criminals not contribute
to society, they are a drain on society’s resources. By reducing the number of criminals, we
obviously reduce the number of crime-related tragedies in our nation, but we would also increase
the number of productive, contributing members of society. Therefore, all citizens have a direct
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Westman provides a more thorough discussion of the relationship between parenting and public welfare in
Chapters 3 and 4 of Licensing Parents.
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interest in how children are being raised; competent parenting is a public interest, thereby
making it a public institution worthy of public regulation.
Daniel Engster has further misgivings about a licensing program for parents, stating,
“These plans would create special burdens on women, expose many children to harm, and
potentially undermine basic liberal freedoms” (2010, 235). He also raises a concern about the
timing of licensing. According to Engster, requiring licenses before pregnancy is unrealistic
since many pregnancies are unplanned. Requiring licenses upon pregnancy is also a problem,
because if a woman fails to meet the criteria for licensing, she may not take the necessary
measures to ensure proper fetal development (2010, 246, 248). Furthermore, Engster argues that
women who do take care of the growing fetus may experience emotional trauma when the baby
is taken away upon delivery. Engster cautions that women who suspect they will fail licensing
tests may hide their pregnancies and not seek medical attention, thereby putting both the woman
and the fetus at risk (2010, 246).
Michael McFall advocates for a possible solution to the timing problem: reversible
sterilization. Engster concedes, “This solution would avoid the timing difficulties described
above, lessen the differential impact of parental licensing on women and virtually eliminate the
possibility that unfit parents might bear children” (2010, 250). However, Engster resorts to a
slippery slope objection to reversible sterilization, stating that some may be denied licenses due
to religious, racial, and ethnic biases (2010, 250). He mentions biases in adoption processes as
evidence that such an objection is not far-fetched. The obvious reply to this objection is that the
potential for bias and discrimination in the administration of a policy does not mean that the
policy itself is inherently flawed. There are biases and instances of discrimination in almost
every bureaucratic system within education, business, and judicial sectors. If unfair practices
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exist in the administration of a policy, then we should focus on ways to remedy those practices
rather than jettisoning the policy. Also, the possibility for injustice in our institutions is the basis
for a system of appeals.
Engster objects to using adoptive parent licensing programs to justify licensing programs
for all parents, based on what he perceives to be relevant differences between the two. He cites
David Archard’s point that adopted children may have been abused and neglected by their
biological parents, and may thus require “a higher standard” when looking for adoptive parents
(2010, 253). Also, he argues that such children become wards of the state when they are removed
from the homes of their biological parents, so the state has a “special responsibility” to ensure
that each child up for adoption is placed in a home with adequate and competent caretakers
(2010, 253). However, the main justification for adoption licenses is the provision of a safe and
loving environment. Every parent should be held to the same high standard of competence,
regardless of their biological relation to their children. Also, every child presents their parents
with challenges and difficulties to varying degrees. Licensing would ensure that those all who
become parents are up to the task of meeting those demands.
Since the responsibility for bearing children falls solely on women, Engster argues that
women would be unequally burdened by licensing obligations (2010, 248). While Engster
focuses solely on the problems of licensing after pregnancy, those who favor reversible
sterilization are subject to this objection as well. Engster’s main objection to reversible
sterilization is that such plans “coercively intervene into innocent people’s bodies in order to
suppress

this

capability,

and

make

reproduction

wholly

dependent

upon

state

authorization…These programs thus represent a violation of individuals’ bodily integrity and
self-ownership rights, and violate the most basic liberal freedoms” (2010, 252). As of now, the
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only reversible sterilization process for men is a vasectomy, and reversal is neither easy nor
guaranteed. Reversible sterilization would therefore fall only on women, and, as Engster argues,
that could be morally problematic.
Birth control might offer an alternative to sterilization; however, enforcing its use, given
our current methods, would also be problematic. The most reliable, long-lasting birth control is
an intrauterine device (IUD), since its effectiveness does not depend on a woman’s daily or
weekly administration. However, because an IUD needs to be inserted inside a woman, forcing it
on those who object would be cruelly invasive, especially at the age required for the effective
prevention of pregnancy – before or around puberty. Also, all IUDs come with the risk, however
rare, of adverse side effects. Until our society develops a safe and effective reversible
sterilization process for both men and women, a practical means of preventing pregnancy until
potential parents are licensed is not available. However, if society made parental licensing a
priority, perhaps more research and funding would be directing to developing such a method.
Alternatives to Licensing Parents
As an alternative to licensing, Engster advocates a “public parenting model,” wherein the
cost of parenting is to be distributed among the citizens of society. His model includes affordable
prenatal care, year-long paid parenting leaves, home care visits from medical and child care
specialists during the child’s first year, affordable child care for children under five, public
subsidies or tax breaks for parents, and flexible scheduling in the labor market (pp. 255-256).
Home care visits by health- and child-care workers would provide the monitoring of parents and
advice for how to deal with the challenges of parenthood.
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Some object to Engster’s economic focus on solving parental incompetence. For
example, Westman argues that views on the correlation between poverty and abuse are
misguided, and that child abuse and neglect cross class lines:
Alcohol and drug abuse, preventable accidents, child abuse and neglect, and a host of
health problems as well as educational deficiencies are plentiful in middle-class and
privileged populations as well as among the disadvantaged. Many affluent parents
provide their children with material things but neglect their character development.
(1994, 8)
Engster understands that abuse and neglect are not caused solely by financial distress, but he
cites a UNICEF report, which shows that “poverty and stress are, in fact, two factors that most
closely and consistently correlate with child abuse and neglect across Western countries” (pp.
256-257). While correlation does not necessarily imply causation, easing the financial burden on
low-income families could be one, but should not be the only, strategy for making sure children
are raised with the resources and opportunities they need.
Engster claims that his alternative would decrease instances of abuse and neglect and
increase gender equality (with paid parental leave for both parents), while not infringing on the
personal liberty of parents as much as a licensing program would. He justifies the cost to society
by explaining that the entire society, including its child-free citizens, would benefit from the
competent rearing of children. However, since Engster’s solution focuses on only economic risk
factors correlated with incompetent parenting, Westman warns, “Attributing criminality solely to
economic disadvantage and to disorderly neighborhoods demeans the poor by implying that they
are inherently irresponsible people. It invites society to see the poor as morally different, socially
distorted human beings” (1994, 60-61). McFall also argues against focusing solely on economic
solutions:
I wish to argue that problems with money and other resources would not be as traumatic
as they are if more ISJs existed. To transition towards a completely well-ordered society,
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we should not focus on goods and resources; we should focus on promoting good
parenting and preventing bad parenting. Goods and resources do not make good parents;
rather, having a sense of justice is a foundation of good parenting. (2009, 54)
According to McFall, although poverty is a problem, it is not the problem; competent parents
would not abuse or neglect their children even if faced with economic challenges. Furthermore,
Engster’s plan would not mitigate the abuse and neglect that are caused by non-economic
factors, such as psychological disorders and substance abuse problems. Finally, Engster’s
assurance that health care and social welfare monitors could ensure the safety of children is
optimistic at best, naïve at worst.
LaFollette offers a more modest alternative to Engster’s: “I propose a limited licensing
scheme. Try it out and see if it works. Depending on what we find, we can jettison it, sustain it,
or expand it” (2010, 338). He proposes that instead of punishing those who do not qualify or who
are unlicensed, we begin with a program that rewards those who are licensed through tax
incentives (2010, 338-339). Basically, LaFollette offers a voluntary, reward-based licensing
program for parents. Unfortunately, those who are most at risk for abusing and neglecting their
children, and those who know they would fail the licensing procedure, would most likely not
apply for the program voluntarily, thus rendering this alternative far less effective than a
mandatory program. However, given our current sterilization technology, a voluntary program
could serve as preliminary means of licensing parents, while research and resources are being
directed at a more effective solution to abuse and neglect.
Conclusion
Westman argues, “If we are ever to solve our nation’s critical social problems, we need a
new way of thinking about children” (1994, 199). Indeed, we do. Free will skepticism provides a
sufficient shift in perspective that justifies the social reforms described above. Society as it
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operates now, with the predominate belief in free will and moral responsibility, fails to meet the
basic criteria for a moral society. A society that accepts free will skepticism would be motivated
to produce the best consequences for all citizens, since the social reforms that it would require
would result in less abuse, neglect, and consequently, less crime. Since such a society would
demand just and moral treatment for all humans and respect for all citizens regardless of age, it
would abide by the moral dictates of Kantian deontology. Finally, such a society would
emphasize and facilitate the development of virtuous characters for all citizens (children and
criminals alike). Given the practical benefits and moral superiority of a society operating under
the ideology of free will skepticism, there seems to be no justification for resistance to our
adopting free will skepticism as the prevailing ideology.
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CONCLUSION
My primary goal in this dissertation was to show why everyone should be a free will
skeptic. To that end, I challenged opposing positions, defended my position against objections,
and argued that the ethical implications of free will skepticism are both practical and
advantageous. Blaise Pascal argued that there are pragmatic reasons for believing in God that
render certainty in the truth of the belief irrelevant. According to Pascal, we stand to gain more
and lose less by betting that God exists than by betting he does not. While I do not endorse
Pascal’s strategy as a reason to believe in a divine, personal creator, I contend that similar
reasoning holds true for belief in free will skepticism: it’s the better bet. While Smilanski and
P.F. Strawson offered pragmatic justifications for the belief in free will, I contend that not only
are their justifications unfounded, but practical considerations actually favor belief in free will
skepticism.
In defense of shifting our attitudes towards human nature, Skinner argues that in
accepting the causal role of environmental influences,
What is being abolished is autonomous man…his abolition is long overdue. Autonomous
man is a device used to explain what we cannot explain in any other way. He has been
constructed from our ignorance, and as our understanding increases, the very stuff of
which he is composed vanishes. Science does not dehumanize man, it de-homunculizes
him, and it must do so if it is to prevent the abolition of the human species. To man qua
man we readily say good riddance. Only by dispossessing him can we turn to the real
causes of human behavior. Only then can we turn from the inferred to the observed, from
the miraculous to the natural, from the inaccessible to the manipulable. (1971, 191)
There is little controversy surrounding the idea that all humans are affected and influenced by
external factors. The free will debate concerns only the degree to which external factors play a
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causal role in agential actions and to what degree control over those actions is compromised. I
propose that even if we did have a modicum of control, enough to grant FMR, the reforms
advocated by free will skepticism would still be a good idea; i.e., even if free will skepticism
were false, we would benefit as a society more if we acted as if it were true. In such a scenario,
the reforms would be pragmatically, rather than theoretically, justified. Thus, even if free will
skepticism were false, I contend that belief in free will skepticism, rather than belief in free will,
would be a necessary illusion.
Of course, I do not believe that free will skepticism is false. The arguments for the
contrary positions fall prey to serious challenges that undermine their tenability, and objections
to free will skepticism can be answered and overcome. All that remains is the task of convincing
the public and those in positions of influence of the viability and importance of changing a long
and deeply held conviction. Free will skepticism needs a marketing campaign. This is no small
feat since free will is taken for granted by many, and abstruse theoretical justifications for free
will skepticism are not accessible to many non-philosophers.
Therefore, I suggest a shift in focus for the future of the debate. More can be said about
the ethical implications and social advantages of accepting free will skepticism. For example, in
chapter four, I discussed only two social reforms, but if free will skepticism were to be taken
seriously, more than punishment and parenthood would be affected. Education, for example,
should take into consideration the specific needs and learning styles of each child to maximize
each child’s potential. This would necessitate the end to “standardized” testing which ignores the
varying academic strengths and needs of students. Relinquishing free will and moral
responsibility need not inspire apprehension and fear; rather, I join the optimistic skeptics, such

156

as Pereboom, in their belief that free will skepticism is the most feasible, practical, and moral of
all the positions in the debate.
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